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This dissertation explores the connection between aesthetic and political representation in three 
prominent German writers’ responses to the French Revolution. Though they present conflicting 
judgments of the Revolution, I argue that Friedrich Schiller, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Georg 
Büchner all use it as an occasion to reflect on the interpenetration of aesthetic and political 
processes. Each configures aesthetic and political principles differently, according to an 
idiosyncratic concept of representation that combines aesthetic, political, historiographic and 
theatrical modes. I consider each writer an aesthetic-political “type” based on how he organizes 
these axes and the forms of representative distance (between representative and represented) they 
involve. This study builds on recent discussions in political philosophy and historiography by 
profiling Schiller, Fichte and Büchner as influential cases of aesthetic-political fusion around 
1800. 
 Chapters one and two read Schiller’s aesthetic writings and history plays as theoretical 
and practical wings of a program to correct the failures of the French Revolution, understood as 
the collapse of representative distance. Schiller constructs a politics around the aesthetic concept 
of beauty in On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795) after rejecting its opposed concept of 
sublimity, which he sees behind revolutionary violence. His “politics of the beautiful” calls for 
gradual political change via social education through artworks that encourage viewers to 





foundation, it situates modern society in the larger developmental arc of humanity. Aesthetic 
education corrects a malformation in internal drives that resulted in the violence of the 
Revolution. I argue Schiller’s “classical” history plays—Wallenstein (1798-99); Maria Stuart 
(1800); Die Jungfrau von Orleans (1801)—attempt to implement this program. This systematic 
interpretation of Schiller’s late oeuvre is new in critical literature. 
 Chapter three argues that Fichte’s defense of the Revolution in his treatise Contribution 
to Correcting the Public’s Judgment of the French Revolution (1793) is based on an aesthetic—
and specifically sublime—understanding of politics. The connection between aesthetic theory 
and Fichte’s political thought is absent in current scholarship. I argue Fichte’s “sublime politics” 
conceives of violent upheaval as an opportunity for moral transcendence. Fichte denies that 
humans are historically determined and advocates the French Revolution as an unprecedented 
break with the past. This break must be absolute: to realize their moral potential, Fichte insists 
people reject all embeddedness in the political past, all pleasures they currently enjoy, and any 
forms of representational distance that prevent them from experiencing the immediacy of 
revolutionary virtue.  
 Chapter four details Büchner’s critique of idealism as it appears in both Schiller and 
Fichte. In his pamphlet The Hessian Courier (1834) and drama Danton’s Death (1835), Büchner 
rejects the notion that the French Revolution must be signified or interpreted, instead exploring 
the Revolution’s rhetorical character and addressing its practical and discursive consequences for 
subsequent European politics. His innovative practice of literary citation in Danton’s Death 
represents history without overly conceptualizing it. Similarly, Büchner does not idealize “the 
people” in the manner of Schiller, Fichte and antecedent political thought, but focuses on the 





the polity as a “concrete multiplicity” contributes to ongoing debates regarding the status of 
Büchner’s materialism. Likewise, the dissertation clarifies Schiller and Fichte’s positions as 










“Aesthetics and politics,” a conjunction now very familiar in academic discourse, has its origins 
around the time of the French Revolution. Such at least is the claim of Nikolas Kompridis in his 
recent edited volume The Aesthetic Turn in Political Thought (2014). In describing the near 
ubiquity of aesthetics in contemporary political theory, Kompridis allows he is charting less a 
“turn” than a return to the late eighteenth century, “when one could already speak of an aesthetic 
turn in political thought,” and the two categories first became “overtly implicated and entangled 
with each other” (xv). This study is part of that return.  
Like any area of sustained scholarly attention, aesthetics and politics has gravitated 
toward certain central figures. As concerns its beginnings in revolutionary Europe, Edmund 
Burke and Immanuel Kant loom largest of all: Burke, of course, decried the French Revolution 
as an aestheticized orgy of violence, “bloody theater”1; and Kant, though not as explicit as Burke 
in using aesthetic categories to frame events in France, nonetheless developed a philosophical-
historical interpretation of the Revolution drawing heavily on his conception of aesthetic 
judgment in Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790). Kant’s position on the Revolution and its relationship 
to aesthetics found its most famous votary in Hannah Arendt, whose Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy (1982) attempts to integrate Kant’s concept of judgment into an overall theory of 
politics. A glance inside Kompridis’ Aesthetic Turn confirms how enormous an influence Arendt 
																																																						
1 Burke quoted in Jason Frank, “Delightful Horror: Edmund Burke and the aesthetics of democratic revolution,” in 





and her reading of Kant continue to have. In fact, to the extent that contemporary discourse on 
aesthetics and politics draws on figures from German-speaking Europe, Kant and Arendt (or 
Kant via Arendt) tend to dominate. That trajectory is an important one, to be sure, but it is only 
one: German thought and literature, especially around 1800, is rich in unexplored (or 
misapprehended) territory for thinking through the connection of aesthetics and politics. My 
contribution on this count is to offer alternative readings of works by Friedrich Schiller, Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte, and Georg Büchner, figures that, if approached in the right light, can deepen and 
enhance contemporary discussions of aesthetics and politics. Or so I hope to show. 
 I begin with Schiller and Fichte, contemporaries who respond directly to the French 
Revolution and are writing as it unfolds. Schiller’s aesthetic-political work, though famous and 
widely discussed since the 1790s, has fallen largely into cliché. The familiar reproach of escapist 
aestheticism has dogged Schiller’s revolutionary writing—especially Über die ästhetische 
Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen (1795; hereafter Ästhetische Erziehung) and 
the late history plays—at least since Lukács.2 In this portrayal, Schiller’s sensitive idealism, 
though initially stoked by the French Revolution, is so grievously injured by the Reign of Terror 
(1793-94) that Schiller constructs an alternative vision of politics governed by aesthetic 
principles—it is “aesthetic education” versus political reality. Everything he writes after 1795 is 
part of that contentedly disengaged world of Erziehung, or so the story goes. Fichte, for his part, 
is conspicuously the only major German Idealist philosopher not to devote a treatise to 
aesthetics, and his theoretical enterprise has steadily developed a reputation as anti-aesthetic, as 
																																																						
2 The relevant text is Lukács’s “Zur Ästhetik Schillers” (1954). Lesley Sharpe: “After an early period of 
revolutionary fervor, Schiller, in Lukács’s view, turned away in horror from the degeneration into barbarism he saw 
in Revolutionary France. His solution in the Ästhetische Briefe is the construction of a utopia, which in theory makes 
revolution superfluous, yet one to which Schiller is unable to give stable conceptual shape because of his inadequate 
grasp of the economic conditions determining his world.” Schiller’s Aesthetic Essays: Two Centuries of Criticism 





though the integrity of his system precludes it.3 Though Fichte published political works, these 
are generally considered minor in his oeuvre, and when it comes to discussion of aesthetics and 
politics, his name is nowhere in sight. 
 My goal here is twofold: (1) to argue Schiller’s aesthetic politics need to be re-appraised; 
(2) to argue Fichte has an aesthetic politics. In both cases, the French Revolution is the empirical 
impetus, the catalytic agent driving the respective fusions of aesthetic and political theory. 
Similarly, 40 years later, the second French Revolution—the so-called July Revolution of 
1830—is an occasion for young playwright Georg Büchner’s proletarian call-to-arms in his 1834 
pamphlet Der hessische Landbote. The next year he writes Dantons Tod, the first major history 
play treating the revolutionary Terror. The two texts together comprise an aesthetic politics that, 
though distinct in important ways from the analytical systems developed by Schiller and Fichte, 
nonetheless places 1789—and its shadow in 1793—at the center. In their aesthetic-political 
responses to the French Revolution, I argue there is a tendency uniting Schiller, Fichte and 
Büchner: they judge the Revolution from the standpoint of an idiosyncratic, multifaceted concept 
of representation. Each figure’s assessment of the Revolution—whether favorable, critical or 
otherwise—is inseparable from a representative model that includes aesthetic, political, 
historiographic and theatrical understandings of what it means to represent.   
 I describe this idea in more conceptual detail in the next section. For the moment I want 
to reinforce the basic elements of what I am proposing. First, Schiller, Fichte and Büchner judge 
the French Revolution, by which I mean they produce texts that variously evaluate, process, 
condemn, justify, contextualize, and otherwise respond to it. But these are unconventional 
																																																						
3 See Paul Gordon, Art as the Absolute: Art’s Relation to Metaphysics in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and 






judgments. Schiller, Fichte and Büchner do not simply state their opinions on the Revolution as 
private citizens; nor do they call upon established intellectual traditions or conventions to defend 
their positions. Instead, each figure’s judgment of the Revolution emerges and is inseparable 
from a specific and (for the time) unusual concept of representation. Where this term is usually 
understood differentially in terms of disciplinary context—e.g. political or artistic 
representation—Schiller, Fichte and Büchner combine various discourses in which representation 
is an important category. This project focuses on four of these fields: politics, aesthetics, 
historiography and theater. It is easy to picture what representation means in each of these areas 
respectively, but the “representative judgments” I profile engage them all. 
 The remainder of this introduction is divided into four sections. The first discusses the 
significance of the French Revolution for both the history and theory of modern politics. In order 
to indicate the breadth of the Revolution’s impact on contemporary discourse, I touch briefly on 
several thinkers: Pierre Rosanvallon, Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, François Furet, Claude Lefort, 
Frank Ankersmit and Jacques Rancière. The second section focuses on the concept of 
representative judgment I just introduced, tracing the overall form it takes in Schiller, Fichte and 
Büchner back to Kant’s analysis of the French Revolution. The third section introduces the role 
of theater, both as a venue for representing political history and a tool for enacting a political 
program in the present. Of special interest here are the historical dramas composed by Schiller 
and Büchner, the project’s two playwrights. I conclude with a section that positions the 
dissertation in a larger intellectual-historical context: I introduce the category “aesthetic-political 
idealism” to describe Schiller and Fichte, who are conventionally understood simply as 
“idealists,” and highlight the ways Büchner’s work combats not just textbook philosophical and 





Modern Politics and the French Revolution 
 
The French Revolution makes unavoidable the idea—and challenge—that politics should be 
representative. Pierre Rosanvallon, a contemporary political theorist and historian at the Collège 
de France, frames the issue this way: once the notion that politicians should represent the will of 
the people is accepted as a premise of government, it becomes urgent to figure out how that 
representation will work, at which point the conceptual tangle of political representation emerges 
in its full opacity—“paradoxically, it is when representative governments are put into place that 
the meaning of representation is obscured.”4 According to Rosanvallon, the French Revolution 
introduces the full scope of this problematic into modern political history, and we have debated 
its vagaries for over 200 years, largely because they are still current. The pretense of democracy 
and popular representation structures most present-day governments, and the attendant 
(conceptual, to say nothing of practical) difficulties are ubiquitous. 
 One overarching problem is whether democracy and representative government really 
amount to the same thing. This involves the distinction between representative and direct models 
of democracy: should government stand for and steward the popular will, or incarnate this will 
and serve as its living enactment? Direct democracy removes the mediating element of 
representation integral to the other paradigm, and one point of value in continuing to study the 
French Revolution is that both models are on display in the same event: from 1789 to early 1793, 
the nascent French Republic was framed as a representative democracy, while under the Jacobin 
government (1793-1794), “representation” was high among the political evils understood to 
manipulate and deceive the will of the people. The Jacobins were the first modern government to 
take the premise of “popular” sovereignty literally, insofar as they rejected as dilutions of the 
																																																						
4 Pierre Rosanvallon, “Revolutionary Democracy,” Democracy Past and Future, ed. Samuel Moyn (New York: 





popular will those representative bodies—the Constituent Assembly, Legislative Assembly, and 
National Convention—advanced between 1789 and 1792 as organs of the sovereign French 
nation. Of course, popular sovereignty is hardly a detailed blueprint for governance, and rather 
than “the people” making decisions under the Jacobins, political representation was replaced 
with a series of centralizing equivalences that ultimately placed power, not with the French 
citizens, but the Jacobins themselves.5 
But the contrast between representative and Jacobin phases of the Revolution goes far 
beyond a simply empirical or period interest: it has become emblematic, almost metonymic in 
contemporary theoretical disputes. Of particular concern here is the debate, internal to the left, 
between what we could call “moderate” and “radical” approaches to political change. 
Robespierre and the Jacobins have come to represent a given strain of radical political thought 
advanced by leftist philosophers like Slavoj Žižek—who contributes a hagiographic introduction 
to the 2007 English edition of Robespierre’s collected speeches6—and Alain Badiou, who 
praises the “great patriots” of Jacobinism as paragons of whatever-it-takes commitment to 
political principle.7 The common enemy for Žižek and Badiou is historian François Furet, whose 
1989 edited Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution remains a pillar of historiography on 
the Revolution. For Furet, not only is the Jacobin period a stain on modern political history, it 
may also call into question the legitimacy of the Revolution itself, even the very idea of 
																																																						
5 Patrice Gueniffey: “The people, it was assumed, now wanted what the Convention wanted, and the Convention 
wanted what Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety dictated.  Between the autumn of 1793 and the spring 
of 1794 Robespierre left his stamp on the unfinished process of restoring the state: the Convention was muzzled, the 
organization of the popular movement was dismantled, the clubs were transformed into cogs in the bureaucratic 
machinery, and local autonomy was destroyed.  All that had originated at the base and periphery was transferred to 
the summit and center.” “Robespierre,” Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution (Harvard University Press, 
1989), 307. 
6 The marquee-like full title of the book is Slavoj Zizek presents Robespierre: Virtue and Terror, trans. John Howe 
(Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2007). 





democracy.8 Though he is not quite a conservative—meaning he does not prima facie reject the 
Revolution—Furet has come to embody what Žižek calls “1789 without 1793,” a position that 
defends the Revolution’s stated principles but decries the violent means “needed to really defend 
and assert” those principles, a “decaffeinated revolution.”9  
In advancing general arguments about democracy and political change, Žižek, Badiou 
and Furet not only return to the French Revolution, they select particular phases of it as decisive 
illustrations of their claims. Within this specific dispute between moderate and radical 
paradigms, the Reign of Terror emerges as a dispositive element, almost an ideological cipher: 
you are radical if, like Žižek and Badiou, you defend the Terror as a courageous and necessary 
means of securing revolutionary democracy, no matter the collateral cost; you are moderate if 
you condemn it—and maybe any sort of political violence—outright as a perversion, as Furet 
does. 
This is a general and imperfect distinction; its function here is mostly heuristic: the 
relationship between 1789 and 1793 is just as significant for Schiller, Fichte and Büchner as it is 
for Žižek, Badiou and Furet, and in many of the same ways. It involves one’s position on the 
ideological spectrum of the left. Schiller, Fichte and Büchner all fall on this spectrum, so it is no 
surprise that each of them, in his own way, applauds the events of 1789. But 1793 introduces the 
differences: Schiller repudiates the Revolution and regards it as a missed opportunity; Fichte, 
conversely, finds himself more enthusiastic, and publishes the pro-revolutionary treatise Beitrag 
zur Berichtigung der Utreile des Publicums über die französische Revolution (1793; hereafter 
Beitrag). For our purposes, the basic difference between Schiller and Fichte on the French 
Revolution is their respective attitudes to the events of 1793: Schiller rejects and Fichte affirms 
																																																						
8 See François Furet, “Terror,” Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, 145-50. 





them. By the time Büchner is writing in the 1830s, the French Revolution is literally history, and 
no longer a matter of a simple affirmative or negative response. Thus the equivocation and 
density of Dantons Tod, which stages the dynamic of 1793 coming to terms with 1789 as the 
Jacobins debate the fate of the moderate, but nonetheless revolutionary Girondins.  
By the rubric I am proposing, Schiller is a moderate, Fichte a radical. Büchner is a radical 
as well, though in a different way than Fichte, whose position is that of a spectator affirming 
events others consider extreme. For one, Büchner is an actual political organizer and operative—
Der hessische Landbote is a pamphlet meant to galvanize a popular movement, not simply a 
theoretical statement of principles—and we will return to this difference. For the moment, it is 
important to say a few more words about the revolutionary events of 1793, which saw not only 
the deposition of the moderate Girondins (May 31-June 2) and the onset of the Terror later in the 
year, but also, on January 21, the execution for high treason of King Louis XVI. For political 
philosopher Claude Lefort, this is effectively the beginning of modern politics: the three 
dominant political forms of the past two centuries—democracy, totalitarianism, and bureaucracy, 
according to Lefort—share a common root in the French regicide. Lefort locates this effect in the 
symbolic function of the king’s body, which, prior to 1793, kept intact an image of society as an 
integrated corpus. This is the formula framing public life before the Revolution: “the society of 
the ancien régime represented its unity to itself as that of a body—a body which found its 
figuration in the body of the king, or rather which identified itself with the king’s body, while at 
the same time it attached itself to it as its head.”10 In this symbolic arrangement, the individual 
bodies of the citizenry “fitted together within a great imaginary body for which the body of the 
king provided the model and the guarantee of its integrity” (Lefort 303). The execution of Louis 
																																																						
10 Claude Lefort, “The Image of the Body in Totalitarianism,” The Political Forms of Modern Society, trans. Alan 





XVI explodes this figural system: the king’s body is no longer available as a symbolic 
representation of social cohesion.  
A widespread “disincorporation” (Lefort’s term) of social units results: individuals, 
groups, areas of discourse and specialization, but most generally, “the disengagement of civil 
society from a state, itself hitherto consubstantial with the body of the king” (Lefort 303). The 
zone of the public, the people, popular society—this can no longer completely coincide with the 
state, the actual apparatus of government. This is the immediate symbolic consequence of 
decapitating the king. Moreover, because he is executed in the name of a democratic 
movement—Lefort calls the execution the moment in which the “democratic revolution, for so 
long subterranean, burst out” (“Image,” 303)—the newly sundered category of “the social” 
makes a claim to replace him as the source of sovereign authority. But because the king (and his 
symbolic, integrating function) is dead, society can no longer be represented as unified, and the 
will of the “popular” sovereign is very difficult to identify. Thus, for Lefort, the elementary 
difficulty of modern democracy: “unity can no longer efface social division. Democracy 
inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be 
said to be sovereign… but whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will 
remain latent” (“Image,” 303-4). 
This is precisely the problem of representation sketched by Rosanvallon: once popular 
society emerges as the locus of sovereign power (in the late 18th century), government must 
determine how to represent it. Crucial to note for both Lefort and Rosanvallon is that there is an 
interminable gap between society and the state: the two can never truly coincide, which is 
another way of saying that the total system of political society is essentially, at some level, 





Revolution, each of which is morphologically distinct based on how it approaches this basic 
social-political division: democracy affirms the distance between state and society as well as the 
constitutive multiplicity of the social; totalitarianism attempts to overcome this multiplicity by 
using the state to impose a vision of social unity; while a sprawling, bureaucratic state strives to 
resemble as much as possible the variegated society it governs, effectively eliminating the 
difference between the two.  
We find a similar typology in the work of political theorist and historian Frank 
Ankersmit, who describes as “chameleonic” the bureaucratic state’s process of becoming “as 
close a copy of society as possible.”11 Bureaucracy, in this conception, is akin to totalitarianism, 
which Ankersmit defines as “the subsumption of state and society under one principle,” in that 
both seek to efface the division between government and the social body. So far very close in his 
categories to Lefort, Ankersmit suggests there is an additional distinction at work here: 
addressing the larger-scale intellectual history, Ankersmit places bureaucracy and totalitarianism 
within the trajectory of “mimetic” political forms extending back to the Stoa. In this context, 
mimesis is a paradigm of representative politics in which the “identity of the representative and 
the person represented” is the “ideal of all political representation” (“Representation,” 54; 
original emphasis). We can see, between Lefort and Ankersmit, how bureaucracy and 
totalitarianism are different ways of attempting to fashion this identity. Both thinkers conclude 
these programs are inevitably doomed and potentially (if not probably) violent. Thus Lefort 
affirms the full, maddening social multiplicity of democracy (against any attempt to unify 
society), while Ankersmit advocates a counter-paradigm to the mimetic theory of political 
representation—he calls it aesthetic. 
																																																						
11 Frank Ankersmit, “Political Representation: The Aesthetic State,” in Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy 





By “aesthetic,” Ankersmit refers to a theory of politics in which “the difference between 
the representative and the person represented… is as unavoidable in political representation as 
the unavoidable difference between a painted portrait and the person portrayed” 
(“Representation,” 54). The impossibility of mimetic identity is the starting point for this 
aesthetic politics, which affirms the constitutive and necessary distance between state and 
society. Significantly for our purposes, Ankersmit writes that aesthetics displaces mimesis as 
“the most authoritative” model of politics around 1800. The core figures in this transition, not 
surprisingly, are French: as Ankersmit describes, Rousseau and Sieyès—two intellectual 
godfathers of the French Revolution—conclude in respective ways that (mimetic) representation 
is unrealizable as a model of politics, thus practically “invit[ing] us to consider alternative 
forms” of representation, i.e. aesthetic (“Representation,” 29). Thus we get another glimpse into 
the “crisis of representation” (Rosanvallon) that occurs around the French Revolution: not only is 
it the point, epochally, in which aesthetics overtakes mimesis as the principal paradigm of 
representative politics, it is also the stage on which these two models collide: the first phase of 
the Revolution closely approximates what Ankersmit calls “aesthetic” politics, while the Terror 
can easily be read as a particularly brutal program of social and political mimesis. 
There is another important consequence to Ankersmit’s “aesthetic” understanding of 
politics. Ankersmit is partial to the metaphor of painting—that the same process or principle is at 
work in politically and pictorially representing a person. Again, aesthetic representation 
paradigmatically affirms the difference between the representative and what is represented—the 
point is to keep them apart. The result, for Ankersmit, is to put emphasis on political “style” and 
encourage innovation in political forms, much in the way artistic movements develop over time. 





transformation. Ankersmit’s position helps us see why Kompridis, for one, can claim 1800 is the 
beginning of “aesthetics and politics” as we know it: obviously the categories have been in 
contact at least since Plato banished artists from the Republic, but only since the time of the 
French Revolution have they really interpenetrated, initially as forms of representation. To put it 
another way, since the French Revolution, aesthetics and politics have displayed homologous 
representational dynamics. 
Talking about aesthetics and politics, today, is different than talking about literature and 
statistics, or chemistry and human rights—they are not simply separate domains that may or may 
not come into contact, but mutually constituting fields of knowledge and practice. Or at least, 
following Ankersmit, they should be, and he is not alone in this position: one highly visible 
philosophical partisan of aesthetic politics is Jacques Rancière, who has been theorizing this 
intersection since the 1990s. Signature Rancièrean concepts like “dissensus” and the 
“distribution of the sensible” all refer to aesthetics and politics, and it should come as no surprise 
that Rancière traces his thought on these questions to the era of the French Revolution, and 
especially Schiller’s Ästhetische Erziehung, which Rancière refers to as the “original scene” of 
modern aesthetics.12 There is a trend here: Lefort, Rosanvallon, Ankersmit, Rancière—like 
Kompridis, all “return” to revolutionary Europe as the constitutive scene of political and 
aesthetic modernity.  
This is only a sketch, but at the very least we can appreciate the ongoing importance of 
the French Revolution: not only is the event itself decisive for modern political history, but 
theoretical debates about how to evaluate and represent it have proved just as determinative for 
																																																						
12 “Aesthetics and politics” as we know it begins, for Rancière, with Schiller’s aesthetic letters. See Jacques 
Rancière, Dissensus, trans. Steven Corcoran (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010), 117. See also Rancière, “Aesthetics as 






modern political self-understanding. The Revolution persists as the original occasion for 
theoretical systems that continue to structure contemporary thought. German philosophy and 
literature are especially rich in this respect, and to appreciate Schiller, Fichte and Büchner in the 
full uniqueness of their individual contributions, it helps to revisit the first great systematic 





I will discuss Kant’s analysis of the French Revolution at some length, for two reasons: first, it is 
an important part of the immediate intellectual context in which Schiller and Fichte are writing, 
and second, it constitutes a prototypical form of what I’ve called “representative judgment.” In 
this sense, Kant’s post-revolutionary works “Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie 
richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis” (1793) and Der Streit der Fakultäten (1798) can help 
introduce the aesthetic-political fusions we find in Schiller, Fichte and Büchner.13 
Kant’s response to the Revolution continues to loom large in debates on political theory 
and democracy, both as an inspiration (i.e. to Arendt and Arendtians) and a foil: in his 
introduction to Badiou’s Metapolitics, Jason Barker calls Kant an emblematic “fraud” for turning 
on the Jacobins after praising 1789.14 Badiou himself makes sustained attacks on Kant (and 
Arendt) throughout that book, a work rich in hymns to Robespierre and Saint-Just and 
denunciations of present-day “political philosophy” and western capitalist “parliamentarism.” 
This should give us a rough sense for how Kant has come to be situated in contemporary 
																																																						
13 For both of these texts I cite from Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 61-92; 176-90. Excerpted in this edition is the “Renewed Question” 
section from Der Streit der Fakultäten, “Erneuerte Frage: ob das menschliche Geschlechte im beständigen 
Fortschreiten zum Besseren sei.” 





discussions: from the radical perspective of Badiou, Žižek, et al., he is “1789 without 1793,” a 
philosophical Furet, “decaffeinated,” an impotent moderate, etc. 
 Much of this critical response involves Kantianism’s absolute prohibition on violence, 
even in resistance,15 but perhaps even more important is Kant’s emphasis on the role of the 
spectator. Kant’s analysis of the Revolution comes from the perspective of an observer, someone 
watching political events unfold and judging (rather than enacting or seeking to further actualize) 
them. It is a political philosophy of the critic, and avowedly so: “We are here concerned only 
with the attitude of the onlookers as it reveals itself in public while the drama of great political 
changes is taking place,” Kant writes in Der Streit der Fakultäten (181; original emphasis). Of 
highest priority, for Kant, is what happens among the spectators as major political events 
transpire—ideally, in the process of sympathetically choosing sides and developing their own 
positions, these remote observers experience a specific kind of elevation: Kant continues in Der 
Streit der Fakultäten,  “Their reaction (because of its universality) proves that mankind as a 
whole shares a certain character in common, and it also proves (because of its disinterestedness) 
that man has a moral character, or at least the makings of one” (181). This twofold realization is 
the stuff of actual political progress: onlookers’ grasping the universality of their humanity as 
well as their own moral powers, no longer identifying as self-interested individuals but as 
morally endowed representatives of a common, human cause. To self-actualize in this way while 
observing great political change is to experience enthusiasm, a crucial concept in Kant’s political 
thought: “true enthusiasm is always directed towards the ideal, particularly towards that which is 
purely moral… and it cannot be coupled with selfish interests” (Streit 183; original emphasis). 
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Politics should aim to induce enthusiasm in the public, and even in 1798, when many have given 
up the French Revolution entirely, Kant still reflects favorably on the political enthusiasm it 
inspired, in which “the external public onlookers sympathized with [the revolutionaries’] 
exaltation, without the slightest intention of actively participating in their affairs” (Streit 183). 
 This formulation is significant, and intentional: central to the concept of enthusiasm is 
non-participation in the actual events one is observing. Enthusiasm is not about political action 
itself but how that action is signified from outside. Kant abstracts from the concrete reality of the 
Revolution—especially after its violent turn and what he regards as the “horrible crime” of the 
king’s execution—and renders it into a symbolic sequence. Andreas Gailus describes the 
sequence: “First, Kant shifts the historical focus from production to reception, from the 
Revolution as a political event to the emotional response it inspires in those that observe it from 
afar. Second, he splits the occurrence of enthusiasm, distinguishing between its actual expression 
as a feeling… and the moral disposition to which this feelings points.”16 In this double move we 
see two forms of representation: first, spectators represent the Revolution in coming up with 
ways to depict and signify it, in the sense that debating anything requires that we represent it to 
ourselves; second, their enthusiastic feeling represents morality insofar as it indicates, stands for, 
manifests that morality—thus Kant famously calls the French Revolution a Geschichtszeichen.  
 The fact that Kant’s signature judgment of the Revolution—that it is materially lost but 
symbolically redeemed—rests on this twin model of representation makes it, in my terms, a 
representative judgment. Kant’s mixed conclusion on the Revolution is inseparable from the 
idiosyncratic representational paradigm underlying his concept of enthusiasm. Also important to 
note is that representation, as Kant presents it here, would be described by a thinker like 
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Ankersmit as both aesthetic and political, both stylistic-constructive (spectators’ reception of the 
Revolution) and a matter of standing for something (feeling and morality). 
 We can see how a political radical would find this position repellant. Kant subordinates 
action to reception, and there is an anti-populist flavor to the way he frames this reception: why 
should the public need moral “elevation” beyond what it already feels? This becomes explicit 
later in Der Streit der Fakultäten, where Kant avows civic progress must proceed “from the top 
downwards,” and leaders “should treat the people in accordance with principles akin in spirit to 
the laws of freedom which a people of mature rational powers would prescribe for itself, even if 
the people is not literally asked for its consent” (188; 187; original emphasis). In other words, 
Kant advocates a kind of enlightened elitism in which political leaders govern according to 
rational principles—i.e. they represent these principles—but do not actually solicit the popular 
will, which, for Kant, enjoys no special, inviolable sanctity. In contrast: the popular will should 
evolve.  
An attentive reader of Kant who shares this idea is Schiller. Like Kant, Schiller believes 
no people is innately entitled to political enfranchisement or control over government. Instead, 
they earn that privilege through “wholeness of character” (Totalität des Charakters), which he 
considers a prerequisite to political liberties (Ästhetische Erziehung 4; 7).17 Schiller ascribes the 
violent turn of the French Revolution to a deficit of precisely this wholeness among the French 
polity, but it is hardly a problem for France alone. It is epochal—Schiller’s aesthetic letters are a 
clarion call against the fragmentation characteristic of modernity itself. He does not consecrate 
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the popular will because this will arises from a fractured state of being. As Marx would say, the 
point is to change it. 
When it comes to the mechanism of this change, Schiller shares Kant’s gradualism—
wholeness of character can only develop over time—but unlike Kant, he does not trust an 
enlightened state to drive it. According to Frederick Beiser, fearing inevitable corruption at the 
“top,” Schiller argues reform has to “come from below, and more specifically from enlightened 
individuals taking responsibility for the education of the people.”18 Beiser considers Schiller 
quintessentially “republican” because of this “fundamental principle” that “civil freedom must 
derive from moral character”—in effect, that “the character of the people themselves has to be 
reformed” before tangible political progress is possible (SP 124). Kant is republican in this sense 
as well, but while both he and Schiller agree the character of the people must evolve, they 
imagine diametrically opposed processes for bringing that about: Kant advocates enlightened 
governance by politicians who listen to public opinion but do not grant the public any power to 
actually make law, while Schiller develops a bottom-up program of civic education—by artists.19 
Artworks shaping the popular character, fortifying it to responsibly wield political liberty 
in the future—this is the basic idea of aesthetic education. Again, as thinkers like Beiser have 
pointed out, this is a republican program—i.e. it ties outward political freedoms to the moral 
psychology of a people—but Schiller’s emphasis on aesthetics is totally new to this tradition.20 
In essence, Schiller (like Kant) is proposing a theory of reception: rather than simply morally 
self-educate, citizens should consume aesthetic representations, especially plays (we’ll see why 
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19 Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 129: “On a practical level, [aesthetic education] puts an enormous burden on the 
artists who would execute it. For they not only have to maintain their integrity throughout the corruptions of the age, 
but they also have to influence the public… all this without the aid of the government.”  





in the next section)—in developing a real “delight in semblance… a propensity to ornamentation 
and play” (“Freude am Schein, die Neigung zum Putz und zum Spiele”), they come closer to 
human completeness (ÄE 26; 3). Schein and Spiel are the crucial terms here: aesthetic semblance 
(“ästhetischer Schein”) is the general property inhering in all artworks that serve as vehicles of 
aesthetic education; play (Spiel) is the psychological mechanism of that education, a unifying 
agent that re-integrates components of human cognition and experience alienated from each 
other by modern existence. For Schiller, we are only at the point of Totalität des Charakters 
when that character is imbued with Spiel: in one of his famous chiastic statements, Schiller 
declares “man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is 
only fully a human being when he plays” (“der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des 
Worts Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt”) (ÄE 15; 9).  
Spiel is something only aesthetic experience provides, and we feel it most powerfully in 
the theater. This is why I call aesthetic education a model of reception analogous to Kant’s 
notion of enthusiasm: in the latter case, spectators witness a political event and experience moral 
elevation; for Schiller, an audience likewise witnesses an aesthetic production—as we’ll see, of 
political events—and experiences Spiel, which strengthens its members’ internal wholeness. 
Schiller’s Totalität is different than Kantian morality, but their models are structurally nearly the 
same. If anything, aesthetic education is more representational in nature than Kantian 
enthusiasm: whereas Kant calls for the self-presentation (in debates and discussions) of a 
political event as it transpires, Schiller’s program demands exactly this kind of presentation of 
something that is itself already an (artistic) representation, e.g. a history play. But this threatens 
to get too detailed for introductory purposes—chapters one and two take us through the genesis 





enough to say that Schiller’s judgment of the French Revolution—that it is a colossal missed 
opportunity and its violence is degenerate (more or less “1789 without 1793”)—is inseparable 
from (1) a concept of aesthetic representation in which aesthetic images educate and prepare the 
public for real political freedoms; and (2) a republicanism which amounts, in essence, to 
Schiller’s insistence on some representative distance between political leaders and the people.21 
Later we will see how he integrates these principles into a dramatigurical program of 
representing political theory. The convergence of these separate representational dynamics in 
Schiller’s rejection of the French Revolution make it what I call a representative judgment. 
Fichte’s response to the French Revolution involves the same educational pretense we 
find in Kant and Schiller, i.e. that the people needs to undergo some instruction before it can be 
part of a free, modern state.22 In the preface to his Beitrag defending the Revolution, Fichte 
refers to this as instruction in the “duties, rights and prospects of humanity” (“Die Lehre von den 
Pflichten, Rechten und Aussichten des Menschen”) and claims the Revolution is a unique 
opportunity to disseminate these principles through the social body.23 This is the second major 
commonality between Kant, Schiller and Fichte: each addresses the French Revolution as a 
symbol, an occasion—in each respective analytical system, the event of the Revolution always 
ramifies in terms of some other, higher priority. The chief work of the Revolution is to signify: 
for Kant, civilizational progress; for Schiller, the immaturity of modern humanity; and for his 
part, Fichte likens it to a “painting” (“Gemälde”) set over the “text” of human rights and human 
																																																						
21 Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 125: “While never a champion of radical democracy, [Schiller] was still an 
admirer of the classical republics and their ideal of community. Like Montesquieu and Ferguson, Schiller stressed 
the value of representative institutions and prized a mixed constitution along English lines.”  
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worth (“Menschenrecht und Menschenwert”) (Beitrag 4). Repeatedly in his preface to the 
Beitrag Fichte refers to the Revolution as a Gemälde, usually in relation to the book’s stated 
ambition of educating the public in its political rights and duties.24 Which is to say we draw 
instruction from the Revolution in much the same way we draw perceptual insights from a 
picture: like the latter, the French Revolution is something to be observed appraised, made to 
signify in some way.  
This, in Fichte’s view, is what it means to practice judgment (“Beurtheilung”), the 
process by which a concrete, empirical fact is compared with a law. For Fichte, the whole 
question of judgment is what standard we are using to judge—what is the law that either 
condemns or commends a given fact or event? The argument of the Beitrag is that only 
“empirical” laws—self-interest, utility, tradition, etc.—can condemn the French Revolution, 
whereas if we judge from the eternal principles of reason (Vernunft), we must endorse it. The 
boldness of Fichte’s claim is that he writes this in 1793, after Louis XVI has been executed and 
the Jacobins begin their rise. Fichte knows many (like Schiller) have already turned away from 
the Revolution—thus it is the most urgent time to defend it, to educate the people on how to 
rightly judge what is taking place in France. There is a reason he chooses the term Berichtigung 
for his title. And whereas Schiller’s aesthetic education is designed to prepare the people for 
eventual stewardship of society, Fichte insists the people can overthrow the state at any time, 
provided the state acts contrary to the laws of reason. In this respect, Fichte inverts Kant: the 
legitimacy of government emanates from rational principles embodied in the people, who can 
depose at will any state that fails to honor its foundation in popular reason. 
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In this conception, the state is simply a means to a higher moral-rational end, what Fichte 
calls the final purpose of humanity (“Endzweck des Menschen”): the complete coincidence of 
the will with rational law (“völlig[e] Uebereinstimmung seines Willens mit dem Gesetze der 
Vernunft”) (Beitrag 39). Political progress is a society’s ongoing approximation of this 
Übereinstimmung, and if the government in question acts counter to that process, Fichte asserts 
the people has a right to overthrow it. Once a political order is on the right track in terms of 
delivering its people to the rational law, Fichte suggests the governing apparatus itself will 
gradually slip away, will become unnecessary and eventually disappear, because fully rational 
humans require no external government.25 All in all, the Beitrag is a sui generis political work. 
The specifics of Fichte’s argument are difficult to situate comfortably in any established 
theoretical tradition. My argument below is that an important concept from aesthetic theory helps 
us illuminate some of the treatise’s peculiarities: the sublime, especially as it is laid out in Kant’s 
third Kritik. The central claim of chapter three is that the concept of sublimity implicitly 
structures Fichte’s Beitrag to such a degree that we can call the work a specimen of “sublime 
politics.” In chapter one, I introduce the idea of a political program conceived as sublime in 
relation to the Jacobins, and chapter three argues Fichte’s Beitrag is effectively its theoretical 
statement of prinicples. 
The sublime is one of two categories that dominate German aesthetic thought after Kant’s 
Kritik der Urteilskraft. The other is beauty, and the difference consists in how each configures 
the faculties of cognition and sensibility: while the effect of a beautiful artwork is to harmonize 
them, to make thought and sensation agree, sublimity is a state in which intellect totally 
subordinates the body. I argue Schiller and Fichte present an especially instructive contrast for 
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thinking through aesthetics and politics because each essentially chooses a category—beauty for 
Schiller; sublimity for Fichte—and constructs an aesthetic politics around it. This is explicit in 
Schiller but tacit in Fichte, whose defense of the French Revolution, I claim, rests on an 
interpretation of the event as an opportunity for sublime elevation, to lock humanity into a 
rational mode and leave behind its physical nature once and for all. This is what Fichte considers 
education: the extirpation of the sensuous, while for Schiller the integration of sense into 
practices of thought is a hallmark of (aesthetically mediated) maturation. Fichte’s judgment is 
representative insofar as he praises the French Revolution as a symbolic occasion for humanity’s 
sublime elevation, but we’ll see Fichte, unlike Kant and Schiller, structures his favorable 
judgment of the Revolution around negation of representation as both a political and aesthetic 
principle: his arch-rational populism is really a strict form of direct (non-representative) 
democracy; and as an aesthetic category, sublimity rejects both (1) the creation of stimulating 
images and (2) the principle of mediation and distance. To put it another way, Fichte presents a 
representative judgment of the French Revolution in that his conclusion is inseparable from a 
paradigm of (aesthetic and political) non-representation. 
Büchner concurs with Fichte on one important point: the French revolutionaries were 
justified in executing the king. Der hessische Landbote calls Louis a “Verräter” and judges his 
punishment a righteous one: he failed to honor his position as “der erste Diener im Staat,” and 
instead arrogated undue power to himself at the expense of the people.26 This duty emanates 
from the French Revolution’s first phase: “[das Volk] erhob sich und berief Männer, denen es 
vertraute, und die Männer traten zusammen und sagten, ein König sei ein Mensch wie ein 
anderer auch” (WB 223). In this vision, the king is accountable to the people (“er müsse sich vor 
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dem Volk verantworten”), but it is important to note nonetheless that, as Büchner’s pamphlet 
describes, it was not simply das Volk that placed this stricture on the king, but representatives of 
the people (“Männer, denen es vertraute”). Even at this early moment of self-assertion, the 
Revolution was a movement of popular representation rather than direct popular insurrection, 
and in Büchner’s description, the execution of the king simply facilitated the representational 
streamlining of France’s new (free) government: “Die Männer, die über die Vollziehung der 
Gesetze wachen sollten, wurden von der Versammlung der Volksvertreter ernannt, sie bildeten 
die neue Obrigkeit. So waren Regierung und Gesetzgeber vom Volk gewählt und Frankreich war 
ein Freistaat” (WB 223). 
Of course, just months after Louis’ death comes the Terror, but this is not Büchner’s 
direct concern in Der hessische Landbote, a pamphlet about 1830s Germany, not 1790s France. 
The point of discussing the latter is to illustrate the generative conditions of the former: Der 
hessische Landbote presents a kind of miniaturized (two paragraphs), highly compressed version 
of European history since 1789, passing through the Declaration of the Rights of Man, Louis 
XVI’s execution, the onset of the revolutionary wars, Napoleon’s rise and fall, the restoration of 
the Bourbons, finally to the dubious victory of the July 1830 Revolution, in which one French 
monarch (Charles X) is exchanged for another (Louis Philippe). Büchner regards 1830 as 
specious progress at best, an occasion to mislead the people of both France and Germany into 
choosing the lesser of two evils—i.e. less autocratic monarchs—instead of insisting on their 
rights. In Büchner’s picture of 1830, an emergent popular force lets itself be placated and 
deceived by empty concessions from the ruling princes—“und so ward Deutschland betrogen 





Chief among these hollow gestures at political enfranchisement are the civil constitutions 
(Verfassungen) that do effectively nothing to constrain standing rulers like Hessian Grand Duke 
Ludwig II, who “nach den Artikeln” of the Duchy’s constitution is “unverletzlich, heilig und 
unverantwortlich. Seine Würde ist erblich in seiner Familie” (WB 225). In other words, Ludwig 
embodies the kind of monarchy the first generation of French revolutionaries wanted to abolish 
forever—immune, hereditary (i.e. not representative), unaccountable: tyrannical. Büchner uses 
the term Tyrann freely to describe those in power in 1834, when Der Hessische Landbote was 
first disseminated, and he predicts a popular uprising will be necessary to overthrow them. 
Rather than settling for institutional reforms from above, “Das ganze deutsche Volk muß sich die 
Freiheit erringen” (WB 227). But what follows that struggle is not a gradual withering of the state 
apparatus à la Fichte, nor Schiller’s aesthetically integrated society, but a representative 
democracy: “Die besten Männer aller Stämme des großen deutschen Vaterlandes werden, 
berufen durch die freie Wahl ihrer Mitbürger, im Herzen von Deutschland zu einem großen 
Reichs- und Volkstage sich versammeln, um da… christlich über Brüder zu regieren” (WB 231). 
Büchner envisions a political arrangement of honest representation, dedicated to “das allgemeine 
Wohl.” 
In such a society, “Kunst und Wissenschaft” flourish “im Dienste der Freiheit” (WB 233). 
This is one of two very brief references to Kunst at the end of Der hessische Landbote, and 
Büchner never spells out explicitly what “service to freedom” entails as a paradigm of art (or 
science). Of course, the relationship between Büchner’s own literary work and his politics has 
drawn vast scholarly commentary, one theme of which I want to highlight in this project: the act 
of citation. Büchner is known for quoting liberally in his works: just one example of significance 





Tod. I want to investigate this practice as a paradigm of aesthetic representation, taking as a point 
of departure Rüdiger Campe’s claim that, in Büchner’s writing, “citation is meant to highlight 
the process by which a thing (or person) is, by being cited, made to appear before an 
audience.”27 Understood in this sense, Campe considers Büchner’s practice of citation an 
“integrative and performative process,” and in the following two sections, we’ll see how that 
model of integration and performance puts significant pressure on the aesthetic principles at 
work in Schiller and Fichte.  
For the moment, let me briefly characterize Büchner in terms of representative judgment: 
he judges the (first) French Revolution positively insofar as it deposed an unaccountable 
monarchy in favor of representative government; the need for legitimate political representation 
is recurrent and emphatic in Der hessische Landbote—if the pamphlet stands for a particular 
political worldview, it is evidently representative (not direct) democracy. This is the first strand. 
But Büchner’s judgment is also more nuanced than either Schiller’s or Fichte’s because, by 
Büchner’s time, evaluating 1789 is no longer just a matter of choosing sides—that is, Büchner 
does not simply affirm or reject the Revolution, but also judges it historically, placing it in a 
sequence of conditions terminating in the political situation of the 1830s. And if, extending the 
concept of representative judgment to Büchner, we confront historical sequences as objects of 
judgment, we will have to expand our concept of representation to include history as well. That 
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Politics, History, Theater 
 
I earlier distinguished between the first and second phases of the French Revolution in terms of 
their respective attitudes to representative government. Marie-Hélène Huet has shown there is 
another important axis to this distinction: the role of theater. Between 1789 and 1792, the 
Revolution endeavored to “stage both the erasure of the old regime and the emergence of the 
new order” as a public event, a spectacle, and this ambition was reflected in a comprehensive 
theatrical program: “a series of decrees regulating all levels of performance, permitting the 
unchecked proliferation of theaters… and the decision, by the Convention, that a selection of 
patriotic plays be produced, at no cost to the public, for the education and benefit of all 
citizens.”28 In this way, the first wave of revolutionaries directly reversed the ancien régime, 
which had imposed oppressive restrictions on numerous “little theaters” that later flourished in 
Paris after 1789 as part of the Revolution’s public, citywide, dramatic self-presentation. Paris 
itself was conceived as a “stage for the revolutionary project,” and “observers could not help 
seeing the events of 1789 and 1792 as a powerful, if mixed, theatrical genre… a spectacle for 
all” (Huet 137). 
 But as Huet describes, the Jacobins were just as committed to purging the theatricality of 
the Revolution’s first phase: “The Terror was a war against spectacles and images, performance 
and representations; ultimately, it was a war against language itself,” insofar as language could 
be used to conceal the truth, i.e. “that the most revolutionary proclamations only served to hide 
or mask aristocratic plots” (“Performing Arts,” 138). In April 1794, the Jacobin government 
reinstated censorship on the theaters enfranchised after 1789, instead confining official display of 
the Revolution to a “Festival of the Supreme Being” scheduled for several weeks later. The 
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Supreme Being, a deity conceived by Robespierre, was to be honored at a public celebration 
“without images or representations,” itself part of a new civic religion—the “Cult of the Supreme 
Being”—that, “like revolutionary virtue, would be sublime and would wrest itself away from all 
sensual representations of its ideal” (“Performing Arts,” 139; my emphasis). The Jacobin “war 
on spectacles” and representations was essentially, per Huet, a war on the kind of distance they 
entail: between image and reality, statement and intention, representative and constituent. 
Robespierre and St. Just wanted these categories to coincide in a kind of total integrity they 
called “virtue,” understood as “not only what drives and motivates revolutionary discourse, but 
also, in its sublimity, what would elevate such discourse beyond all possible misrepresentation” 
(“Performing Arts,” 143; my emphasis). Sublimity as a concept and Terror as a practice “both 
transcended material representations and allowed for no spectacle” (Huet 142)—which is to say 
they were anti-theatrical.  
 Thus the sublime, in the hands of the Jacobins, becomes a means of opposing both 
aesthetic and political representation: no theatrical spectacle could represent patriotic zeal, just as 
no statement or official could represent the popular will—only the sublime immediacy of 
revolutionary virtue would suffice for Robespierre and Saint-Just. Huet claims they (selectively) 
appropriate this conception of the sublime from Kant’s third Kritik (139), and I explore this 
connection at the beginning of chapter one, which details Schiller’s transition away from 
sublimity as the dominant concept in his aesthetic thought. Between 1791 and 1793, Schiller 
composed a series of theoretical essays—“Über den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen 
Gegenständen,” “Über die tragische Kunst,” “Über das Pathetische,” and “Vom Erhabenen”—
that expounded the Kantian sublime and proposed ways it could be applied in artworks. In these 





nature, to consecrate the superiority of humanity’s rational and spiritual essence over its worldly 
embodiment. But as Huet has observed, this was precisely the maxim of the Jacobin government: 
“Robespierre tried to define the Revolution as sublime,” as the transcendence of virtue over the 
material world (“Performing Arts,” 141). The results, from Schiller’s perspective, were 
catastrophic. On February 8, 1793—two weeks after Louis XVI’s execution—he writes to friend 
and frequent interlocutor Christian Gottfried Körner, “Ich kann seit 14 Tagen keine 
franz[ösische] Zeitung mehr lesen, so ekeln diese elenden Schindersknechte mich an” (TS 286).29 
Five months later, in the first of his letters to the Duke of Augustenberg that provided the 
foundation for the Ästhetische Erziehung, Schiller concludes, again harshly:  
Der Versuch des französischen Volks, sich in seine heiligen Menschenrechte einzusetzen, und 
eine politische Freiheit zu erringen, hat bloß das Unvermögen und die Unwürdigkeit desselben an 
den Tag gebracht, und nicht nur dieses unglückliche Volk, sondern mit ihm auch einen 
beträchtlichen Theil Europens, und ein ganzes Jahrhundert, in Barbarey und Knechtschaft 
zurückgeschleudert. (TS 501) 
 
Incidentally, Schiller writes this letter on July 13th, the day Jean-Paul Marat is assassinated by 
Charlotte Corday in Paris, prompting a widespread crackdown and consolidation of Jacobin 
power. But the Jacobins had been ascendant for months, at least since their victory in the debate 
on the fate of the king. As I argue, the Revolution was now in its sublime mode. Schiller’s 
feelings on this turn of events are clear in his correspondence from 1793, in which Schiller not 
only expresses his regrets about France, but simultaneously begins to sketch a new direction in 
his aesthetic thought: starting in 1793, Schiller is almost exclusively concerned with the concept 
of beauty. The letter to Körner is effectively a small aesthetic treatise concluding with the 
famous formula that “Schönheit also ist nichts anders, als Freiheit in der Erscheinung” (TS 285), 
and the Augustenberger Briefe germinate into the aesthetic letters. Schiller’s turn away from the 
																																																						





French Revolution coincides with a turn toward beauty as the guiding concept of his aesthetics, 
and we could even say Schiller and the Revolution display a kind of cross movement: the 
Revolution begins in the spectacular, beautiful mode and transitions, with the Jacobins, to the 
sublime; Schiller’s first pass at Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft is largely preoccupied with 
sublimity, but after 1793, he shifts his emphasis to beauty, and not just as an aesthetic concept, 
but also a principle for politics—he famously insists early in the Ästhetische Erziehung “dass 
man, um jenes politische Problem in der Erfahrung zu lösen, durch das ästhetische den Weg 
nehmen muss, weil es die Schönheit ist, durch welche man zu der Freiheit wandert” (ÄE 2; 5). 
 I argue in chapter two that Schiller’s late history plays—Wallenstein (1798-99), Maria 
Stuart (1800), and Die Jungfrau von Orleans (1801)—effectively comprise the practical wing of 
this beautiful politics, his effort to instantiate aesthetic education.  Schiller returns to the theater 
with Wallenstein after a ten-year hiatus from playwriting, and I suggest the medium, as well as 
the genre of historical drama, is uniquely suited to the program laid out in the Ästhetische 
Erziehung. For one, in exchanging sublimity for beauty as the organizing principle of his artistic 
work, Schiller wants a venue that is as profuse in representative mediations as possible—in the 
theater, viewers witness a spectacle; actors represent not only roles but, especially in Schiller’s 
plays, ideas and drives; and in the three dramas I consider, episodes from remote European 
history are made present on the 1800 stage. Second, Schiller wants a mode of expression that 
most forcefully embodies Spiel, the harmonizing mechanism that is the trademark of beautiful 
works—this likewise is the theater, where an audience can actually see play-dynamics develop 
and falter in the relationships and events on stage, and (in this case) empirical history can be 
brought into reciprocal interchange with not only the present, but history as it could have been. I 





indispensable component of Schiller’s late historical dramas, and the point where they link most 
resonantly with the program laid out in the Ästhetische Erziehung. 
 Unlike the sublime politics of the Jacobins and Fichte, Schiller’s politics of beauty and 
play insists on a surfeit of representations and mediations: everything has to be balanced, 
negotiated, reciprocated—has to be subject to Spiel. For Schiller, there is no reason without 
countervailing sensibility, no necessity without contingency, no autonomy without constraint, no 
empirical without counterfactual history. Any of these mutually conditioning statements could be 
drawn from the Ästhetische Erziehung, but I claim they are most evident in Wallenstein, Maria 
Stuart, and Die Jungfrau von Orleans, where they are literally performed. Schiller uses the 
theater to display in multifaceted form a paradigm of beauty and play that is at once aesthetic, 
political, analytical, representational—only in the historical dramas is this system present in all 
its dimensions. As I’ve intimated, the element of history is crucial in this theatrical program. The 
French Revolution is an occasion for Schiller to return to playwriting as well as the symptom of 
the social alienation his dramas are designed to address, yet 1789 is nowhere in his plays: 
instead, we find the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648); the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots in 
1587; and the late Medieval story of Joan of Arc. We’ll see this is yet another mediation integral 
to Schiller’s aesthetic politics: engaging the political present through past struggles for power. 
Schiller chooses historical tipping points, moments of concentration in which, I argue, the Spiel-
dynamics underlying the practice and transformation of political authority are most patent. 
 Schiller addresses the aftermath of 1789 via critical episodes in Medieval and pre-modern 
European politics; Büchner, likewise, comes to terms with 1830s monarchy via 1789. Dantons 
Tod is the first German play to stage the French Revolution as history. Büchner’s interest in the 





terminating in the social-political circumstances of the 1830s—for Büchner, 1789 belongs to the 
history of the present. Similarly, as we’ll see in chapter two, Schiller chooses dramatic material 
relevant to the geopolitical preconditions of the 1790s. For both playwrights, then, historical 
drama is part of a politics oriented to the present, or to put it differently: Schiller as well as 
Büchner are politically engaged dramatists who select historical materials, who use theater as a 
venue to display political history. But why they make this decision, and the way it connects to 
their respective politics, are more difficult questions.  
One thing is clear: having chosen the same genre—historical drama—Schiller and 
Büchner adopt radically different approaches to it. As I describe below, Schiller’s plays present a 
highly idealized vision of European political history—not idealized in the sense of glorified, but 
conceptualized: Schiller freely invents and transforms the empirical record in order to provide a 
more theoretically crisp depiction of the events he wants his audience to understand, where 
“understanding” entails not grasping history exactly as it was, but as it could and perhaps should 
have been: to perceive the necessary, elemental, latent forces (all deduced from the Ästhetische 
Erziehung) at work in any historical conjuncture. Not so with Büchner, who takes “history as it 
was” to an unprecedented step in Dantons Tod, literally quoting and having actors deliver 
verbatim speeches by Robespierre and Danton. Büchner not only depicts but cites the French 
Revolution, lets his audience experience its actual language in a process Campe calls “making 
[it] appear.” It is a mode of citation that represents what it cites. 
This is much different in form and function than what Schiller describes in the aesthetic 
letters, where the reciprocal completeness of Spiel is communicated to a spectator through a 
vision, a “vollständige Anschauung seiner Menschheit,” and the object (Gegenstand) that 





Gegenstand, of course, is the drama, and it transmits Spiel to its audience to the extent that it 
activates this representative relay: the image communicates to the spectators their (at least 
potential) human Totalität, and in being recognized as such, accedes to a symbolic register in 
which it expresses humanity’s “accomplished destiny.” In this sense, theatrical representation for 
Schiller is inseparable from a process of reflection and reflective distance, in which spectators 
contemplate the dramatic material, which, rather than simply being what it is, is reflected back 
on the those spectators’ internal faculties (where Spiel is supposed to take effect)—it becomes an 
image not, for instance, of Mary Stuart’s execution, but of humanity’s process of reconciling its 
own cognitive powers, all of which is then reflected onto the higher order question of the human 
race’s Bestimmung. 
 I argue in chapter four that Büchner’s approach to historical drama in Dantons Tod has 
the effect of short-circuiting this reflective chain. Büchner’s play shows no concern with the 
French Revolution’s external symbolic significance or how it reflects on humans as a whole.  
This is likely part of what has made the work so maddeningly resistant to interpretation, insofar 
as interpretation entails adding a layer of significance to it. In the critical literature, Dantons Tod 
is notorious for its ambivalence, for not giving its viewers a clear choice—for being a political 
play without a politics. At its simplest, my argument in chapter four is that Dantons Tod is best 
approached as a “process” work—the point is to show us how, in a given constellation of 
circumstances, politics was actually practiced. Büchner is not interested in dispensing political 
principles, in playing the partisan—he has already done that in Der hessische Landbote, and 
Dantons Tod comes at the larger political questions driving Büchner’s work from a different 
angle. And if the play is about political process, the conclusion we draw is that the process of 





depicts. We see French revolutionaries scrambling to characterize the event as they are executing 
it, to position themselves within a larger discourse that is constantly in flux. Büchner’s use of 
citation not only presents these rhetorical acts themselves, it gives us a chance to glean from 
them—from the linguistic decisions and preoccupations on display with Robespierre and 
Danton—the outline of this overall discursive field structuring the Revolution. This involves 
another level of citation: because, as Campe writes, Robespierre and Danton have a “citational” 
way of speaking, of drawing on and organizing their surrounding discourse, Dantons Tod 
effectively cites their citations (“Citation,” 53). 
Before bringing Fichte back into the fold, it is worth reviewing exactly where Schiller 
and Büchner fall on the concept of representation and its various axes: in terms of political 
representation, both favor representative government (neither is a direct democrat) though 
Büchner is less skeptical of the people’s present enlightenment—he locates the problem with 
their leaders; when it comes to aesthetic representation, both choose the same form (theater) and 
genre (history), but Schiller’s conception of theatrical representation—and any schöne Kunst—
relies heavily on the image (Schein) as the atomic form of all artistic experience, while Dantons 
Tod uses theater to showcase the linguistic-discursive dimension of political action; finally, in 
terms of historical representation (within the plays), Schiller presents schematic, substantially 
modified histories driven by the concepts of the Ästhetische Erziehung, while Büchner employs 
rigorously cited materials. In chapters two and four, I will use the terms hybridization and 








Aesthetic-Political Idealism and its Limits 
 
Virtually any intellectual history of German around 1800 will refer to Schiller and Fichte as 
“idealists”: Fichte (along with Kant, Schelling and Hegel) as a canonical philosopher of German 
Idealism; Schiller as an “aesthetic idealist” or something equivalent.30 I argue this term is not so 
much false as inexact: Schiller and Fichte are not simply “idealists,” or rather, their writings in 
response to the French Revolution are not reducible to idealism as it is typically conceived 
philosophically, politically or otherwise. Instead, I claim these texts display a more precise 
aesthetic-political idealism that needs to be delineated from more general uses of the term, as 
well as the usual characterizations of Schiller and Fichte: Schiller’s Ästhetische Erziehung and 
late historical dramas do not embody idealist “aestheticism” and Fichte’s Beitrag is not simply 
another programmatic treatise of German Idealism. It is true that these works accord reason, 
morality, cognition, etc. a privileged role over material sensations and concrete experience—in 
this sense they are generically “idealist”—but the way they configure that hierarchy, the way 
they assign and construe that privilege, is inseparable from the specific way they merge 
aesthetics and politics. This is what I mean by aesthetic-political idealism: idealism that is not so 
much an upfront commitment or guiding principle, but a result of certain theoretical decisions 
about how to connect aesthetic and political concepts. 
 At its simplest, idealism (like materialism) is a paradigm of how to relate ideas and 
bodies. Schiller projects these two regions onto separate “drives” (Triebe) operating within the 
psyche: the material-drive (Stofftrieb), which roots us in the physical circumstances of the 
moment; and the form-drive (Formtrieb) that challenges us to transcend immediate conditions 
and strive for infinity. The Stofftrieb “geht aus von dem physischen Dasein des Menschen oder 
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von seiner sinnlichen Natur,” while the Formtrieb proceeds from the “absoluten Dasein des 
Menschen oder von seiner vernünftigen Natur” (ÄE 12; 1, 4; my emphasis). Schiller departs from 
typical forms of idealism and materialism by introducing a third term, the Spieltrieb, to mediate 
between the other two. As we saw, this process takes place under the auspices of aesthetic 
education, via a schöner Schein—in this case, the theatrical representation of history. The central 
harmonizing mechanism of the Ästhetische Erziehung—play—is also Schiller’s solution, so to 
speak, to the ancient philosophical problem of how to configure minds and bodies. And whereas 
antecedent (and later) traditions simply choose a side, Schiller insists that both need to be present 
in any viable resolution—the Ästhetische Erziehung is nothing if not a screed against one-
sidedness (Einseitigkeit), the undue dominance of any one drive or faculty over the others. The 
politics of the beautiful brings these elements into contact, demands negotiation in the name of a 
higher (aesthetic and political) unity. In this respect, Schiller’s system seems less “idealist” than 
dialectical.31 
 Nonetheless, there is reason to retain the term for Schiller’s aesthetic politics: even if the 
rational faculty and its corresponding Formtrieb do not enjoy an automatic privilege over 
sensibility in the world of the Ästhetische Erziehung, the aesthetic image in which they are 
reconciled does—recall it is the symbol of humanity’s accomplished destiny, of the Totalität des 
Charakters missing from the fractured modern age. Schiller adds a crucial clarifying point: the 
task of reconciling the formal and sensuous component of human existence is itself a 
commandment of reason, an idea.32 Spiel is, at some level, a product of the Formtrieb: Vernunft, 
																																																						
31 De Man would protest this claim vehemently. His critique is also emblematic of what we could call the “anti-
dialectical” reading of Schiller, in which Schillerian harmony precludes any sort of constructive collision of 
opposites. See “Kant and Schiller,” in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). 
32 “Dieses Wechselverhältnis beider Triebe ist zwar bloss eine Aufgabe der Vernunft, die der Mensch nur in der 
Vollendung seines Daseins ganz zu lösen im Stand ist. Es ist im eigentlichen Sinne des Worts die Idee seiner 





in Schiller’s conception, does not simply aim for its own predominance, but the reciprocal 
operation of formal and sensuous faculties, and to this end, deploys the Spieltrieb where this 
reciprocity is lacking. 
 I argue in chapter two that Schiller sees European political history as a tangle of non-
reciprocity, and the theater becomes his venue for dispatching the Spieltrieb: to the Thirty Years’ 
War; to Elizabethan England; to the late Middle Ages. It never succeeds in “fixing” history, but 
the point is that we see history as, effectively, a drama of drives. Thus Schiller freely intervenes 
into the historical record to make the drive-dynamics clearer. As we’ll see, this becomes a 
complicated and multi-tiered process, but for the moment, I want to emphasize that, once he 
returns to playwriting with Wallenstein, Schiller’s relationship to his dramatic material is 
analogous to that between Vernunft and the drives in the aesthetic letters: just as reason 
discharges the task of reciprocally configuring formality and sense, Schiller has to coordinate 
historical sources with specific poetic, formal ambitions—with aesthetic ideas. But unlike in the 
theoretical situation, Schiller can write a play that presents Spiel as a failure—or more 
specifically, as a missed opportunity—and still “succeed” aesthetically: it just means he’s written 
a new kind of tragedy.  
 In sum, Schiller’s aesthetic politics is idealist in two central respects: first, the process of 
creating an aesthetic symbol that harmonizes form and sense is assigned and driven by reason 
itself; second, aesthetic education transfigures material—Stoff has no programmatic value in 
itself, but only in entering a higher unity with form. The history plays are the clearest example: 
Schiller has no interest in presenting history as it was, but as a mutual coordination of empirical 
and hypothetical history, as a specific amalgam of drives. But neither is material wholly 





genuinely mutual—as I’ve suggested, it has hallmarks of dialectics—and for this reason, I’ve 
chosen to call Schiller’s aesthetic-political idealism reciprocal.33  
 The concept of reciprocity is the analytical backbone of the Ästhetische Erziehung, but 
Schiller is hardly proprietary about it—on the contrary, he credits it to Fichte, whose conception 
of Wechselwirkung in the Wissenschaftslehre provides the model (Schiller claims) for his 
reconciliation of form- and sense-drives (ÄE 13; 2, fn1). Paul de Man accuses Schiller of 
egregiously misappropriating Fichte on this count, and the Beitrag would only seem to support 
de Man’s critique: there is no sign of aesthetic harmony in this work, nor anything that evokes 
the Wechsel-dynamics so central to the Ästhetische Erziehung.34 Nonetheless, I do claim Fichte 
is, like Schiller, an aesthetic-political idealist. The difference is that where Schiller’s program is 
reciprocal, Fichte’s is oppositional: rather than harmonizing discordant drives or faculties, 
Fichte’s aesthetic politics intensifies the conflict; and while the “higher unity” of aesthetic 
education is a beautiful symbol that incorporates formality and sense, Fichte’s is a truly unitary 
unity, with one element that has eliminated all opposition. At a certain level, I argue, this 
difference reflects the respective aesthetic concepts at work in Schiller and Fichte’s political 
thought: for Schiller it is beauty, which calls for harmony and reciprocity; for Fichte it is the 
sublime, which stages conflict and victory. This is one illustration of what I mentioned above: 
idealism—the programmatic privileging of ideas over material—assumes the form it does in 
Schiller and Fichte not at the outset, but as the result of specific aesthetic-theoretical decisions. 
																																																						
33 This in part to underscore the ubiquity of the prefix wechsel- in Schiller’s descriptions of beauty and Spiel in the 
Ästhetische Erziehung: like we saw above, letter 14 tells us Vernunft demands a Wechselverhältnis between the 
drives; in a footnote to letter 13, Schiller names Wechselwirkung the mutual necessity “ohne Forme keine Materie, 
ohne Materie keine Form”; in the same footnote, he acknowledges the inevitability of one drive’s occasionally 
subordinating the other, with an important caveat: “Unterordnung muss allerdings sein, aber wechselseitig” (my 
emphasis). 





The idealism of Spiel looks the way it does because it is structured by the concept of beauty; 
likewise with the idealism of Fichte’s Beitrag and the sublime. 
 In the Beitrag, the material category exists to be overcome. It is not neutral or 
incidental—it is a problem, and Fichte’s aesthetic-political idealism is a program of surmounting 
it. Again, his analytical style is oppositional: he intensifies the conflict between ideal and 
material registers in such a way that the former not only outpaces the latter, but obliterates it. It is 
a transcendent—not transcendental, in the Kantian sense—model: ideality, gripped in struggle 
with material, finally rises above and purges it. Thus, as we saw earlier, Fichte can claim in the 
Beitrag that humanity’s final purpose is total coincidence with the rational law—humanity is 
consummated when its collective volition is determined under the absolute and exclusive power 
of reason. Whereas Schiller’s human Vollendung involves the proper balancing of faculties, for 
Fichte, it is one proper faculty exerting complete control. Human fulfillment is synonymous with 
total rationality. Under the rubric of Schiller’s form- and sense-drives, this would amount to a 
total formalization, an absolute principle for politics. Fichte intimates this is simply pursuant to 
Kantian moral theory and that the Beitrag is his attempt to apply that theory to public life, but 
my basic argument in chapter three is that Fichte’s analytical choices in that book—especially 
concerning the relationship between reason and material—are far more indicative of the Kantian 
sublime than the categorical imperative. 
 While Kant’s moral thought is designed to produce certain forms of behavior—the 
categorical imperative tells us how to act—the Endzweck espoused by Fichte’s Beitrag is an 
internal condition of the will, its proximity to reason. Not free action but free volition is the core 
of the Beitrag’s politics. Still, some concrete externality is necessary for this kind of volition to 





unique opportunity for the moral elevation of European politics. In fact, in the world of the 
Beitrag, this is the basic mechanism whereby societies foster the popular moral will (and thus 
approach the Endzweck): they respond with proper judgment to critical political events. The act 
of judging politics consolidates their moral integrity. I argue in chapter three that this stimulus-
response structure is precisely that of the sublime, in which a harrowing external experience is 
converted into moral transcendence. Though the idea behind sublimity is to realize moral 
autonomy, the distinctive moment of the process—and the one most called to mind when we 
describe things as “sublime”—is the first, empirical moment: an encounter with something 
terrifying, enormous, dangerous, threatening, etc. Put another way, it is inconsistent with the 
sublime to simply state moral principles, though sublimity as a process eventuates in autonomy 
grounded on these principles. The process is important: we have to pass through the initial, 
experiential stage; we have to be subject to a struggle between what we experience and our moral 
response to it. This is the oppositional principle of the sublime that is also at work in Fichte’s 
Beitrag, which insists we need to properly judge the French Revolution in order to overcome 
antecedent political history and the current iniquities of public life. But as I argue, there is a 
corresponding danger: this process of overcoming is one manifestation of Fichte’s overall 
imperative to formalize, to reduce material to absolute principles, and there is no structural 
limitation on how political formalization takes place, nor who qualifies as resistant “material.” 
That is, sensuous overcoming, understood as a process of formalization, is easily conducive to 
political violence—and indeed, as I suggest, it is the basic formula of the Terror. 
 But to return to the comparison with Schiller: it is worth noting that, for both aesthetic-
political idealists, empirical political history often plays the part of the problematic “material” 





element that is transfigured or overcome, whether in one of Schiller’s hybrid history plays or the 
process of political transcendence Fichte calls for in the Beitrag. In both cases, the idealism 
results from the specific aesthetic politics: Schiller’s aesthetic education is, in essence, a process 
of enlightened elitism tied to a moderate, representative idea of democracy; beautiful images are 
a means of both developing (i.e. balancing) the public’s powers of cognition and setting political 
history on its right course; the “ideals” at work—a consummated humanity and history 
progressing toward freedom—match directly to the aesthetics of beauty and Schiller’s gradualist 
liberalism. Likewise, the notion of moral autonomy via transcendence at the core of Fichte’s 
Beitrag could be taken straight from Kant’s analytic of the sublime, and his insistence on a clean 
break from the corruptions of antecedent political history aligns neatly with the great direct 
democrats of the day, the Jacobins. We can imagine two distinctions—one aesthetic, one 
political—configured in one analogy: beauty and moderate, representative democracy paired on 
one side (in Schiller’s reciprocal idealism); the sublime and radical democracy on the other (in 
Fichte’s oppositional idealism). 
 Büchner dismantles this analogical picture, on several levels: for one, the practice of 
citation rejects the premise common to the aesthetics of beauty and the sublime, that “material,” 
however defined, in some way needs to be transfigured or converted into something that ramifies 
on a more “ideal” register like reason or morality. In all three figures empirical political history 
ends up playing the role of material, but only Büchner presents it directly, in the form of a 
citational montage. Unlike Schiller’s hybrid-technique, which also mixes empirical and invented 
content, Büchner’s use of montage does not attempt to harmonize them in a higher form. 
Büchner reverses the others still further: he uses theater, the venue Schiller had chosen to 





content of that history; and in Dantons Tod, he represents citationally the event Fichte treated as 
a symbolic opportunity for sublime elevation. In this way, Büchner anticipates and perhaps 
renders moot the whole conflict between Schiller’s and Fichte’s idealisms, which is essentially a 
debate about how concepts should govern content. It is unclear whether this distinction even 
holds for Büchner, and whatever the case, the aesthetics of citation has no need for it.  
Does this make Büchner “materialist”? Maybe, but not in the sense I mentioned earlier, in 
which materialism is the straightforward antithesis of idealism. In this understanding, both 
principles emerge from the same problematic—hierarchizing ideas and bodies—and simply 
choose different sides. But Büchner is not the “body” to Schiller and Fichte’s “idea,” nor is 
Dantons Tod really beautiful or sublime—the logic of citation is, as I’ve suggested, outside this 
particular discursive zone, and does not engage these distinctions inside the basic parameters of 
the 1790s. If anything, citation gives us both ideas and bodies (and beauty and the sublime), not 
in any idealized harmony, but insofar as they register linguistically, rhetorically: it shows them 
as elements of political language. 
 Büchner’s use of citation indicates a particular disposition to political history, a certain 
value placed upon it, absent from the aesthetic-political idealisms of Schiller and Fichte. Where 
historical “understanding” for the latter two means penetrating to the moral forces or structures 
of necessity underlying political change, Der hessische Landbote stays true to the manifest level 
of politics, does not subordinate events to metaphysical or spiritual powers. In this sense, 
Büchner’s understanding of history is more straightforward: he states what he sees since 1789, 
and the result is a concrete sequence of political events. Büchner’s pamphlet invites 
disenfranchised Germans in the 1830s to place themselves in that sequence—i.e., the latest round 





“politics.” Büchner does not avail himself of aesthetic or moral ideals because the motive core of 
his politics is the experience of history itself; no special symbolic treatment of politics is 
disseminated among the people because these people are the nucleus of politics—politics 
emanates from them. This is the crucial difference between Büchner and Schiller: though both 
advocate representative (not direct) democratic government, Schiller insists the people need to be 
brought gradually in line with aesthetic-political ideals—they need to be educated, i.e. formed; in 
Der hessische Landbote, it is enough that the people are able to select leaders who represent their 
will and interests, and any discrepancy between the governing apparatus and the people in this 
regard needs to be remedied on the side of government.  
 But Der hessische Landbote also makes clear that Büchner does not idealize “the people” 
in manner of Robespierre and Fichte. The people is not an abstract entity in Büchner: it is the 
empirical people suffering the iniquities of monarchy and radical democracy alike; it is the 
Hessians being extorted by the arch-duchy of Ludwig II as well as Parisians starving in the 
streets while the Jacobins debate about Rousseau. While Schiller and Fichte represent the people 
on the model of one universal person with an individual’s cognitive faculties to scale—i.e. there 
is popular reason, sensibility, morality, and it is a question of reconfiguring these faculties to 
improve the social body—for Büchner it is not the people as the classical One, but a concrete 
multiplicity: people with jobs, families, and, famously in Der hessische Landbote, taxes. 
Büchner’s strategy of citing tax statistics for the people of Hessen may be the best index for his 
departure from Schiller and Fichte: rather than assessing the present by a people’s proximity or 
distance from an aesthetic-political ideal, Büchner measures it by how much a government 





which questions of representation and political legitimacy are inseparable from economics, and 










Schiller’s Turn:  
 
Sublime Terror and the Politics of Beauty 
 
 
Schiller responds to the French Revolution first with theoretical, then literary works. This 
chapter is largely concerned with the former: Schiller’s aesthetic writings, beginning with his 
essays on the concept of sublimity in the early 1790s and ending with 1795’s Ästhetische 
Erziehung, his most famous work of theory. There is a noticeable difference between the 
aesthetic vision Schiller develops in the earlier essays and that of the aesthetic letters. After 
Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft established beauty and sublimity as the governing categories of 
German aesthetic theory, Schiller initially threw himself into expounding the sublime. In 1792-
93, he published four pieces in the journal Neue Thalia—“Über den Grund des Vergnügens an 
tragischen Gegenständen,” “Über die tragische Kunst,” “Vom Erhabenen,” and “Über das 
Pathetische”—in which he hoped to elaborate both the basic conceptual parameters of sublimity 
as well as its promise as an element of tragic drama. But in 1793, Schiller changed his focus 
from sublimity to beauty with the Kallias-Briefe, his first sustained work on the concept of the 
beautiful, and the Augustenburger Briefe, written to Schiller’s patron, the Duke of Augustenburg, 





 We know from Schiller’s correspondence that he lost faith in the French Revolution after 
the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793, and that his interest in beauty coincides with this 
disappointment. Not incidentally, Schiller developed his aesthetics of the beautiful as the 
Revolution entered its radical phase, culminating in the Terror. My argument here is that the 
Terror presented Schiller with a political manifestation of sublime aesthetics, and that this helps 
us understand his subsequent commitment to the category of beauty after 1793. Not only did 
Robespierre’s speeches expressly frame the Terror (and the Revolution itself) as a sublime event, 
but the very conceit of the Terror—eliminating sensuous vice in the name of moral 
transcendence—fit squarely the principles of sublimity Schiller had just expounded in his Neue 
Thalia essays. Much as the Jacobins adopted the sublime as a framework for their own political 
vision, Schiller’s unambiguously politicized his aesthetics of beauty. Above I quoted the 
programmatic line from letter two of the Ästhetische Erziehung, “dass man, um jenes politische 
Problem in der Erfahrung zu lösen, durch das ästhetische den Weg nehmen muss, weil es die 
Schönheit ist, durch welche man zu der Freiheit wandert.” As I argue, Schiller proposes a 
specifically “beautiful” kind of freedom, one defined against the specious liberties promised by 
Robespierre and the violent political program they are used to justify. 
 The second and third sections below lay out these two formations: Schiller’s concept of 
sublimity and its resonances with the Jacobin Terror, and the politics of beauty Schiller commits 
to after his turn away from the French Revolution. I conclude with two sections that anticipate 
chapter two, on Schiller’s late history plays: one on the relationship between approaches to 
historiography and Schiller’s concept of Spiel; and another on the idea of dramatic writing as a 
form of political praxis. These sections are designed to serve as a link between the exposition of 





begin below by expanding on Claude Lefort and Jacques Rancière, two contemporary thinkers I 
discuss in the introduction, whose work can help us understand the situation in which Schiller 
turns from sublimity to beauty. First, Lefort and Rancière provide an instructive complementary 
picture of why 1790s Europe is so crucial for what we contemporarily think of as “aesthetic 
politics,” and also what this conjunction signified for thinkers and artists working in the wake of 
the French Revolution. Second, though they work from very different analytical directions, 
Lefort and Rancière alike arrive at the centrality of theater and dramatic literature as the 
aesthetic-political form par excellence. For this reason, it will be helpful to keep Lefort and 
Rancière in mind, not just for the largely conceptual discussion of this chapter, but also when we 
turn to Schiller’s history plays in the next.  
 
 
Parallel Returns: Lefort and Rancière 
 
Lefort and Rancière give us two very different bodies of work that nonetheless converge on 
1790s Europe as a point of origin. There is for each theorist a critical moment: as I discussed in 
the introduction, Lefort traces modern politics to the execution of King Louis XVI of France on 
January 21, 17931; similarly, Rancière considers Schiller’s aesthetic letters themselves the 
“original scene” of aesthetics as we know it. As we’ll see, Lefort’s conception of modern politics 
is inseparable from principles of aesthetic representation; likewise with the aesthetics Rancière 
traces to Schiller and modern theories of power. Both thinkers are very clear about this 
connection. If we put their genealogies of the modern age side-by-side—Lefort’s modern politics 
alongside Rancière’s modern aesthetics—and follow them back to the beginning, we get a 
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discrete sequence of events in the 1790s: the execution of the king (January 1793); Schiller’s 
publication of the Ästhetische Erziehung (1795); and in the middle, the Terror (1793-94). These 
are the benchmarks I will use below to trace the development of Schiller’s aesthetic thought. 
According to Lefort, the French Revolution constitutes the crucial point of consolidation 
for a wider trend that, before 1789, had remained largely subterranean. As we saw, Lefort calls 
this incipient movement the “democratic revolution,” which “burst out when the body of king 
was destroyed” (“Image,” 303). When the French executed Louis XVI, they severed an artificial 
bond it had been the King’s (and all monarchs’) symbolic duty to hold intact, what Oliver 
Marchart calls “the link between society and its transcendent legitimatory foundation” (PF 95). 
That is, in this arrangement—the “monarchic dispositive”—any political society has its 
legitimating ground outside (transcending) it, and whether this ground is God or, later, Justice 
and Reason, it is the monarch’s function to fasten that ground to the empirical people and 
institutions that make up the ‘corporeal’ manifestation of that society. The monarch connects the 
earthly and the divine (or ideal). Hence the precise symbolic significance of the king’s body: it is 
both a physical human body and the site for channeling the divine (or ideal), and thus, for Lefort, 
“long after the features of liturgical royalty had died away, the king still possessed the power to 
incarnate in his body the community of the kingdom, now invested with the sacred, a political 
community, a national community, a mystical body” (“Image,” 302). This is the working model 
of the ancien régime, which society “represented its unity and its identity to itself as that of a 
body—a body which found its figuration in the body of the king” (“Image,” 302). It is also the 
model detonated by the public decapitation of Louis, the symbolic condensation point of the 
democratic revolution. As we saw, Lefort refers to the resultant process as “disincorporation,” in 





king is disincorporated in destruction of his earthly body and renunciation of his transcendent 
function; concurrently, individual members of the polity are disincorporated in becoming 
dislodged from the cohesive, homogeneous “body” that had previously defined their 
community—they are now free to circulate as individuals.2 We came roughly this far with Lefort 
in the introduction. 
 Pushing somewhat further: It is important to recognize that Lefort is not simply 
describing a transformation in French society; more significantly, he is identifying a “mutation” 
in that society’s self-representation. For Lefort, political power has a double function: it forms—
it gives shape to an otherwise amorphous social mass—and then signifies that form, such that, in 
the monarchic dispositive, power is present not only in the concrete social and institutional 
architecture that terminates in the figure of the monarch, it also invests the monarch with the 
capacity to represent that society to itself as a coherent and unified entity, qua monarchy.3 
Beheading Louis was not simply an act with important consequences for French government, but 
an intervention into the very symbolic constitution of authority, an insurrection on a stage 
extending far beyond just France—the king was deposed as a symbolic guarantor of national 
integrity by a new element, the people. Hence a transformation in the symbolic practice of 
governance itself, and the specific historical magnitude of the French Revolution: Marchart calls 
it “the moment when the monarchic dispositive mutated into the democratic dispositive” that has 
structured the next two centuries (“Representing Power,” 99). And while monarchy labored to 
achieve the unity of political society, the democratic element is one of discord: without 
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transcendent power source, individuals attach and collide at will; they autonomously engage (or 
disengage) in a contest for influence that pervades the social body.4 
 At this point in Lefort’s argument, aesthetics becomes central. The freely circulating 
autonomy individuals experience after monarchy is especially pertinent for artists. The effect of 
the democratic revolution was to de-monopolize a field of symbolic resources that had 
previously consolidated around the monarch. Practically speaking, it was no longer the sole task 
of the artist to glorify, edify, or otherwise creatively serve a king or queen; now the artist could 
choose what or whom to serve. This is non-trivial: if the representative image of power is as 
important as its tangible conditions, power needs people who are skilled at crafting 
representations, who can effectively manipulate the symbolic field—it needs artists. And now 
that competing political parties have replaced a unitary monarch, we have the “party artist,” the 
partisan, who lends creative work to a specific agenda. The prototype on both counts emerges in 
the French Revolution: the Jacobins and their partisan painter, Jacques-Louis David, whose 
iconic Death of Marat (1793) attests to the potency of artists’ new political vocation.5  
Further, as Marchart has observed, the whole transformation in which party and artist 
first appear in their modern function is itself aesthetic. The decapitation of the king deprives 
political representation of any specific substance, and in the resultant void, representation itself is 
foregrounded as the stuff of politics: “now it is the very symbolic nature of power which is 
recognized as its true essence”; consequently, the public sphere becomes an “agonal space” of 
contestations between representatives of a variegated political community; and “from a Lefortian 
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perspective,” every such public sphere “assumes the function of a theater. It is the ‘place’ where 
conflict and democratic contest are staged. And by being openly and legitimately staged, the 
‘drama’ of conflict and contest attests to the fact that the place of power does not have any 
substantial content” (“Representing Power,” 100-1; my emphasis). The theatrical language is not 
incidental: Lefort adopts the term mise-en-scène from theater to denote political society’s staging 
of its own self-identity, its own performative self-enactment in the world of symbols and 
appearances. Post-democratic revolution, the representational substrate of politics that structures 
this performance assumes acknowledged primacy; as a result, for Marchart, politics becomes 
more properly and officially aesthetic. 
 Lefort and Rancière converge on this point: theater is a crucial locus and figure for 
aesthetic politics as it emerges in the 1790s. For Rancière, modern politics is essentially 
theatrical: “performing or playing, in the theatrical sense of the word,” politics is about “creating 
a stage,” “establishment of a theater” in which pertinent relationships can be “acted out.”6 In 
Lefort’s political theater, those relationships are manifold, and correspond to given historical 
dispositives—monarchy, democracy, aristocracy, totalitarianism—but Rancière distills that range 
to one governing tension between poles he labels “people” and “police.” Rancière uses the latter 
term to denote any developed political order comprising both a clear delineation of social roles 
and procedures and a symbolic representation of itself “characterized by the absence of void and 
of supplement.”7 The police represents itself as a social whole, a symbolic act that, for Rancière, 
necessarily involves some degree of elision—the police’s self-enclosure inevitably excludes 
																																																						
6 See especially Disagreement and “Entretien avec Jacques Rancière,” quoted in Peter Hallward, “Staging Equality,” 
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Richard Halpern, “Theater and Democratic Thought: Arendt to Rancière,” Critical Inquiry (Spring 2011), 545-572. 






something. This element is the people, the demos, the “supplementary existence that inscribes the 
count of the uncounted, or part of those who have no part” in the order of the police (Dissensus 
33). Politics proper is the means by which the people asserts itself and confronts the police, or, 
closer to Rancière’s own language, makes itself seen and heard. The dynamics of political 
contestation are, for Rancière, always sensuous: exclusion means invisibility and silence, and 
politics is the people’s intervention into the prevailing “distribution of the sensible” (Rancière’s 
signature phrase) that keeps them visually and aurally absent.8 The priority of sensuous presence 
over specific political demands makes Rancière’s emphasis on theatricality easier to understand. 
As Peter Hallward expresses eloquently, “before it is a matter of representative institutions, legal 
procedures or militant organizations, politics is a matter of building a stage and sustain a 
spectacle of ‘show’. Politics is the contingent dramatization of a disruptive equality, the 
unauthorized and impromptu improvisation of a democratic voice” (“Staging Equality,” 112). 
 In Rancière’s vision, aesthetics is the aegis under which that spectacle takes place. Hardly 
some myopic “theory of art,” aesthetics is the paradigm by which demos creates an alternate 
“sensorium,” an experiential space in which predominant relations of domination are abolished 
(AD 11-12). For Rancière, the politics of art “consists in suspending the normal coordinates of 
sensory experience” in favor of the extra-normal space of aesthetic experience, in counter posing 
daily life and art as experiential modes (AD 25). Aesthetics, in a precise sense, is the “regime” by 
which we identify what constitutes art and artistic experience, what specifically composes the 
alternative sensorium that opposes the governing distribution of the sensible. This demarcation is 
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its politics.9  The relevant opposition is between a democratic and emancipatory space of art and 
the reified life-world of the police order. That seems straightforward, but it is not: “the politics of 
art in the aesthetic regime of art,” Rancière reminds us, “is determined by this founding paradox: 
in this regime, art is art insofar as it is also non-art, or is something other than art” (AD 36). Art, 
in the aesthetic regime, is a non-integrated category; it is itself insofar as it partakes in what is 
outside it, life. For Rancière, this paradox dominates the course of the “aesthetic revolution” that 
has governed cultural production in the West for two centuries, still holds today, and started with 
Schiller. 
 The Ästhetische Erziehung is the founding text of this revolution, and Rancière, in book 
after book, remains fixated on the final section of letter 15, in which Schiller states the paradox, 
“der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des Worts Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz 
Mensch, wo er spielt,” and summarily claims this proposition will bear “das ganze Gebäude der 
ästhetischen Kunst und der noch schwierigern Lebenskunst” (ÄE 15; 9). For Rancière, the 
aesthetic revolution is the story of this und:  
Schiller says that aesthetic experience will bear the edifice of the art of the beautiful and of the art 
of living. The entire question of the ‘politics of aesthetics’ – in other words, of the aesthetic 
regime of art – turns on this short conjunction. The aesthetic experience is effective inasmuch as 
it is the experience of that and. It grounds the autonomy of art, to the extent that it connects it to 
the hope of ‘changing life’. (Dissensus 116) 
   
Art is autonomous insofar as it is distinguished from something outside it, yet an immanent 
condition of this autonomy is that art maintains a relation with its outside, with life. After 
Schiller introduces this tension in the Ästhetische Erziehung, all subsequent work in aesthetics is 
devoted to establishing the proper configuration of art and life. Rancière identifies two dominant 
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tendencies: on the one hand, there is the school of “art becomes life,” beginning with strains of 
German Idealism and early Romanticism, continuing through Marxism and manifest in 20th 
century movements like Art Deco and Bauhaus, in which art constructs possible forms of living 
and discharges itself into these forms, reconfiguring life while, at the final stage, abolishing itself 
as a separate condition; there is alternatively a “resistant” form, in which art refuses any sort of 
discharge or assimilation into life, instead insisting on enclosure as the stamp of its political 
commitment and “potential for emancipation,” a position that captures the whole trajectory of the 
modern avant-garde and is encapsulated theoretically in the work of Adorno.10  
 Schiller’s Ästhetische Erziehung is therefore a kind of theoretical flashpoint: it 
crystallizes a problematic that has occupied aesthetic work since, much like the execution of 
Louis XVI, for Lefort, symbolically inaugurates the political terrain of the modern. And if we 
consider Lefort and Rancière together, as I suggested earlier, we get not just two founding 
moments from 1790s Europe, but parallel histories of politics and aesthetics in the modern era 
that attest to the inseparability of these two categories, that display the thoroughgoing 
interpenetration of political and aesthetic logics since the 1790s. This is present formally in the 
explicitly theatrical vocabulary each thinker uses to designate politics, and substantively in the 
change in symbolic and practical function Lefort and Rancière ascribe to artists vis-à-vis their 
respective political life-worlds after the Revolution and Schiller. Finally, there is a conception of 
politics that is fundamentally rooted in conflict. Lefort’s monarchic dispositive and Rancière’s 
police are efforts to represent a false unity, a fictitious social whole that democracy and the 
people expose and disrupt. True politics, for Lefort and Rancière alike, is a condition of discord; 
																																																						





every society is insuperably riven with division, and post-1790s, the real danger comes from the 
drive to eliminate that division.  
That lesson may be most clear from the interval between their founding moments, after 
Louis’ execution and before Schiller’s treatise: 1793-94 in France, the years of Jacobin 
revolutionary government, the Committee of Public Safety, Robespierre, Saint-Just, the radical 
politics of revolutionary virtue and its practical wing, the Terror. 
 
 
Sublime Revolution: 1793-94 
 
In the months immediately following Louis’ execution, concern in France over threats both 
foreign and domestic prompted conception of an official body tasked with maintaining the 
security and integrity of the nascent, post-monarchical republic. To this end, creation of a 
Revolutionary Tribunal was decreed on March 10, and the Committee of Public Safety 
established on April 6; these two organs would later form the administrative centerpiece of the 
Terror. The journée of May 31-June 2 removed the moderate Girondins from the National 
Convention, and power lay decisively with the radical Jacobins and their figureheads: Marat, 
Robespierre and Saint-Just. On July 13, Marat was assassinated by Girondist sympathizer 
Charlotte Corday, giving momentum to already widespread paranoia over a counterrevolutionary 
plot. Robespierre and Saint-Just, both of whom sat on the Committee of Public Safety by late 
July, rhetorically codified that fear, and the Jacobin phase of the Revolution, from June 1793 to 
July 1794, was dominated by suspicion of an aristocratic conspiracy. Jacobin oratory, especially 
that of Robespierre, assumed the task of framing the precise nature of that threat.11 François 
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Furet gives a sense of the overall rhetorical parameters: in the Jacobin picture, “the people 
continued to be menaced by an anti-power, which like the nation was abstract, omnipresent, and 
all-enveloping, but which was hidden where the nation was public, individual where the nation 
was universal, and harmful where the nation was good. This anti-power was thus the negative, 
the inverse, the anti-principle of the nation.”12  
The Terror itself began in earnest shortly after Robespierre was elected to the Committee. 
In the spring and summer months of 1793, a number of repressive measures and executions had 
been justified with reference to the fact that France was at war—at that point, with Austria and 
Prussia—and could not, in the name of security, tolerate any sedition. But as Furet writes, “from 
the autumn of 1793 to the spring of 1794 the case for the necessity of the Terror abandoned the 
circumstantial grounds of the war in favor of a more fundamental justification: nothing less than 
the Revolution itself” (“Terror,” 148). The vague, scheming “anti-power,” the enemy of “the 
people,” became the new reference-point of political action. There prevailed in those months an 
“ambition for regeneration” (Furet), in which the Jacobin government arrogated to itself the task 
of extirpating any and all anti-revolutionary elements from the populace. It was a considerable 
task—as Robespierre said in defense of the Committee on September 25, 1793, “everywhere 
[there are] traitors to expose.”13 
The number of executions increased dramatically after September 5. In October and 
November, many of the prominent Girondins deposed in June were guillotined, as were symbolic 
vestiges of the ancien régime like Louis’ widow, Marie Antoinette. On February 5, 1794, 
Robespierre gave an address to the Convention on “Principles of Political Morality,” which 
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emphasized the convergence of Terror and revolutionary virtue: “Terror is nothing but prompt, 
severe, inflexible justice; it is therefore an emanation of virtue,” he declared. “Intimidate by 
terror the enemies of liberty; and you will be right, as founders of the Republic. The revolution’s 
government is the despotism of liberty over tyranny.”14 In early April, Committee members 
Danton and Herault were among a group of moderate politicians executed for accommodating 
anti-revolutionary sentiment, and the infamous law of 22 Prairial (June 10) accomplished the 
operational streamlining of the Terror: no longer burdened by any meaningful judicial procedure, 
the Tribunal could (and did) accept even the most specious accusations of counterrevolutionary 
activity. The accused had virtually no opportunity for self-defense, and the punishment for all 
offences was death; there resulted a massive and unstable acceleration of executions in June and 
July 1794. The Terror had become a frightening burden, and on July 27, exactly one year after he 
joined the Committee of Public Safety, Robespierre, Saint-Just, and a dozen other prominent 
Jacobins were arrested on order of the Convention. They were guillotined without trial the next 
day, and so ended the Terror. 
The administrative tendency in the months leading up to the “Great Terror” of June and 
July 1794 was one of centralization:  
the people, it was assumed, now wanted what the Convention wanted, and the Convention wanted 
what Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety dictated. Between the autumn of 1793 and 
the spring of 1794 Robespierre left his stamp on the unfinished process of restoring the state: the 
Convention was muzzled, the organization of the popular movement was dismantled, the clubs 
were transformed into cogs in the bureaucratic machinery, and local autonomy was destroyed. All 
that had originated at the base and periphery was transferred to the summit and center.15 
 
This is a revolutionary politics that begins and ends with the figure of Robespierre: he effectively 
supervises the Committee; the Committee controls the Convention, which ostensibly represents 
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the people, but this “people” is chiefly a rhetorical entity constructed, and its wishes fixed, by 
Robespierre, whose central role in the Terror combined exhaustive administrative oversight with 
the effort’s justificatory framing.16 Thanks largely to Robespierre’s oratory, centralization of 
authority (around him) was accompanied at all points by a distinct ideological matrix: 
revolutionary virtue; national regeneration; “severity” in the name of popular unity.17 
In articulating this platform, Robespierre consistently invoked the aesthetic category of 
the sublime. His “Principles of Political Morality” take as axiomatic the “great purity of the 
foundations of the French Revolution, the very sublimity of its objective,” and he referred to the 
Revolution’s “sublime” popular cause in speeches defending the Committee of Public Safety 
(September 25, 1793), denouncing “enemies of the nation” (May 26, 1794), and in honor of the 
revolutionary government’s short-lived civic religion, the Cult of the Supreme Being (Culte de 
l’Être supreme), on the occasion of its first public festival (June 8, 1794, two days before the 
onset of the Great Terror).18 The last deserves special mention: Robespierre developed the Cult 
of the Supreme Being to replace the disgraced Cult of Reason (Culte de la Raison) that was 
dedicated in November 1793 and dissolved in late March 1794, when Robespierre had most of 
its leadership executed. The revolutionaries’ staunch opposition to the Catholic Church—the 
clerical arm of the ancien régime—left a spiritual lacuna in France; the Cult of Reason proposed 
rationality itself as the new object of worship. None of that presented an issue for Robespierre, 
but the bombast of the Cult’s rituals appalled him. Their events were “deliberately theatrical: an 
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intricate ceremony took place at Notre Dame where an actress from the Opera, dressed in tricolor 
garb and surrounded by two groups of young women in white, was paraded around the aisles and 
up to the altar.”19 The Cult celebrated reason via performance and spectacle. “By contrast,” 
writes Huet, Robespierre’s Festival of the Supreme Being “was to be a festival without images or 
representations… when Robespierre proposed the Cult of the Supreme Being, he explicitly 
sought to bring the Revolution back to a form of worship that would owe nothing to previous 
religions or their images” (“Performing Arts,” 138-39). 
The problem, for Robespierre, was “idolatry,” the practice of sensuously presenting or 
honoring a deity, of fixing it to an image: as we saw in the introduction, Robespierre wanted to 
create a form of worship modelled on the sublime, totally stripped of any sensuous component.  
And as Huet observes, it hardly seems random that the Festival of the Supreme Being was held 
on the eve of 22 Prairial, which dispensed with legal representation for the accused, nor that 
these were signature projects of Robespierre and the Jacobin radicals, whose principal departure 
from their moderate Girondist predecessors concerned the question of representative versus 
direct democracy.20 The common enemy is representation itself: the sublime Supreme Being 
cannot be degraded by a representative image; enemies of the people are denied representation in 
court; and the will of the people, rather than being represented by politicians, directly animates 
the course of government. The Revolution itself Robespierre “tried to define… as sublime, as an 
ideal that would transcend all representation and escape all misrepresentation, as a rhetorical 
purity that could only be expressed in a negative form” (Huet 141). For Robespierrist politics, 
																																																						
19 Huet, “Performing Arts,” 138. See introduction as well. 
20 Huet, “Performing Arts,” 140. See also Denis Richet, “Revolutionary Journées,” Critical Dictionary of the 





the power of revolutionary virtue lay in its immediacy, its independence from any symbol, 
image, or sense representation of whatever kind.  
Shortly before sublimity became a hallmark of Jacobin politics, it was the centerpiece of 
Schiller’s aesthetic theory. Initially, Schiller came to the sublime through his work as a 
playwright, and specifically his interest in the concept of tragedy. His essays “Über den Grund 
des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen” and “Über die tragische Kunst” in the journal 
Neue Thalia mark what Beiser calls Schiller’s entry into a “much longer conversation” on a 
“classical problem in aesthetics”—why do people take pleasure in tragedy?21 The question 
becomes an occasion for Schiller to divide the arts between “fine” and “affective” modes—
schöne and rührende Kunst—on the basis of (Kantian) mental faculties: fine art connects 
Einbildungskraft (Imagination) and Verstand (Understanding), and thus shares the latter’s 
foundation in the manifold of sense experience; alternatively, affective art conjoins imagination 
and Vernunft (Reason), which is indifferent to sense experience, and instead occupies itself with 
ideas and a priori principles. There is thus a sensuous aspect to pleasure in fine art, where there is 
none in the affective mode. For Schiller in 1792, this makes the latter essentially more free: 
Frei aber nenne ich dasjenige Vergnügen, wobei die Gemütskräfte nach ihren eigenen Gesetzen 
affiziert werden, und wo die Empfindung durch eine Vorstellung erzeugt wird; im Gegensatz von 
dem physischen oder sinnlichen Vergnügen, wobei die Seele dem Mechanismus unterwürfig, nach 
fremden Gesetzen beweft wird, und die Empfindung unmittelbar auf ihre physische Ursache 
erfolget.22 
 
In a free state, mental powers (“Gemütskräfte”) like Vernunft and Einbildungskraft are subject to 
their own laws (“nach ihren eigenen Gesetzen”) alone. Schiller contrasts this freedom with a 
condition in which physical, sensuous forces encroach on the operations of the mind, making the 
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soul subordinate to mechanical functions (“die Seele dem Mechanismus unterwürfig”). The 
pleasure associated with the latter state Schiller calls “die sinnliche Lust,” and it poses a 
challenge for the kind of artistic practice he wants to develop: 
Die sinnliche Lust ist die einzige, die vom Gebiet der schönen Kunst ausgeschlossen wird, und 
eine Geschicklichkeit, die sinnliche Lust zu erwecken, kann sich nie oder alsdann nur zur Kunst 
erheben, wenn die sinnlichen Eindrücke nach einem Kunstplan geordnet, verstärkt oder gemäβigt 
werden und diese Planmäβigkeit durch die Vorstellung erkannt wird. (“Über den Grund des 
Vergnügens,” TS 237) 
 
Sense pleasure is only permissible when subjected to the rigors of an artistic design which is 
itself subject to intellectual determination (“durch die Vorstellung erkannt”). And in “Über den 
Grund des Vergnügens,” Schiller conceives of intellectual determination as the opposite of sense 
pleasure, as pain. Thus the crucial function of the sublime:  
Der Gegenstand des Erhabenen widerstreitet also unserm sinnlichen Vermögen, und 
diese Unzweckmäβigkeit muβ uns notwendig Unlust erwecken.  Aber sie wird zugleich 
eine Veranlassung, ein anderes Vermögen in uns zu unserm Bewuβtsein zu bringen, 
welches demjenigen, woran die Einbildungskraft erliegt, überlegen ist. (“Über den Grund 
des Vergnügens,” TS 239) 
 
The sublime object contradicts our whole physical sensibility, inflicts a kind of pain, provokes an 
aversion.  We are disinclined from what we experience, and it is precisely that moment of 
discontent that provides an occasion (“Veranlassung”) to become conscious of a certain higher 
faculty, “ein anderes [überlegenes] Vermögen.” 
This superlative power is a moral system that registers itself through conflict: “Diese 
moralische Zweckmäßigkeit wird am lebendigsten erkannt, wenn sie im Widerspruch mit andern 
die Oberhand behält; nur dann erweist sich die ganze Macht des Sittengesetzes, wenn es mit 
allen übrigen Naturkräften im Streit gezeigt wird” (“Über den Grund des Vergnügens,” TS 241). 
The moral prerogative is to dominate the physical world and its “Naturkräfte,” which for Schiller 
here include “Empfindungen, Triebe, Affekte, Leidenschaften so gut als die physische 





forces, the grander morality’s final victory over them.23  And here we get a new kind of pleasure, 
“die moralische Lust,” which Schiller suggests tragedy is uniquely suited to provide. It is 
important to recognize that sensuousness and morality are not simply separate orders that have 
circumstantially come into conflict—they are conjoined in a hermetic logical antagonism. 
Consider the following language from “Über die tragische Kunst”: “Je lebhafter die Sinnlichkeit 
erwacht, desto schwächer wird sie Sittlichkeit wirken, und umgekehrt, jemehr jene von ihrer 
Macht verliert, desto mehr wird diese an Stärke gewinnen” (TS 262). The opposition is absolute; 
natural and moral tendencies are mutually exclusive.  
A similar formulation opens “Vom Erhabenen,” published in September 1793: “Erhaben 
nennen wir ein Objekt, bei dessen Vorstellung unsre sinnliche Natur ihre Schranken, unsre 
vernünftige Natur aber ihre Überlegenheit, ihre Freiheit von Schranken fühlt; gegen das wir also 
physisch den Kürzern ziehen, über welches wir uns aber moralisch d.i. durch Ideen erheben” (TS 
395; original emphasis). The tight logical relation is there again: in a sublime context, the 
diminution of the sensuous category is simultaneously the elevation of the moral, which here is 
synonymous with Vernunft (“moralisch, d.i. durch Ideen”) and hence freedom: “Nur als 
Sinnenwesen sind wir abhänging, als Vernunftwesen sind wir frei” (“Vom Erhabenen,” TS 395). 
The statement suggests an overall analogy in which the relationship between sense and reason is 
the same as that between dependency and freedom—namely, that they are conceptual as well as 
practical opposites. And in “Über das Pathetische”—the companion piece to Vom Erhabenen, 
published in the same issue of Neue Thalia—Schiller states sublimity can only be rational, and 
never sensuous: “Wirkungen aber, welche bloβ auf eine sinnliche Quelle schlieβen lassen und 
bloβ in der Affektion des Gefühlsvermögens gegründet sind, sind niemals erhaben… denn alles 
																																																						





Erhabene stammt nur aus der Vernunft” (TS 428; original emphasis). It is also in “Über das 
Pathetische” that Schiller declares the final goal of all art to be representation of the 
supersensible, for which tragic form is uniquely suited: “Der letzte Zweck der Kunst ist die 
Darstellung des Übersinnlichen und die tragische Kunst insbesondere bewerkstelligt dieses 
dadurch, daβ sie uns die moralische Independenz von Naturgesetzen im Zustand des Affekts 
versinnlicht” (TS 423). Tragic art is ideally equipped to depict the supersensible because tragedy, 
more than any other form, showcases moral autonomy from the sense world, independence from 
the laws of nature. In other words, tragedy delivers transcendence because it is sublime. 
These pieces together constitute Schiller’s attempt to ground an aesthetics of tragedy on 
the concept of the sublime. Their publication period is early 1792 to September 1793, during 
which time was Schiller was closely watching events in France. Though a skeptic from the 
beginning, Beiser writes that Schiller “began to nurture some hopes for the Revolution” in 
autumn 1792, shortly after the monarchy was deposed in the journée of August 10.24 But with 
the trial and execution of the king, Schiller abandoned hope for the Revolution entirely.25 
Significantly, it is only after he definitively rejected the Revolution that Schiller began to focus 
hist theoretical efforts on the concept of beauty: he wrote the first Kallias-Brief to Gottfried 
Körner ten days after Louis was tried for treason, and the first of the Augustenburger Briefe is 
dated February 9, 1793—19 days after the execution. In June, Schiller published the essay “Über 
Anmut und Würde,” famous for its concept of the beautiful soul (“schöne Seele”), and his most 
extensive treatment of beauty before the Ästhetische Erziehung.  
																																																						
24 Frederick Beiser. Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism (Harvard University Press, 1992), 95. The French 
monarchy fell in the journée of 10 August 1792. Subsequent in-text citations as ERR. 
25 Peter-André Alt: Schiller considers it a “Misslingen einer republikanischen Erneuerung des Staates”; Norbert 
Oellers: a “Verwilderung der politischen Sitten.” Alt in “‘Arbeit für mehr als ein Jahrhundert’: Schillers Verständnis 
von Ästhetik und Politik in der Periode der Französischen Revolution (1790-1800).” Jahrbuch der deutschen 
Schillergesellschaft (2002), 107; Oellers in “Bürger von Frankreich – Schiller und die Französische Revolution.” 





But Schiller was still actively theorizing and publishing on sublimity—his last two pieces 
devoted to it appeared in September 1793, the same month Robespierre and the Jacobins codify 
the Terror, an operation explicitly framed as sublime. The parallels are plain to see: Schiller and 
Robespierre alike posit a type of morality that authenticates itself by obliterating the corruption 
of the empirical world, that stems solely from the rational character of human beings, that is in 
no way beholden to any form of sense experience or expression. Schiller’s tragic art and 
Robespierre’s Terror seem to aim at the same thing through antagonistic means: das 
Übersinnliche, moral freedom, revolutionary virtue. I argue we can perceive in Schiller’s turn 
away from sublime aesthetics a specific form of the anxiety that afflicted Enlightenment 
intellectuals everywhere as they observed the Terror: as Beiser writes, “it was in the name of 
reason” that the Jacobins “conceived and executed the Terror… it is reason that sanctions the use 
of force against those who oppose the Revolution. For reason demands that we use every means 
necessary to achieve its ends, and the only effective measure against counterrevolutionary force 
is greater force. Hence even the Terror seemed to receive the blessing of reason itself” (ERR 2). 
The Terror justified itself using Enlightenment reason, and German Aufklärer scrambled to 
defend or modify their principles. For Schiller, circumstances implicated the position of the 
sublime: Jacobinism staged it for him as a political principle, and the Terror showed him its 
violent, terrifying potential.  But the situation also showed him what Lefort would demonstrate 
two centuries later: after the death of the king, alternative discursive paradigms—in this case, 
aesthetics—could be called upon to frame and legitimate political programs. Sublimity had 
migrated into political life via the Jacobins, and with his subsequent theoretical work, Schiller 







Politics of the Beautiful: 1795 
 
The Ästhetische Erziehung began to appear in January 1795, in Schiller’s new periodical, Die 
Horen. As I’ve suggested, the treatise is a change of course in Schiller’s aesthetic thought: 
previously preoccupied with the sublime, Schiller now builds a theoretical system around the 
category of beauty. The chief difference between the two modes involves the relationship 
between rational and sensible faculties: while beauty harmonizes them, sublimity presents them 
in conflict, thus setting the stage for the reason’s victory over sense.26  This is Schiller’s formula 
of sublime morality. It was also the formula of Robespierre’s Terror, and I’ve claimed Schiller is 
led to demote sublimity after witnessing the carnage it can occasion as a paradigm of 
government. After the Terror, Schiller never presented the sublime with quite the same moral 
rigidity as he did in 1792-93. His last essay on the subject, “Über das Erhabene”—first published 
in 1801 but probably written in 1794—already describes the need to reconcile sublime and 
beautiful modes, and by extension, reason and nature: “Nur wenn das Erhabene mit dem 
Schönen sich gattet und unsre Empfänglichkeit für beides in gleichem Maß ausgebildet worden 
ist, sind wir vollendete Bürger der Natur, ohne deswegen ihre Sklaven zu sein und ohne unser 
Bürgerrecht der intelligibeln Welt zu verscherzen” (TS 839). This sentence describes a 
possibility wholly alien to the Neue Thalia essays of 1792-93: sublimity and beauty joining 
(“sich gatten”) to create a more complete form of belonging in both natural and intellectual 
worlds. This is an important theme in Schiller’s aesthetics of beauty: restoring mutuality to 
categories previously understood to be essentially in conflict. It is also in “Über das Erhabene” 
that Schiller first calls for a program of aesthetic education by name: “weil es einmal unsre 
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stresses [in the sublime period], however, that it is only the sublime that gives us knowledge of ourselves as rational 






Bestimmung ist, auch bei allen sinnlichen Schranken uns nach dem Gesetzbuch reiner Geister zu 
richten, so muß das Erhabene zu dem Schönen hinzukommen, um die ästhetische Erziehung zu 
einem vollständigen Ganzen zu machen” (TS 838; original emphasis). Sensibility and spiritual 
principles (“sinnliche Schranken,” “Gesetzbuch reiner Geister”) are regions Schiller had 
theorized as antagonistic in his earlier essays, but here they come together, along with the 
sublime and the beautiful, in order to complete the process of aesthetic education.  
 The chief task of the 1795 treatise is to recuperate and foreground beauty—having 
already propounded the sublime in his Neue Thalia essays, Schiller can only bring the aesthetic 
program he envisions “zu einem vollständingen Ganzen” by integrating its counterpart, the 
beautiful.27 Plus, only beauty retains the category of sense, so far as it harmonizes with reason; 
sublimity alone consigns sensibility to forceful suppression in the name of moral 
transcendence—it is strictly an oppositional category to be eliminated or overcome, as it was for 
Robespierre.28 Schiller needs to retain Sinnlichkeit in order to check a specifically sublime form 
of violence. The way he does that in 1795 is more sophisticated than in 1793, suggesting the 
Ästhetische Erziehung is more than a straightforward elevation of an already-theorized notion of 
beauty: while in the earlier conception, reason and sense simply enter into harmony, a central 
innovation of the aesthetic letters is the play-drive (Spieltrieb), a third term that brings the 
conflicting faculties—represented in the vocabulary of the Ästhetische Erziehung by respective 
formal and sensuous drives, Form- and Stofftrieb—into productive interplay. Some kind of 
exchange between them is important: Stofftrieb alone consigns us to base physicality and pure 
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materialistic self-interest, while we need only look to the Terror for the grim terminus of an 
unqualified Formtrieb.  
Beauty in 1793 harmonizes form and sense where sublimity holds them in total 
opposition; alternatively, Spiel makes them reciprocal (wechselseitig). Reciprocity 
(Wechselwirkung) involves conceptual situations like the following: “von dem physischen 
Charakter die Willkür und von dem moralischen die Freiheit abzusondern—es käme darauf an, 
den ersten mit Gesetzen übereinstimmend, den letztern von Eindrücken abhängig zu machen” 
(ÄE 3; 5). In this instance, physicality and morality productively exchange properties: our bodily 
character loses its arbitrariness (“Willkür”) and becomes subject to laws (“mit Gesetzen 
übereinstimmend”), while our moral character is made open to sense-impressions (“von 
Eindrücken abhängig”). A similar formulation from the aesthetic letters: “Der sinnliche Trieb… 
will sein Objekt empfangen; der Formtrieb… will sein Objekt hervorbringen: der Spieltrieb wird 
also bestrebt sein, so zu empfangen, wie er selbst hervorgebracht hätte, und so hervorzubringen, 
wie der Sinn es zu empfangen trachtet” (ÄE 14; 4). The play-drive makes form- and sense-drives 
reciprocal by combining their qualities—in this case, the respective needs to produce and to 
receive an object. 
Wechselwirkung, understood in this way, is more nuanced than harmonious accord. In a 
condition of play, form and sense start to assume each other’s determinants and qualities: bodies 
accept the direction of law, while reason takes certain cues from sense-data, and in one nimble 
operation of the play-drive, the sense-component can receive an object with the impression of 





receive it.29 And while, prior to 1795, the relationship between form and sense is a matter of 
denotative fiat—beauty: harmony; sublime: opposition—the Ästhetische Erziehung inserts an 
element of contingency: “Wahr ist es, [der Triebe] Tendenzen widersprechen sich, aber, was 
wohl zu bemerken ist, nicht in denselben Objekten, und was nicht aufeinander trifft, kann nicht 
gegeneinander stossen” (ÄE 13; 2). Fundamentally, form and sense can pursue respective 
agendas without infringing on one another’s operations; those agendas are not mutually 
exclusive or zero-sum.  And if the two appear in contention, “so sind sie es erst geworden durch 
eine freie Übertretung der Natur, indem sie sich selbst missverstehen und ihre Sphären 
verwirren” (ÄE 13; 2). It is a situational effect and error—not a conceptual inevitability—that 
form and sense come into conflict. This is Schiller’s diagnosis of the French Revolution: the 
revolutionary event found a popular base that, by virtue of historical factors like the division of 
labor and social stratification, suffered from a dangerous imbalance of form and sense.30 As a 
result, the French were unprepared for their new freedoms, and abused them violently.  
The task, then, is to cultivate internal conditions that facilitate proper handling of 
external liberties—the telos of aesthetic education is first and foremost “wholeness of character” 
(Totalität des Charakters), in which Wechselwirkung obtains between inner faculties of form and 
sense. That Totalität is absent in the 1790s neither by accident nor necessity—it is a product of 
social history.31 In other words, Schiller is proposing an anthropology: his chief concern is the 
developmental trajectory and properties of human beings, under which rubric Schiller interprets 
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30 Alt, “Arbeit,” 108: Schiller attributes the failure to a “fehlende leibseelische Totalität des neuzeitlichen 
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the modern malformation of form and sense drives, as well as the resultant political disaster.32 
Consistent with this anthropological understanding, Schiller defines Spiel—the crucial 
innovation that overcomes the drives’ discordance—as human completeness itself: “der Mensch 
spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des Worts Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er 
spielt” (ÄE 15; 9). Elliptical statements like that, together with the anthropological orientation of 
the work as a whole, have enticed many to conclude the aesthetic letters are Schiller’s flight from 
difficult political realities into ‘apolitical humanism,’ a commonplace that recent scholarship has 
helped to dislodge.33  
Exactly the opposite is the case: the Ästhetische Erziehung is expressly political, most 
explicitly when it comes to determining the ends of artistic practice. In letter two, Schiller 
defines the “most perfect work of art” as the “construction of true political freedom,”34 where, 
not two years previously in “Über das Pathetische,” he defined art’s “final purpose” (“letzter 
Zweck”) as the presentation of supersensible morality.35 But Schiller’s politics is indirect, and 
this is what makes it appear disengaged. Directness is a problem for Schiller—in his view it was 
the problem of the Revolution: the revolutionaries went straight from (as they conceived it) 
tyranny to liberty, and ended at carnage. Schiller’s contribution is the intermediary condition of 
the aesthetic, a preparatory ground where internal faculties can be reciprocally configured. 
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geistig-sinnliche Durchformung des Individuums zurückführen, ist mithin anthropologisch, nicht aber intellektuell-
programmatisch bedingt.”  
33 The prevalent and misguided tendency is traceable to Lukacs—see Alt, “Arbeit,” 109; the political dimension of 
Schiller’s aesthetics is pronounced in Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher; Alt, “Arbeit”; Oellers, “Bürger von 
Frankreich”; Karthaus, “Schiller und die Französische Revolution”; and was already picked up on by Jameson in 
Marxism and Form (1971; see 89-90), who was writing very much against the Lukacsian grain. Subsequent in-text 
citations of Jameson as MF. 
34 “…sich mit dem vollkommensten aller Kunstwerke, mit dem Bau einer wahren politischen Freiheit zu 
beschäftigen” (ÄE 2;1). 
35 Alt, “Arbeit,” 116: “Im Erhabenen ist die politische Moral, in der Erfahrung des Schönen die Idee staatlicher 





Before being liberated as political subjects, we need to secure a more basic human freedom—
internal reciprocity of the drives—and we achieve the latter only aesthetically.36 As the passage I 
quoted in the introduction to this chapter (ÄE 2; 5) makes clear, Schiller believes the only 
prospect for political progress is the aesthetic path (“durch das ästhetische den Weg nehmen”), 
and specifically that of Schönheit. Aesthetic education is the far-sighted alternative to the 
premature immediacy of Revolution,37 and its reciprocal design combats two prevalent forms of 
political degeneracy, each derived from a specific imbalance: barbarism—the crime of the 
Jacobins, in which “Grundsätze” destroy “Gefühle”—and savagery, where sense-impulses 
tyrannize over principle (ÄE 4; 6). 
Nonetheless, Schiller offers no injunctions, or even instructions of any kind, for 
politicians. This decision relates to another property that makes Ästhetische Erziehung seem 
apolitical, but is in fact a core component of its politics: the autonomy of art. The Jacobin 
episode made evident the dark side of state-mandated virtue, which complemented Schiller’s 
own liberal aversion to any government program of civic education.38 Such a program had to 
come from citizens themselves—in Schiller’s case, artists, who in keeping themselves separate 
from the official machinery of the state, are better able to assess, criticize or affirm its operations. 
Peter-André Alt describes one major boon of this distance: art can disclose freedom in a world 
that is unfree. 
Schiller versteht [gegen Herder] unter der Kunstautonomie die Freiheit von vorgängigen 
Zwecken und, damit verknüpft, eine Form der funktionalen Selbstbindung… diese 
Selbstbindung… ermöglicht es der Literatur, sich gegen die Kontingenz eines permanenten 
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Weltbezugs zu schützen, zugleich jedoch den Vorschein der sozialen Freiheit im freien Spiel ihrer 
Formen sichtbar zu machen. (“Arbeit,” 116) 
 
Art discloses possibilities—in this instance, emancipatory opportunities occluded in the course of 
worldly events. Following Alt, we should understand beauty “nicht als Exil des enttäuschten 
Zeitkritikers [Lukacs et al.], sondern als Erprobungsraum für die Erfahrung gesellschaftlicher 
Autonomie” (“Arbeit,” 118). The art of the beautiful is an experimental space for the 
presentation of social forms. Fredric Jameson likens the experience to an “apprenticeship for the 
real political and social freedom to come. In art, consciousness prepares itself for a change in the 
world itself and at the same time learns to make demands on the real world which hasten that 
change” (MF 90) Art brings empirical conditions into exchange with an imaginary—we might 
say hypothetical—mode, and in so doing, constructs a “revolutionary blueprint,” an image of 
political transformation—such, for Jameson, is the politics of Schiller’s aesthetic program. This 
is paradoxical autonomy Rancière finds so innovative in Schiller: art engages politics precisely 
in maintaining some remoteness from the political, in constructing an alternate “sensorium” 
outside the everyday public rhythms that are the object of politics proper. 
 The onus of social change is thus on the practitioners of this sensorium—Beiser observes 
that “on a practical level, [aesthetic education] puts an enormous burden on the artists who would 
execute it. For they not only have to maintain their integrity throughout the corruptions of the 
age, but they also have to influence the public. Furthermore, they must achieve all this without 
the aid of the government” (SP 129). The question of how artistic works are supposed to do 
that—a matter never engaged directly in Schiller’s treatise—occupies the last section of this 
chapter. As a prelude to that discussion, I want to introduce a relationship that is crucial for my 







History and Spiel 
 
The Jacobins renounced history as both a fact and a concept. A central conceit of their political 
program was a radical break from the history of French monarchy and all vestiges of the ancien 
régime. This was the revolutionary imperative of regeneration, and it called for far more than a 
series of institutional corrections: as Furet writes, “the issue was not to reform French society but 
to reinstitute the social pact on the basis of man’s free will” (“Terror,” 148). Rather than 
capitulate to tradition, as had their predecessors, the Jacobins proposed to fashion anew the 
French nation—theirs was a political morality that built from the ground up, in which process the 
Terror played a crucial role: “If the Republic of free citizens was not yet possible, it was because 
men, perverted by their past history, were wicked; by means of the Terror, the Revolution—a 
history without precedent, entirely new—would make a new man” (Furet 148-49). What 
remained of the past had to be purged—its remnants infected the national body and manifested in 
a deficit of revolutionary virtue. It was exactly that absence that the Terror was designed to 
remedy: in eliminating counterrevolutionaries, i.e. adherents of traditional society, it forcefully 
integrated a national consensus “without precedent.” In other words, the Jacobins could defend 
trumpeting “the people” of France while killing thousands of those actual people by leveraging a 
specific conception of history: those still tainted by the past were in fact enemies of “the people,” 
and the popular cause demanded that they be removed.39  
 This particular feature of Jacobin revolutionary ideology—its insistence on the absolute 
newness of the Revolution—was one of the most contrary to Schiller tendencies, and not just 
because of its programmatic linkage to the Terror. Schiller himself was an academic historian 
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who, in the years immediately preceding the appearance of his Neue Thalia essays, published 
studies of the Dutch Revolt, the Thirty-Years War, and other significant episodes in European 
history. In “Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte?”, his inaugural 
lecture as a history professor at Jena in May 1789, he expounded the merits of universal history 
as a course of study. Wolfgang Riedel has argued that “the reconciliation of the ideal with the 
principle of reality can be seen most clearly in Schiller’s relationship to history”— Schiller’s 
ongoing examination of the historical process led him to question the teleological optimism of 
his youth, and he continued to revise his (ideal) conception of history as more concrete data 
came in.40 That is to say, while Schiller’s conception of history—his understanding of its 
properties, implications, and their bearing on the present—may have changed throughout his life, 
at no point did he wholly abandon the category itself. If he had reservations about the manifest 
course of history, he nonetheless never approached Robespierre’s conceit of a totally new 
beginning, outside any antecedent process. But the French Revolution, and especially the Terror, 
posed a problem for Schiller that concerned precisely this question, i.e. the status of history: the 
Jacobin phase showed him the danger of a totally ahistorical political ideology, but he could not 
simply counter Robespierre and unconditionally affirm history, because exactly this history had 
terminated in the Terror. In short, Schiller wanted to adopt a critical distance to history as it had 
transpired empirically, while retaining it both as a productive category in itself and a check on 
any potentially barbarous politics of national renewal. 
  One solution lay in the aesthetic letters: Spiel. Schiller could render the opposed terms—
in this case, total renunciation and affirmation of history—reciprocal. But first, he had to 
demonstrate some analogy between those principles and the antagonism between form and sense 
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that is the natural jurisdiction of the play-drive. The evidence was there: in their complete break 
with history, the Jacobins elevated reason itself, the most complete manifestation of formality, as 
the source of social design; it was only in utterly expunging the past that a fully rational—the 
form-drive demands totality—plan could be imposed. Jacobin governance was invention as pure 
activity with no external check, unqualified acting-on, exactly the one-sided prerogative of the 
Formtrieb. Conversely, the Jacobins consistently framed the concrete history they opposed, the 
ancien régime, in terms of corruption, venality, self-interest, encroachment—the very sins of the 
Stofftrieb.41 And more generally, empirical history has produced the world as it is (available for 
our sense experience). It is past, yes, but all that is manifestly present belongs to its trajectory. 
There is alternatively the category of the possible, history as it could have been. We engage 
possibility through the imagination—formally, in terms of aesthetic education, because 
possibilities are not available to sense—just as we sensuously experience the path of empirical 
history in the course of our daily lives. What would it look like to put these categories into play? 
  Correspondence with Goethe and Körner later in the decade suggests Schiller tries to do 
exactly that, but in a new context. The letter of July 19, 1799 to Goethe is representative: three 
months into writing Maria Stuart (1800), Schiller reports he is experiencing difficulty, “weil ich 
den poetischen Kampf mit dem historischen Stoff darinn bestehen mußte und Mühe brauchte, der 
Phantasie eine Freiheit über die Geschichte zu verschaffen” (Klassische Dramen 545). Maria 
Stuart is a history play, and at first glance, it appears Schiller wants to free his active faculty 
(“Phantasie”) from the bonds of historical “Stoff,” his chosen empirical material. (First note the 
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use of “Stoff” here already implies semantically the analogy I describe in the last paragraph: 
Stoff is the content of history.42) But why is this even a problem? Why doesn’t he simply write 
straight from his imagination? That would be to forego Spiel, to abandon any reciprocal 
exchange between history and possibility. There is no reason for Schiller to write the letter, other 
than that he has imposed this task on himself—he needs both Phantasie and Stoff, and he is 
struggling with how to configure them. He knows that he does not want to present either alone: 
pure fantasy replicates the conceit of the Jacobins, while writing a play that strives to represent 
the past “as it was” would simply display a problematic empirical history he wants to criticize.  
 Schiller’s dramatic work at the end of the 1790s attests to the persistence of this 
problematic. After concluding his theoretical period with Über naive und sentimentalische 
Dichtung (1795-96), Schiller made a forceful return to playwriting with the Wallenstein trilogy 
(1798-99), Maria Stuart, and Die Jungfrau von Orleans (1801). The plays follow in rapid 
succession, and appear to display a common principle: each is explicitly grounded in empirical 
circumstances—General Wallenstein, Mary Stuart and Joan of Arc are and were well-known, as 
were the surrounding political conflicts in which they figured—and yet contains marked 
interventions by Schiller, among them Max Piccolomini in Wallenstein, Mortimer in Maria 
Stuart, and in Die Jungfrau von Orleans, Johanna’s death in battle versus at the stake. Schiller’s 
inventions are decisive elements in the dramas; fantasy and history together propel the action, the 
environment of which is the empirical past. The plays almost seem to advance an historiographic 
maxim: that one should engage history with both internal faculties—Form-Phantasie and Stoff-
Vergangenheit—in play. The dramas themselves suggest the historical misfortunes they depict 
result from an imbalance of forces, but that is a discussion I will reserve for chapter two. For the 
																																																						
42 This use is consistent in Schiller’s correspondence regarding the history plays. See also January 5, 1801 to Körner 





moment, Ulrich Karthaus has a formula that captures well the relationship between history and 
aesthetic play I’ve tried to describe here: Schiller is chiefly interested in “den ästhetischen 
Schein, der allein das Reich der Freiheit darstellen kann. Die Wirklichkeit dient ihm dabei als 
Stoff, der veredelt, gesteigert, womöglich auch getilgt werden muß” (“Französische Revolution,” 
238; original emphasis). 
 
 
Drama as Praxis 
 
Schiller’s Ästhetische Erziehung contains no direct prescriptions for the realization of its 
program, but that does not mean the practical component of aesthetic education is purely a matter 
of speculation. I will contend the three dramas I mentioned above—Wallenstein, Maria Stuart, 
and Die Jungfrau von Orleans, which directly follow the last aesthetic treatises 
chronologically—are just such a form of praxis, are attempts to instantiate the program of 
aesthetic education. We know from Schiller this praxis has to be artistic: the French Revolution 
made clear that direct application of philosophical principles to extant political realities, when 
people are not prepared to wield those principles, fails catastrophically; Schiller’s liberalism 
forbade his simply relinquishing the task to politicians; and the whole episode of the Revolution 
displayed a gross impoverishment (to speak modestly) of sensibility. Therefore the alternative 
had to be indirect, pedagogical, popular, and sensuous. Among the art forms, theater is uniquely 
suited to those demands.  
 It is important to remember that the institution of the theater was central to the initial, 
pre-Jacobin phase of the French Revolution (1789-92). As I describe in the introduction, the 
ancien régime had systematically disenfranchised and degraded most Paris playhouses, banning 





perform silently behind a veil) in the years leading up to 1789.43 Reversing the ancien régime on 
this count was an organizing priority of the Revolution’s first wave, which, to quote Huet, 
meant to stage both the erasure of the old regime and the emergence of the new order, using what 
the Revolutions de Paris called “the powerful language of images.” The desire for a public 
revolution was further enhanced by a series of decrees regulating all levels of performance, 
permitting the unchecked proliferation of theaters, the simultaneous rehabilitation of the actor and 
the executioner, and the decision, by the Convention, that a selection of patriotic plays be 
produced, at no cost to the public, for the education and benefit of all citizens. The use of Paris as 
a stage for the revolutionary project was extraordinarily successful, and observers could not help 
seeing the events of 1789 and 1792 as a powerful, if mixed, theatrical genre. (“Performing Arts,” 
136)44 
 
In its first few years, the Revolution framed itself as a spectacle, as a display of popular renewal. 
It is thus no surprise that Lefort and Rancière will later characterize the politics of the 
revolutionary period as theatrical—in fact their language starts to seem much less figurative—
nor that the Jacobins, on this particular question, quite resembled the ancien régime: theater was 
the hallmark of the Revolution’s moderate phase, its early stage driven by the Girondins. 
Spectacle, image, sensation, ultimately linguistic representation itself—in Robespierre’s vision, 
these could only stand between citizens and revolutionary virtue (Huet 142-3). The trappings of 
theater diluted the power of the Revolution, and the moderates of 1789-92, who would 
eventually oppose the king’s execution—for Robespierre, an unforgiveable treason—were proof. 
Robespierre’s own espoused sublimity—his intense pursuit of the ineffable, the unrepresentably 
absolute, virtue so pure it could not even be stated—was more precise than its antecedent 
philosophical formulations: it had a specifically anti-theatrical agenda. Robespierre renounced 
spectacles, representative statements, and the very notion that works of theater have any 
productive role in a republic. In the spring of 1794, ancien-style censorship was again imposed 
on the playhouses, this time by the Jacobins (Huet 138). 
																																																						
43 For this whole progression, see my introduction above and Huet, “Performing Arts,” 137. 






 Aesthetic education is the programmatic counter to Jacobin aesthetics (if we can call it 
that), and it is not hard to see Schiller’s subsequent literary work as its creative extension. 
Schiller selects the Jacobins’ hated genre, theater, and the conceptual touchstones of his late 
history plays are mediation and representation. He engages his present, but only indirectly, by 
writing dramas about the political past.45 These plays present historical personages, but, 
consistent with Schiller’s own dramatic principles, idealize and elevate them into representative 
figures in a human typology. As Schiller writes in “Über den Gebrauch des Chors in der 
Tragödie,” his preface to Die Braut von Messina (1803), “die tragischen Personen… sind keine 
wirkliche Wesen, die bloß der Gewalt des Moments gehorchen und bloß ein Individuum 
darstellen, sondern ideale Personen und Repräsentanten ihrer Gattung, die das Tiefe der 
Menschheit aussprechen” (KD 289-90). In this way, Schiller’s dramatis personae embody 
principles, but that is never the whole story: the plays show these principles in contest not just 
with each other, but with ambivalent real circumstances and limitations. They thus depict a 
specific kind of mediation—that experienced by ideality in its contact with material 
recalcitrance, indifference, confusion, contingency. Hence Riedel’s judgment that history is 
where Schiller reconciles the ideal with the real; and it is no accident Riedel chooses the late 
dramas as his occasion to profile Schiller the realist (“Religion and Violence,” 247-48). 
 All of which is packaged in a theatrical display. Where Robespierre renounced images 
and words in the name of moral immediacy, aesthetic education takes as its vehicle the live aural 
																																																						
45 Alt, “Arbeit,” 118-19: “Vergangenheit, wie sie im Wettstreit mit der Antike hervortritt, und Zukunft, die im 
Entwurf der Ideen von Mensch, Geschichte und Gesellschaft umrissen wird, stehen in Schillers Denkmodell am 
Beginn, währen die Gegenwart gerade das ist, was später zur Erscheinung kommt. Die Freiheit der Kunst, die dem 
Menschen im Medium ästhetischer Erfahrung Autonomie-Experimente ermöglicht, ist nur dort gegeben, wo die 






and visual representation of an event. Drama belongs to the category Schein that is central to the 
educative capacity of beauty: 
Die für die Briefe zentrale Lehre vom Spiel als Organ der Freiheit, die in der Rezeption des 
Schönen erlebbar wird, ist zunächst eine Theorie des Scheins als Medium individueller 
Erfahrung. Sie schließt das Bewußtsein ein, daß der Mensch durch die Begegnung mit dem 
Schönen bisher unbekannte Einblicke in seine eigenen Handlungsoptionen gewinne. Das Schöne, 
so lautet Schillers fundamentale Prämisse, programmiert menschliche Erfahrung und bringt den 
Menschen im Wortsinn auf den ‘Geschmack der Freiheit’. (Alt, “Arbeit,” 111) 
 
Rather than issue a moral injunction—the modus operandi of Jacobin sublimity—the aesthetic 
image provides a “taste of freedom” by disclosing a range of possibilities for action; beauty 
opens and hypothesizes where sublimity has always already decided what is right. Unlike 
Jacobinism, the beautiful image does not impart a moral principle that subjects must obey in 
order to be “free”; its task is simply to produce an effect conducive to individuals’ realization of 
their (political) freedom, which is less a matter of moral integrity than self-determination: 
“Freiheit wird hier als die Möglichkeit verstanden, nach eigenem Maß zu leben; die Freiheit des 
Staatsbürgers ist die Möglichkeit, nach eigenen Vorstellungen und nach eignenem Gutdünken 
persönliche Ziele zu erstreben” (Karthaus 217). The point of aesthetic education—and the 
specific duty of what takes place in the arena of aesthetic Schein—is to endow those personal 
Vorstellungen and Ziele with internal balance, with reciprocity of form and sense.  
 In its emphasis on individual self-determination, such a concept of freedom evokes 
classical liberalism, but as Beiser writes, “Schiller’s fundamental principle—that civil freedom 
must derive from moral character—ultimately derives from the modern republican tradition” (SP 
124-5). For Beiser, straight liberalism is individualistic in the sense that self-interest is the 
governing principle: according to “modern individualism… to establish a state nothing more is 
necessary than the self-interest of its citizens”; conversely, “a republic requires that people 





sake of the common good” (SP 125). Schiller does not endorse self-interest—“moral character,” 
the product of aesthetic education, displaces it—but neither does he submit wholly to the 
republican maxim, at least in the statist incarnation of the Jacobins. In the latter case, the 
hegemonic category “people” (in application, coterminous with the state) obliterates all 
individuality in the name of popular regeneration. True to the principles of Spiel, Schiller retains 
both individual and collective and brings them into productive exchange: his republicanism is 
predicated on cultivating an educated character among the people, who realize their freedom 
individually; individuality here is not self-interest, but rather a sense for one’s position in the 
shared civic mission of the republic. 
 For Beiser, Schiller’s distinctive contribution to republican thought is his prioritization of 
aesthetics (SP 126), and I think we can specify that theater, as an instrument of aesthetic 
education, is ideally suited to initiating the play between individual and collective I just 
described. Schiller considers this exchange a core task of culture itself,46 and the properties of 
drama, as a form of aesthetic experience, are expeditious. Theater is unique among literary forms 
in that it convenes a communal space—it is directed toward a Publikum.47 This component is 
central to Lefort’s and Rancière’s shared thesis that modern politics is essentially theatrical—
politics qua theater is codified in the 1790s because that is when a competitive public sphere 
becomes the official scene of politics proper. Once the king qua symbolic center is dead, politics 
is composed of competing representations on display, on a stage. Lefort and Rancière 
demonstrate well the conceptual affinity between theater and the public, which has its practical 
																																																						
46 Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher, 140: “Schiller thinks that it is the task of culture to preserve the realm of 
individuality and variety as much as that of universality and unity.” 
47 Schiller, “Über den Gebrauch des Chors in der Tragödie,” in Klassische Dramen, 290: “[Tragische Personen] 
stehen gewissermaßen schon auf einem natürlichen Theater, weil sie vor Zuschauern sprechen und handeln, und 






cognate in the fact that drama is a display not for one but many spectators. Yet the effect of a 
properly constructed aesthetic Schein—the reciprocal interplay of internal faculties—is 
something strictly individual: one person’s form- and sense-drives are differently configured 
than those of the next, and we can only experience their interplay individually. The point is not 
that we experience the same interior exchange—as though our respective internal constitutions 
had to somehow perfectly reflect one another (this would be Jacobin virtue)—rather that all of us 
do experience some sensuo-formal interplay. Hence the communal space of the performance: in 
Rancière’s terms, it is important that we all visit the aesthetic sensorium, not that each of us has 
precisely the same experience of it. At no point does aesthetic education attempt to erase 












Politics as Spiel:  
Schiller’s Late Historical Dramas 
Schiller’s writing career was conspicuously segmented: he published Die Räuber, Die 
Verschwörung des Fiesco zu Genua, Kabale und Liebe, and Don Karlos between 1781 and 1787, 
then stopped writing plays for a decade; instead he produced histories—Geschichte des Abfalls 
der vereinigten Niederlande in 1788 and Geschichte des dreißigjährigen Kriegs, finished in 
1792; then came the aesthetic works—theoretical essays on the sublime and the beautiful from 
1791, finally the famous 1795 treatises on aesthetic education and naïve and sentimental poetry; 
he then returned to playwriting with the late, “classical” dramas—the Wallenstein trilogy, Maria 
Stuart, Die Jungfrau von Orleans, Die Braut von Messina, finally Wilhelm Tell, the last drama 
Schiller completed before his death in 1805.  
Taken together, we can outline four thematic phases to Schiller’s career: the early dramas 
(1781-1787); the histories (1788-1792); aesthetic theory (1791-1795); and late dramas (1798-
1804). Much of Schiller scholarship reflects this periodization. Volumes like Schiller als 
Historiker (1995) and Beiser’s Schiller as Philosopher, as their titles suggest, focus on Schiller’s 





theorist.1 Similarly, with respect to Schiller’s dramatic work, two recent studies are structured by 
the division between his “early” (1780s) and “late” plays (Wallenstein and after).2 Both are 
reception histories: David Pugh’s Schiller’s Early Dramas: A Critical History (2000) offers a 
synopsis of criticism on Schiller’s 1780s dramas, while Kathy Saranpa’s Schiller’s Wallenstein, 
Maria Stuart, and Die Jungfrau von Orleans: The Critical Legacy (2002) traces commentary on 
Schiller’s late plays back to their immediate reception by his contemporaries. Both studies make 
clear that the distinction between Schiller’s early and late dramas is sufficiently long-standing in 
scholarship for contemporary studies to effectively presume it.  
Still, there is an important specification to be made with respect to Saranpa’s book: she 
does not take on Schiller’s “classical” dramas as a whole, but instead selects Wallenstein, Maria 
Stuart, and Die Jungfrau von Orleans. Unlike Die Braut von Messina and Wilhelm Tell, these are 
historical dramas (Saranpa 5). The empirical referents for Wallenstein, Maria Stuart, and 
Jungfrau—respectively General Wallenstein’s role in the Thirty Years’ War, the execution of 
Mary, Queen of Scots, and the history of Jeanne d’Arc—are and were well documented. Schiller, 
a former professional academic historian, knew the sources and the stories well, and in the case 
of Wallenstein, had published a book-length historical study on the material.  This is another 
important distinction for Saranpa: though the early plays Fiesko and Don Karlos are also based 
on historical sources, they precede Schiller’s work as a professional historian (Schiller’s 
Wallenstein, 6). As I argue below, Schiller’s thinking about history changes significant in the 
course of this work, with attendant implications for the dramas that follow.  
																																																						
1 Schiller als Historiker. Ed. Otto Dann, Norbert Oellers, Ernst Osterkamp (Stuttgart, Weimar: Metzler, 1995). 
Beiser cited above. 
2 David Pugh. Schiller’s Early Dramas: A Critical History (Rochester, Suffolk: Camden House, 2000). And Kathy 
Saranpa, Schiller’s Wallenstein, Maria Stuart, and Die Jungfrau von Orleans: The Critical Legacy (Rochester and 





 Like Saranpa, I choose to focus on these three late history plays. I argue Schiller’s 
sustained engagement with historical material between 1788 and 1792 allows him to introduce a 
dynamic between history and invention that is critical Wallenstein, Maria Stuart and Die 
Jungfrau von Orleans alike. Each play is the hybrid product of meticulous historical precision 
and bold creative intervention. The last chapter began to describe the conceptual basis of this 
interplay in Schiller’s aesthetic theory, and now it is time to address his specific decisions in the 
dramas: what are the empirical circumstances he chooses—what sort historical mosaic does he 
give us? What remains as it was documented, and where does Schiller intervene? And if we 
consider his inventions together, does any sort of consistent logic or theme emerge? 
 
 
Three Levels of Play 
 
I suggested in the last chapter that we approach Schiller’s late dramas as attempts to instantiate 
the program of aesthetic education. If we grant that is the case, the prerogative of the works is to 
produce Spiel, the reciprocal mechanism at the heart of the Ästhetische Erziehung. In the 
theoretical treatise, Spiel initiates a productive and ultimately emancipatory interplay between 
the conflictual motive regions of formality (Formtrieb)—representing reason, morality, 
principle—and sensuousness (Stofftrieb): the maxims of physicality, sense-immersion, craving, 
desire. Spiel brings these drives into reciprocal exchange, and thus fashions a Totalität des 
Charakters Schiller considers a prerequisite for human freedom. In two signature chiasmi, 
Schiller logically conjoins this complete humanity with Spiel—“der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in 
voller Bedeutung des Wortes Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt”—which is 





nur mit der Schönheit spielen.” The whole unifying procedure takes place under the auspices of 
beauty. 
Such, we can assume, is roughly what takes place in any genuinely aesthetic experience: 
Spiel works its brokerage between form and sense and the subject is that much closer to 
Totalität. Still, this is only the most general formula of aesthetic freedom, and the question 
remains how to approach distinctions within the expansive terrain of schöne Kunst. If a measure 
of Spiel is the product in every case, do separate artistic forms nonetheless package and deliver 
that modicum differently? Does a drama induce Spiel like a painting? The subcategory of interest 
for this chapter is historical drama, specifically in the form presented by Schiller’s Wallenstein, 
Maria Stuart, and Die Jungfrau von Orleans, in which well-documented historical episodes are 
expressed in combination with select inventions. I described in the last chapter the relevance of 
this dynamic for Spiel: especially in the rhetoric of Robespierre and the Jacobins, there was an 
implicit analogy between empirical history and invention, on the one hand, and sense-corruption 
and moral transcendence, on the other. A new moral order would overcome the corruption of the 
past, a degeneracy most evident in the history of politics, which for the Jacobins was simply the 
history of tyrants and their interests. One use of the aesthetic letters’ conceptual vocabulary is 
that it allowed Schiller to diagnose this deeply ideological model of political change—I’ve 
suggested the historical dramas are the response to this one-sided presentation (or non-
presentation) of history: Schiller, in the reciprocal spirit of Spiel, wants both empirics and 
imagination, and in some degree, wants them to be evident as such. He wants to treat critical 
episodes in political history both as they were and could have been. For convenience I will call 






(1) Aesthetic Play itself: the general form of reciprocal exchange between form and sense 
denotatively present in any work of fine art, by virtue of the fact that it is fine art; 
(2) Historiographic Play: exchange between empirical history and creative invention 
present in the formal construction of a work of fine art, in this case a drama; 
(3) Substantive Play, or play at the level of dramatic content: figures or aspects of the 
drama can embody the constituent elements of aesthetic education—form, sense, even 
Spiel itself. 
In what follows, I am chiefly concerned with levels (2) and (3): the historiographic play between 
empirics and imagination, and the embodiment of form-sense dynamics on the stage. I have 
already given a brief profile of level (2), and (3) should be fairly straightforward, especially 
given Schiller’s tendency to idealize his characters, to render them into living principles.3 But the 
three dramas under consideration are teeming with figures—nearly 100 in total. It is not difficult 
to read some traces of form- and sense-logic into most of their expressions: form and sense are, 
after all, the omnipresent categories of Schillerian psychology. Thus, in the hope of making this 
study more precise, I come to level (3) only through (2): I first itemize the contrast between 
history and invention—i.e. what are the empirical circumstances, and what specifically does 
Schiller invent?—and then explore form-sense relations within that particular dynamic. Do 
Schiller’s inventions resonate with the doctrine of Spiel? Is there Spiel already present in the 
empirics, or are these episodes in which history dramatically failed to play? 
 The rough arrangement of the chapter follows the empirics-invention split of level (2): in 
the next section, I address history—what circumstances and eras does Schiller choose in these 
three plays, and what, if any, collective picture emerges from the selection of historical 
																																																						






materials? I’ll then turn to the plays themselves, and focus on Schiller’s inventions: having 
chosen his historical episodes, how does he intervene, what (and who) does he make up? 
 
 
Schiller and European History 
 
If Schiller’s late plays are exercises in aesthetic education, and that education is an attempt to 
diagnose and correct the calamities of the French Revolution, it seems fair to ask why Schiller 
does not write about the Revolution itself, or even anything historically close to it: the nearest 
events are those of Wallenstein, set 150 years before Bastille, and the jump to Die Jungfrau von 
Orleans, set around 1430, more than doubles that historical distance. Alt suggests the reasons are 
multiform: for one thing, the late 1790s were already flooded with German plays about the 
French Revolution, especially comedies designed to mock the Jacobin extremists4; Schiller 
worried also that the proximity of his dramatic material to current popular interest would 
invariably limit his own artistic freedom.5 But just as importantly, Schiller wanted that history 
itself—he did not choose the materials for Wallenstein, Maria Stuart, and Die Jungfrau von 
Orleans simply because they were temporally remote, rather because they presented 
Brennpunkte of European political history, and in this way illuminated the path to revolutionary 
France and European geopolitics around 1800. Alt again:  
Hinzu kam, daß die machtpolitischen und gesellschaftlichen Spannungsfelder der 
vornapoleonischen Revolutionsära wesentlich durch die Entwicklungen des frühmodernen 
Europa von der spanischen Weltherrschaft zum französischen Absolutismus (1550-1700) 
bestimmt worden waren. Über konfessionelle Tendenzen verstärkte Interessengegensätze (so der 
																																																						
4 “Gerade in der Phase um 1800 entsteht eine Flut von Dramen, die direkt auf die französische Zeitereignisse Bezug 
nehmen… Überaus populär (und dabei der Obrigkeit genehm) waren Jakobinerkomödien, die sich darauf verlegten, 
die verbreiteten Vorurteile gegen den politischen Radikalismus nach vertrautem Gattungsmuster mit dem Spott über 
allgemeine menschliche Torheit zu verbinden.” Schiller: Leben – Werk – Zeit, Band II (München: Beck, 2000), 376. 
5 “Da die Möglichkeit der künstlerisch unabhängigen Verfügung über den Gegenstand mit dem Grad seiner 
Aktualität zu schwinden scheint, besteht für Schiller die Verpflichtung, historisch entlegene Sujets zu wählen. Diese 
Regel—angedeutet schon in der Schrift zur ästhetischen Erziehung—gilt auch deshalb, weil zeitgeschichtliche 
Themen das materielle Interesse des Publikums durch modische Sensationen zu fesseln drohen, ohne es, wie 





jahrhundertealte dynastische Konflikt Englands mit Frankreich), territorial bedingte 
Auseinandersetzungen (zwischen Preußen, Österreich, Polen und Rußland) und militärstrategisch 
veranlaßte Krisen (etwa das von Spanien, den Niederlanden und England geführte Ringen um die 
Seehoheit) bildeten nicht selten dauerhafte Spannungsfelder, die noch für die europäische 
Staatenwelt um 1800 Bedeutung besaßen. Hinter Schillers Neigung zu Stoffen aus der Zeit 
zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung verbirgt sich mithin keine apolitische Haltung, sondern 
das Bewußtsein, daß sich die Machtverhältnisse der eigenen Epoche nur in Kenntnis ihrer 
historischen Voraussetzungen begreifen ließen. (Schiller, 373) 
 
The point for Schiller is to grasp the Revolution in terms of its long-term historical gestation. In 
this way, Schiller’s may be the most direct possible rebuff to the Jacobin conceit that the 
Revolution interrupted, radically broke with antecedent political history. It is also perfectly 
consistent with the principles of aesthetic education, an essentially historical program premised 
on the large-scale anthropological trajectory of human societies. With respect to early modern 
Europe, Alt mentions several precedent strands that frame not only Schiller’s historiography of 
that period (and thus his developmental understanding of the French Revolution) but his 
historical dramas as well: absolutism, which structures the basic power dispute in Maria Stuart; 
the long-standing dynastic conflict between England and France that is the immediate context of 
Die Jungfrau von Orleans and also frames much of Maria Stuart; and the convolved network of 
military and territorial tensions among Austria, Prussia, Spain, the Netherlands, etc., conflicts 
that drove the Thirty Years’ War and determine the circumstances of Wallenstein. Together these 
dynamics compose an historical system in which the French Revolution, far from constituting a 
radical break, is thoroughly enmeshed: the same ancien régime overthrown by the Revolution 
supported Mary Stuart’s claim to the English throne, and the first wave of revolutionary wars, 
initiated by France against Austria in 1792, reprised the French-Habsburg rivalry that dominated 
1618-1648. 
 Schiller’s choice of empirical material in the plays thus showcases a specific, pertinent 





Schiller to explore the phenomenon of politics itself in a more conceptual, axiomatic register. 
That is, Schiller wants his history to be not only relevant (in the sense of illuminating aspects of 
the Revolution) but also emblematic, presenting “typische Modelle politischen Handelns” and 
“Grundformen politischen Denkens” (Alt, Schiller, 373; 375). In this vein, Riedel calls the 
historical dramas “exemplary histories” aimed at an “essence” behind the events themselves.6 
The plays depict not only particular, contingent histories—events as they empirically took 
place—but also the essential forms of political thought and behavior embedded in those histories. 
I’ve given the basics of the first category; what Schiller understands by political-historical 
“essences” is still unclear. 
 I’ll offer hypotheses to that question after addressing the problem of teleology: Schiller’s 
approach to the Revolution as a historical vanishing point seems to suggest it, even if his 
ultimate judgment of the event itself is negative. If we accept that early modern European history 
results in the Revolution, it’s possible to come away with a sense of historical movement as 
directional, linear, logical. Crucially, this view allows even the harshest criticism of the 
Revolution to be subsumed under a general optimism centered on the “perfectibility” of 
history—the Revolution could simply be construed as an unfortunate error, or more clichéd, a 
learning experience. Schiller himself espouses such overall optimism in the 1789 lecture on 
universal history, and in his later work this will be an important point of reversal. The 
presumption that political history somehow inexorably progresses disappears in the late dramas, 
where we get a more raw and agnostic view of power itself.7 The historical telos that guided the 
young Schiller seems only to have waned after it was announced: Elisabeth Krimmer writes, 
																																																						
6 Riedel, “Religion and Violence,” 249. 
7 “Seine [späten] Dramen inszenieren die unwegsame Welt der Macht, ohne daß sie die optimistischen Prognosen 





“Schiller’s belief in an inherent order in history appears to have decreased over time until, in his 
later works, any affirmation of a higher meaning is hard to find.”8 
Accepting that Schiller had and then lost an optimistic belief in historical order, and that 
his disenchantment took place sometime between the 1789 Jena lecture and Wallenstein, it 
remains to be seen what precisely was involved in that transition, and how Schiller’s late dramas 
relate to his change in perspective on history. Following Krimmer, Schiller’s cynical turn is 
datable to the years 1791-92, when he writes Geschichte des Dreyßigjährigen Kriegs. Striking 
with respect to that work, Schiller’s last historical study, is the “distinct discrepancy between 
beginning and end… the text falls short of the introductory assertion of a higher order (“höhere 
Ordnung”) in history” (“God’s Warriors,” 224). That is, Schiller begins the work with a 
teleological commitment—he will demonstrate the coherence of the Thirty Years’ War with a 
salutary, progressive model of history (Krimmer: “In the beginning, Schiller offered an 
unqualified assertion of the benefits of the war”)—that he fails to deliver, in which he himself 
loses faith, by the end. According to Krimmer, two forces are at work on him during this period: 
the dismal Realpolitik of his historical material—he ultimately could not reconcile the Thirty 
Years’ War with any beneficent historical telos—and “contemporary events in France, leading 
up to a declaration of war in 1792,” which themselves greatly “dampened Schiller’s historical 
optimism” (“God’s Warriors,” 225). 
Still, the twin blows of 1618-48 and 1792 evidently do not lead Schiller to abandon all 
the trappings of teleology: he loses the optimism but keeps the developmental model; history is 
not a linear progression toward some final perfection but a trajectory of discernible 
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consequences.9 This shift entails accepting a greater interpretive burden: one can no longer 
summarily conclude what comes later is more perfect, and thus must be prepared to identify not 
only regression, e.g. the Terror, but also the elision of opportunity, missed chances to build a 
greater and more redemptive politics, to avoid carnage and degradation. If the progression of 
history is no longer understood as stalwart necessity, we must become attentive to its moments of 
contingency, nodal points of possibility that could have been actualized in any number of ways. 
Schiller wants to provide a dramatic history that makes those points visible. 
 As such, it is no surprise that he selects episodes of dense and seemingly insuperable 
conflict, often centered on questions of sovereignty—who or what has final power? With respect 
to Schiller’s study of the Thirty Years’ War, “instead of the grand plan of historical progress, the 
text offers the lawlessness of soldiers and the self-interested actions of their leaders” (Krimmer, 
“God’s Warriors,” 228). Schiller’s material presented him with a vast array of actors and 
interests—monarchs, dukes, mercenaries, Catholics, Protestants, serving a half-dozen European 
powers—pursuing agendas hardly explicable in terms of their official allegiances. A picture 
emerges of the war as a violent aggregate of brute self-interest, straightforward power-
aggrandizement, even aggression for its own sake.10 (It is not incidental that Hobbes publishes 
Leviathan (1651), with its famed “war of all against all,” in the immediate wake of the Thirty 
Years’ War.) The brutality of the conflict’s more notorious episodes—especially the 1630-31 
Sack of Magdeburg—posed insurmountable counter-evidence to Schiller’s initial pretense that 
the war was inherently progressive, and even the most ostensibly noble axis of contention, the 
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historians to understand history and reality, but they reject the notion of a teleological organization of history.” 
10 Schiller coins the term “Gewaltunternehmer”—merchants of war, who profited from the spread of violence. See 





religious dispute between Protestants and Catholics, does not somehow stand apart from the 
others in Schiller’s study, but is just “one element in a complicated mesh of motivations, which 
also includes the expectation of financial gain and relations of power and dependency” 
(Krimmer, “God’s Warriors,” 221). For Krimmer, this is the “most important insight of the text, 
namely that religion cannot be disentangled from its political, economic, social, and cultural 
contexts, and that any attempt to analyze religion in isolation is doomed to misunderstand its 
object” (“God’s Warriors,” 228). One can imagine why Krimmer places emphasis here: the 
Thirty Years’ War is traditionally construed as a religious conflict and falls officially into the 
broad historiographic category “European wars of religion” following the Protestant 
Reformation. Yet as Schiller and Krimmer alike point out, the war was not a conflict driven 
simply by a denominational dispute, but a multiform web of dependency and influence in which 
“religion, finance, politics, and warfare are entangled in a combustible mix” (“God’s Warriors,” 
217). 
 In the traditional reading, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia ended the war and inaugurated 
the modern system of sovereign nation-states. The second half of the 17th century also saw the 
flourishing of French absolute monarchy under Louis XIV (reigned 1643-1715), which system 
met its end with the Revolution and execution of Louis XVI in 1793. France’s predecessor in this 
regard was England, which enjoyed its own golden age of sovereign rule—the reigns of 
Elizabeth I (until 1603) and James I (until 1625)—subsequent public disillusionment, and the 
eventual regicide of Charles I in 1649.  The theoretical foundation of absolutism was formulated 
in the 1570s by Jean Bodin, who responded to the major legal issue raised by the religious wars: 
should a monarchial sovereign be subject to any other human power? Bodin answered in the 





absolute prince who holds of none and is dependent on none.”11 In Keith Baker’s reading of 
Bodin, “this will must necessarily be unitary. And to be unitary, it must necessarily be perpetual, 
indivisible (hence inalienable), and absolute: which is to say that it must be free of any 
conditions that would make it subject to the judgment of command of others.”12 “Others,” in this 
context, refers to any outside human authority, because Bodin recognizes only divine and natural 
laws as legitimate checks on sovereignty.13 That the sovereign is independent from any other 
human power means, for Baker, it is “above the law in two senses: first, in the sense that the 
sovereign cannot be brought to judgment before it; and second, in the sense that prior laws 
cannot bind the sovereign in the free exercise of legislative will” (“Sovereignty,” 844).  
In Schiller’s late history plays, this conception of absolutism operates as a theoretical 
conceit that is continually frustrated in practice.14 His study of the Thirty Years’ War showed 
him a conflict in which sovereigns were simply one group of actors among many, separated by 
quantitative rather than qualitative power differentials; and Charles I of England was tried, 
convicted, and executed by his subjects for treason—that is, an absolute sovereign was not only 
judged but executed by the law. For Schiller the historian, the Thirty Years’ War—in its capacity 
to level all echelons of power in the pursuit of material advantage—belied the very idea of 
absolutism. The clearest historical contrast he found was the Protestant Reformation, which for 
Schiller constituted “the most momentous and influential event in recent history,” for the reason 
that Protestantism emerges as a “transnational force that unites different nationalities in a 
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online at http://www.yorku.ca/comninel/courses/3020pdf/six_books.pdf 
12 Keith Baker, “Sovereignty,” Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, 844. 
13 Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, 27: “sovereign power given to a prince charged with conditions is neither 
properly sovereign, nor absolute, unless the conditions of appointment are only such as are inherent in the laws of 
God and of nature.” 
14 See Alt, Schiller, 501: especially in Maria Stuart, “die unbedingte Souveränität, wie sie die Sozialphilosophie der 
frühen Neuzeit von Bodin über Lipsius bis zu Hobbes als Geschäftsgrundlage des starken Staates begreift, tritt hier 





common cause… Religion defines primary allegiances.”15 What excites Schiller about the 
Reformation is religion’s capacity to supersede political divisions, to act as a great unifier. In this 
way, the Reformation displayed in somewhat more complicated form the basic direction of 
influence between religion and politics present in late-Medieval monarchy: religion dictates and 
legitimates politics, not the other way around. A monarch in Medieval Europe is in place as a 
godly steward, and the stability of the monarchy depends on its perceived alignment with divine 
will (as we saw with Lefort in the previous chapter). 
This is precisely the dynamic at work in Schiller’s late-Medieval play, Die Jungfrau von 
Orleans: the monarch Karl lacks the legitimacy and authority to maintain a unified France, and 
the play hinges on the interpretive question of whether Johanna represents God or the devil. 
Maria Stuart presents an elemental difficulty of absolutism: what happens when two sovereigns 
clash, when they claim the same throne? The macabre Realpolitik and multifarious power-
jockeying of the Thirty Years’ War is on full display in Wallenstein, which in its framing conflict 
displays its remoteness from the culture of the absolutism historically preceding it: Wallenstein 
has determined it suits his interests to betray the Kaiser. This may be what Alt has in mind when 
he writes of political “Grundformen”: Schiller’s historical dramas are effectively a triptych of 
European political history, in which Schiller highlights not only separate eras but also, with 
respect to each one, the animating principle of political authority in various constellations. In the 
late Middle Ages, as Schiller sees it, the political question is essentially synonymous with the 
religious one: what does God want? Divine will determines political practice. In Schiller’s view, 
Protestantism begins to harness the political unifying power of Christianity, but this power is 
then challenged: theoretically, by the claims of absolute sovereignty; and practically, by the 
																																																						





brutal, levelling divisiveness of the Thirty Years’ War. This arc of European history, from the 
15th to the 17th centuries, was Schiller’s chief interest as an academic historian (Alt, Schiller, 
372), and so it is perhaps no surprise that he returns to dramatic writing with plays set during this 
period. But as is clear from the dramas themselves, Schiller’s goal is hardly a straightforward 
recapitulation of “history as it was.” 
 
Die Jungfrau von Orleans 
Today, Joan of Arc is an icon of western culture, but for over 300 years after her death in 1431, 
her story was relatively obscure. It took a collision of two dramas at the end of the 18th century to 
catapult her to fame: Voltaire’s 1762 Enlightenment satire La Pucelle d’Orleans targeted 
religious traditionalism by way of mocking Joan; the play was still popular around 1800, when 
Schiller responded with Die Jungfrau von Orleans in 1801, and a redeemed protagonist. 
Schiller’s play drew the attention and praise of Michelet, who focused intensely on Joan’s story 
in his subsequent and enormously influential historical work. By the second half of the 19th 
century, she was a centerpiece of French historiography, “the symbol of French nationalism,” 
and in 1920, canonized a Saint by the same church that, centuries earlier, burned her alive for 
heresy.16 So Die Jungfrau von Orleans is, in one evident sense, a successful intervention: 
Schiller redeems Joan and sets her on the path to becoming a French national hero. But this is not 
Schiller’s sole ambition with the play. Françoise Meltzer has suggested that Schiller selects Joan 
as a dramatic figure not simply, or even primarily, because prior historiography has obscured her 
and he wants to remedy that, but because he perceives in the Stoff of her story an opportunity to 
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advance his own theoretical program: “at the core of the matter lies Schiller’s entire aesthetics. 
Die Jungfrau von Orleans, then, is not merely the rewriting (and reinventing) of Joan’s source 
story; it is also Schiller’s attempt to put distance between himself and the Enlightenment, and to 
put reason in the shadow of the heart.”17 Following Meltzer, the play is Schiller’s attempt to 
instantiate an aesthetic paradigm, the terrain of which is the relation between reason and 
sensibility (“the heart”): whereas the Enlightenment tradition (Voltaire’s camp) 
uncompromisingly privileges reason, Schiller wants to redeem the role of sense.  
Meltzer’s thesis aligns well with the trajectory in Schiller’s aesthetic thought I describe in 
the last chapter. The bulk of Schiller’s aesthetic work can be divided into two thematic groups: 
essays on tragedy and the sublime published in 1792-93; and the theory of beauty starting with 
the Kallias-Briefe of 1793 and culminating in 1795’s Ästhetische Erziehung. The motive anchor 
of the first group is moral freedom—sublimity in tragedy showcases the triumph of reason over 
nature and thereby exalts the moral law—whereas the texts on beauty develop a concept of 
freedom premised on the reciprocal interplay of intellect and Sinnlichkeit. Having thus delineated 
the regions of beauty and sublimity, Schiller proposes in “Über das Erhabene” to unify them in 
an overall program of aesthetic education. All this we saw above. Worth noting is that “Über das 
Erhabene,” the text in which Schiller calls for a large-scale reconciliation between the sublime 
and the beautiful, appears in 1801, the same year as Die Jungfrau von Orleans. For Meltzer, 
Schiller’s Johanna is the direct dramatic expression of this unifying ambition, “the harmony of 
morality and aesthetics… whose every act on stage therefore at once reveals the insistence of 
‘theory’, and begins the blurring of fiction and theory itself” (“Rewriting Joan,” 71). 
																																																						





 I want to follow but also amplify Meltzer on this count: Schiller advances Johanna as a 
syncretic figure, embodying the unity of his aesthetic theory. This is a bold but likewise fraught 
project: Schiller’s aesthetics is built on an array of conceptual distinctions—not just beauty and 
sublimity, but Form and Sinnlichkeit, Anmut and Wurde, morality and politics, etc.—distinctions 
that, if Schiller wants to express or embody his aesthetic thought as a unity, all must be unified, 
or at least brought into some rapprochement. Schiller sees in the figure of Johanna a unique 
opportunity to do exactly that: her gender allows him to complicate the distinction between grace 
and dignity; there is a pronounced interpenetration between Johanna’s national and religious 
aims; her death scene seems designed to engineer an aesthetic experience simultaneously 
sublime and beautiful; and Johanna’s attraction to Lionel (invented by Schiller) makes her a 
psychological case-study in the collision of Formtrieb and Stofftrieb. But the question remains: 
what exactly does unity entail, at a conceptual level, in each of these cases? Is it a kind of 
Wechselwirkung in the style of the aesthetic letters? Does Schiller’s Johanna, at least in ambition, 
anticipate Hegelian Aufhebung? And is there an underside to this quest for unity—is it possible 
that Schiller, in attempting to make Johanna embody a great reconciliation of categories, simply 
ends up presenting a different, darker category: the pathological obsession with unity itself? 
 It is probably not incidental that Schiller chooses a late-Medieval figure to achieve this 
balancing of aesthetic categories. By selecting a pre-modern heroine, Schiller is able to thematize 
European society before and after the onset of the Neuzeit. According to Schiller’s historical 
diagnostic in letter six of the Ästhetische Eriehung, the guiding principle of modernity is 
division: while the ancients allowed themselves to be oriented by “vereinende Natur,” moderns 





spirit of division not only permeated the world of social organization, but came to affect the 
constitution of individuals as well: 
Die Kultur selbst war es, welche der neuern Menschheit diese Wunde schlug. Sobald auf der 
einen Seite die erweiterte Erfahrung und das bestimmte Denken eine schärfere Scheidung der 
Wissenschaften, auf der andern das verwickeltere Uhrwerk der Staaten eine strengere 
Absonderung der Stände und Geschäfte notwendig machte, so zerriss auch der innere Bund der 
menschlichen Natur, und ein verderblicher Streit entzweite ihre harmonischen Kräfte. (ÄE 6; 6) 
 
A lost harmony at the level of “menschliche Natur,” and a society fractured into multitudinous 
Wissenschaften, Stände, Geschäfte—these result from the division imposed by Kultur, and are 
codified, made “vollkommen und allgemein,” by a specifically modern spirit of government, 
“der neue Geist der Regierung” (ÄE 6; 7). Regarding the new style of government, Schiller cites 
two illustrative disjunctions: “der Staat und die Kirche, diese Gesetze und die Sitten”—church is 
split from state, laws from customs. Die Jungfrau von Orleans is marked by the interpenetration 
of these regions: by her own account, Johanna’s vocation is simultaneously religious and 
national, legal and ethical. At the very least, her self-presentation makes it difficult to disentangle 
these categories, the stark delineation of which is a hallmark of the Neuzeit. So, to follow my 
hypothesis, Schiller’s move with Johanna is twofold: first, he presents her as an integrated 
composite of categories derived from his aesthetic thought; second, he positions that composite 
historically, in the Middle Ages, in a way that conforms with his vision of European modernity 
as an era of lost unity. 
 Returning to the categories themselves, independent of Schiller’s particular treatment of 
Johanna, she blurs two prominent gender prototypes: according to Meltzer, she is, on the one 
hand, “the peasant girl who sewed and prayed at her mother’s side,” and on the other, “the 
general who led her troops into battle”—feminine and masculine archetypes, respectively (Fear 
3). Johanna’s gender-bending acquires an additional dimension with Schiller, who in the 1793 





dignity around a gender correspondence: one is more likely to encounter Anmut in women, 
“wovon die Ursache nicht weit zu suchen ist. Zur Anmut muß sowohl der körperliche Bau, als 
der Charakter beitragen; jener durch seine Biegsamkeit, Eindrücke anzunehmen und ins Spiel 
gesetzt zu werden, dieser durch die sittliche Harmonie der Gefühle. In beidem war die Natur dem 
Wiebe günster als dem Manne” (TS 372). The claim is that women are better endowed than men 
in two key respects conducive to grace: physical receptivity (“Biegsamkeit, Eindrücke 
anzunehmen”) and emotional balance (“Harmonie der Gefühle”), qualities Schiller’s Johanna 
conspicuously lacks. To say she is not receptive—to stimuli, enticements, information, etc.—
would be an understatement: as Meltzer remarks, until Johanna falls in love with Lionel (III: 10), 
“she possesses the single-minded vision of those chosen by God. Indeed, until then she does not 
seem to see anything at all unless it is specific to her mission” (“Rewriting Joan,” 66; original 
emphasis). Consistent with that mission, when both Dünois and La Hire propose marriage to her 
in the same scene (III: 4), she rebuffs them with one message:  
 Berufen bin ich zu ganz anderm Werk, 
 Die reine Jungfrau nur kann es vollenden. 
 Ich bin die Kriegerin des höchsten Gottes, 
 Und keinem Mann kann ich Gattin sein. (2201-2204) 
 
Johanna is staying true to instructions she claims, in the prologue, to have received from God: 
“Nicht Männerliebe darf dein Herz berühren mit sünd’gen Flammen eitler Erdenlust” (411-412). 
She is called on to wage holy war (“Ich bin die Kriegerin des höchsten Gottes”) and cannot be 
constrained: by marriage, by vanity—fundamentally, by anything wordly. “God” cautions her 
away from Erdenlust; earlier in the same monologue, she avows, “Mich treibt nicht eitles, 
irdisches Verlangen” (400; my emphasis); near the end of the play (V: 5) she explains to 
Raimond that the two of them belong to different orders: “Du siehst nur das Natürliche der 





Gesehen” (3189-3192; my emphasis). Nature, body, physicality—these are terms and categories 
of experience Johanna explicitly rejects in favor of Geist, das Unsterbliche, etc., in a way that 
contradicts both stated conditions of Anmut: her blanket refusal to participate in das Natürliche 
and das Irdische amounts to a doctrinal absence of sense-receptivity (first condition), and her 
relation to items like das Unsterbliche and the Holy Virgin is less commitment than monomania, 
her obsession so total that it precludes the multiplicity of feeling out of which any Harmonie der 
Gefühle (second condition) would have to arise. And in any case, Johanna would likely assert 
she does not experience Gefühle at all. 
 All of these dynamics are at play in Johanna’s encounter with Montgomery (II: 7), an 
English soldier left behind after his army’s defeat in the second act. But here the situation 
becomes more complicated: we are reminded that Johanna’s peculiarity is not simply to be a 
woman who defies the principles of grace—in fact, she claims not to be a woman at all. 
Montgomery, reasoning in line with “Über Anmut und Würde,” begs for his life, calculating that 
Johanna, being female, is more likely to be forgiving: “Bittend will ich ihre Knie umfassen, um 
mein Leben flehn, sie ist ein Weib, ob ich vielleicht durch Tränen sie erweichen kann!” (1577-
1580) The underlying premise is that she is receptive, that she can be softened (“erweichen”), 
and he again invokes her femininity as she stands over him: “O bei der Milde deines zärtlichen 
Geschlechts / Fleh ich dich an. Erbarme meiner Jugend dich!” (1606-1607) Johanna’s response: 
 Nicht mein Geschlecht beschwöre! Nenne mich nicht Weib. 
 Gleichwie die körperlosen Geister, die nicht frein 
 Auf ird’sche Weise, schließ ich mich an kein Geschlecht 
 Der Menschen an, und dieser Panzer deckt kein Herz. (1608-1611) 
 
She denies she has a heart, which on its face sounds absurd, but Herz is always Schiller’s 
shorthand for the arena of emotional and sensuous feeling—Johanna here compares herself to a 





gendering. Without Herz there is certainly no Anmut, but we get the sense there is much more at 
work in Johanna’s self-styling than a simple rebuttal of grace. It seems as though Johanna wants 
to transcend the very world in which Anmut is a factor. What world is that? Two hints from 
Schiller: the apodictic statement “Alle Anmut ist schön… aber nicht alles Schöne ist Anmut” (TS 
330); and Johanna’s exclamation on slaying Montgomery, “Erhabne Jungfrau, du wirkst 
mächtiges in mir!” (1677) 
 The theoretical stakes are higher: Die Jungfrau von Orleans and Johanna herself 
repeatedly engage the conceptual territory of beauty and the sublime. On first glance, everything 
about Johanna seems to place her under the rubric of the sublime: by her own avowal, she has 
transcended the arena of sense, self, volition, etc., and exists solely to execute the supra-
terrestrial will of God. But already here the question of her motivation is not totally clear: 
throughout the play, there is a pronounced slippage between God and France as the object of 
Johanna’s loyalty. Is her mission national or religious? Are they the same? She suggests as much 
to Montgomery:  
 Ihr Toren! Frankreichs königliche Wappen hängt  
 Am Throne Gottes, eher rißt ihr einen Stern 
Vom Himmelwagen, als ein Dorf aus diesem Reich, 
Dem unzertrennlich ewig einigen! (1644-1647) 
 
Johanna links the integrity of France to that of heaven, and the image of the French royal 
emblem hanging on the throne of God suggests that her religious and national commitments 
unproblematically coincide. But there is a problem, at least a complication, in terms of Schiller’s 
aesthetic theory: religion, being a form of transcendence, belongs to the terminal zone of the 
sublime—the sublime mode propels us toward the divine, morality, ineffability, the absolute, 
etc.; beauty, conversely, leads to politics: as we saw, Schiller states unambiguously in letter two 





Kunst. Thus to present Johanna as the coincidence of religion and politics is, in some measure, to 
fuse beauty and sublimity. Conceptually this is an awkward move: as I described in the last 
chapter, there are basic disagreements between sublime and beautiful modes, especially when it 
comes to the category of Sinnlichkeit—for sublimity, it is simply something to be overcome, 
while in the doctrine of beauty, it is integral to the sensuo-rational harmony from which aesthetic 
and political freedom arises. But Schiller seems intent on the combination: once Johanna meets 
Lionel (III: 10), her position regarding the sensuous is to simultaneously experience and 
renounce it. The fact that she falls in love with him—again, Schiller’s invention—makes clear 
that, whatever she may avow, she is subject to desire, susceptible to affection: in some 
meaningful degree, she is part of the order of Sinnlichkeit. Her earlier assertion to Montgomery 
is belied: she does in fact have a Herz, which means that, conceptually, she must find a way to 
negate that Herz if she is to remain in the sublime mode. 
 She does ultimately renounce Lionel and her love for him, but it is telling that she does 
so, not in the name of God, but France (V: 9). This is immediately before the end of the play, 
where Schiller dramatically intervenes into his historical material, and beauty seems finally to 
overtake the sublime: instead of reproducing the empirical Joan’s burning at the stake, Schiller 
gives his Johanna a triumphant death on the battlefield. Conceptually, this is a pregnant change. 
Schiller had rigorously theorized the sublime and must have perceived that, if his goal was to 
activate sublimity, he simply needed to represent history: Joan suffered an unjust sentence and 
excruciating public death, inspiring pity and fear, all in the name of a transcendent power. She 
claimed to represent the divine and was punished as a heretic (in the name of the divine) for the 
sake of inspiring the public’s fear and awe—of the divine. Schiller’s Johanna dies much closer to 





is, she suffers no external injustice and no extreme visible pain. Already early in the play, 
Johanna has embraced that her journey will end in her death: “endlich werd’ ich selbst 
umkommen und erfüllen mein Geschick,” she tells Montgomery (1666-1667). And she dies 
under the opposite of duress: she breaks miraculously out of her chains in the English camp (V: 
11), carries the French army to victory in the following penultimate scenes of the play, and in (V: 
14) is presented, mortally wounded, to her king and fellow soldiers. She gives a rousing speech 
and dies with her personal banner of the Holy Virgin. But crucially, the play ends on a stage 
direction in which the king orders surrounding soldiers to cover Johanna with French flags. 
Critics as diverse as Heine, Bernard Shaw, and George Steiner have criticized the overt spectacle 
of this moment—Steiner even compares it to a “christmas pageant.”18 But this may be the point: 
Schiller wants to leave the play on a note that is simultaneously political and spectacular, 
aesthetically triggering the beautiful mode through sheer visual stimulation, and directing the 
drama’s arc toward political liberty, the terminus of schöne Kunst, rather than moral 
transcendence. 
 The importance of the national allegiance in Die Jungfrau von Orleans also connects to 
the Kantian concept of enthusiasim, which I discussed in the introduction. In the third Kritik, 
Kant defines enthusiasm as “die Idee des Guten mit Affekt” (B 121). Enthusiasm is directed 
toward an idea—here, the idea des Guten, a moral maxim—but it is experienced as a feeling 
(“mit Affekt”), thus uniting the divided orders of sense and reason. Gailus suggests we think of 
enthusiasm as “affective transcendence: as a passion for principle—that is, a transcendent feeling 
moved by, and itself sustaining, moral law—enthusiasm brings together for the shortest of 
																																																						
18 George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). Regarding Heine and Shaw see 
Elisabeth Krimmer, “Transcendental Warriors: Warfare in Schiller’s Wallenstein and Die Jungfrau von Orleans.” 





moments the categorical and the emotional, law and body, the impersonal and the subjective” 
(57; my emphasis). And it is critical that, as Kant formulates enthusiasm in 1798’s Der Streit der 
Fakultäten, its object is not religious but national—specifically, the assertion of political rights 
by the first wave of French revolutionaries (Gailus 57). Essentially, enthusiasm, as it is theorized 
in the late 1790s, involves an idea of political liberty, a passion for which is felt by political 
actors. Nonetheless, Kant claims in the third Kritik that enthusiasm is sublime aesthetically, 
“weil er eine Anspannung der Kräfte durch Ideen ist, welche dem Gemüte einen Schwung geben, 
der weit mächtiger und dauerhafter wirkt, als der Antrieb durch Sinnenvorstellungen” (B 121). 
 Politics, morality, feeling, sublimity—the great divisions of Schiller’s aesthetics all 
appear to be overcome in this conception of enthusiasm, and it seems likely that this is how we 
are supposed to read Johanna: she is a selfless patriot whose transcendence nonetheless has an 
important worldly component—that is, she feels her transcendence (Schiller is sure to establish 
that Johanna is sinnlich), which it itself directed toward the relatively concrete sphere of political 
freedom. But there is problem here: as Gailus puts it, “enthusiasm is a drive to action—and thus 
an engagement with an object in terms of will—that remains suspended at the level of wish 
owing to its spectatorial character” (Passions, 61). There is no suspension or spectation to 
Johanna: she is all action, executing her ideal throughout the drama. Concretely, this means she 
is prolific on the battlefield—Schiller’s last major invention: his Johanna is violent, even brutal, 
and thus not simply a patriotic enthusiast. Rather, it may be that Schiller, though he hoped for 
Johanna to embody unifying enthusiasm, combined that drive for unity with active agency and 








When I say Schiller’s Johanna may be a fanatic, I use this term intentionally to align with the 
German Schwärmer, another concept Schiller theorized before his return to drama. A brief 
excursus on it will help introduce Maria Stuart.  
Toward the end of Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, Schiller defines 
Schwärmerei as a disorder of the sentimental mode, the dominant feature of which he calls 
Überspannung: a rational conceit is carried beyond the limits of all possible experience, yet 
nonetheless insists on its own representability within that experience: “daß er den Bedingungen 
aller möglichen Erfahrung widerstreitet… [aber] sich als darstellbar und dichterisch angekündigt 
habe” (TS 787). I want to draw attention to three aspects of this definition: first, Schwärmerei 
occurs within Schillerian sentimentality, meaning it presumes the schism between nature and 
culture and assumes the prerogatives of the latter—autonomy, the status of the ideal, and 
Selbsttätigkeit regarding nature (where Empfänglichkeit defines the naïve). This independence 
from the natural is related to the second element of the definition, namely that Schwärmerei 
concerns the proper limits of reason—more accurately, for Schiller, Schwärmerei describes 
reason without limits: 
Das sentimentalische Genie hingegen verläßt die Wirklichkeit, um zu Ideen aufzusteigen und mit 
freier Selbsttätigkeit seinen Stoff zu beherrschen; da aber die Vernunft mit ihrem Gesetze nach 
immer zum Unbedingten strebt, so wird das sentimentalische Genie nicht immer nüchtern genug 
bleiben, um sich ununterbrochen und gleichförmig innerhalb der Bedingungen zu halten, welche 
der Begriff einer menschlichen Natur mit sich führt, und an welche die Vernunft auch in ihrem 
freiesten Wirken hier immer gebunden bleiben muß. (TS 786; original emphasis) 
 
Schiller construes Schwärmerei as a loss of sobriety (“nicht nüchtern bleiben”): reason’s drive 
toward the unconditioned (“zum Unbedingten”) is potentially intoxicating—it threatens to depart 
entirely from reality and confine itself to the enclosed universe of its own laws and ideas. He 





freiesten Wirken… gebunden bleiben”)—there must be some source of limitation to keep its 
operations “nüchtern.” For Schiller, this limitation comes from an object of sensibility, a 
Gegenstand that keeps reason anchored in the sensuous world that Schwärmerei leaves behind.19  
But ultimately, of course, the Schwärmer returns to make a claim on the world of sense—
third important part of the definition: Schwärmerei insists its ideals are darstellbar—and herein 
lies the danger: Schiller describes as “gefährlich” the freedom enjoyed by an independent 
imaginative faculty that is not in some way answerable to sense-experience, a risk pertinent “von 
der moralischen und religiösen Schwärmerei, und von der exaltierten Freiheits- und 
Vaterlandsliebe. Da die Gegenstände dieser Empfindungen immer Ideen sind und in der äußeren 
Erfahrung nicht erscheinen, [kann die Einbildungkraft nicht] durch die sinnliche Gegenwart ihres 
Objekts in ihre Grenzen zurückgewiesen werden” (TS 789). The danger lies in an irresolvable 
tension: the cognitive faculty advances a precept (e.g. moral freedom) and calls for its 
presentation in sensible experience, but the nature of that precept is such that it is beyond all 
sensuous presentation; the Schwärmer is distinctive in refusing to recognize this limitation and 
persisting in the original demand, and the stage is set for a violent reorganization of the sensible 
in line with the rational precept, which can of course never be satisfied—something like moral 
freedom is always and essentially undarstellbar. 
 For Kant, whose discussion of Schwärmerei in the third Kritik has clear resonances in 
Schiller, this Undarstellbarkeit is the point: moral freedom can only ever be presented 
negatively, as a lacuna, the trace of an empirical or cognitive shortcoming that, while 
substantively unresolvable, is nonetheless indicative of a higher vocation: the Kantian 
																																																						
19 At one point, Schiller gives this concise formulation of Schwärmerei: “Die Vernunft zieht bei ihren Schöpfungen 
die Grenzen der Sinnenwelt viel zu wenig zu Rat und der Gedanke wird immer weiter getrieben, als die Erfahrung 






Übersinnliche, humanity’s capacity to transcend the sensible world. Exactly this indication is the 
prerogative of sublimity—the sublime points us to, but does not represent, the transcendent. But 
here we are very close to the territory of the Schwärmer, whose condition, in Alberto Toscano’s 
phrasing, Kant considers a “pathology of transcendence.”20 That is, Schwärmerei involves a 
distortion in the process that is supposed to result in the negative presentation of a transcendent 
ideal. “Schwärmerei, welche ein Wahn ist, über alle Grenze der Sinnlichkeit hinaus etwas sehen, 
d.i. nach Grundsätzen träumen (mit Vernunft rasen) zu wollen”—Schwärmerei makes the 
impossible demand to see the ideal, despite Kant’s insistence that “die Unerforschlichkeit der 
Idee der Freiheit schneidet aller positiven Darstellung gänzlich den Weg ab” (KU, B 125; 
original emphasis). In so defining Schwärmerei, Kant intervened into contemporaneous 
theorization of the category: where, previously, the Schwärmer was defined as the outside of 
reason, the very embodiment of irrationality, Kant places it as the heart of reason itself, as a 
potentiality inherent to reason’s process of transcendence—in a word, Schwärmerei results from 
reason’s innate universality, its drive for totality. For Toscano, one immediate consequence of 
this “introjection” of Schwärmerei is that Kant must confront its ambivalence, “its disturbing 
proximity, as an abstract passion, to those forms of action he deems to be politically and morally 
noble because they are universalizable” (Fanaticism, 121). 
 There are echoes of this ambivalence in Schiller, whose exposition of Schwärmerei 
connects the phenomenon to morality, religion, patriotism: legitimate, even estimable 
convictions that partake of the universalizing gesture unique to reason, and therefore risk turning 
their representatives into Schwärmer. For Schiller as well as Kant, the decisive step involves 
choosing to ignore the limitations imposed by sensibility, i.e. to claim or demand an actual 
																																																						





sensuous experience of the ideal. This is Johanna’s problem: her cause of national liberation is 
itself hardly reproachable, but she claims intimate knowledge of the divine order that, she insists, 
legitimates that cause. And it is no accident that in her case, the assertion of transcendent 
experience coincides with an almost exultant violence against all opponents of God and France. 
Remove God, and you have the Jacobins (though a form of God is still there: Jacobin ideology is 
steeped in sublimity and therefore transcendence—see previous chapter). Johanna and 
Robespierre share the same uncompromising commitment to a political ideal, the idea of a 
nation, that also serves as a universal stamp of justification for aggressively promoting or 
violently “defending” that ideal. 
It is the same with Mortimer, the doomed conspirator and would-be liberator of Maria 
Stuart. Schiller’s sole invented personage in the play, Mortimer is the nephew of Paulet, captive 
Maria’s chief warden, to which circumstance Mortimer attributes great significance:  
 Um diese Zeit kam mir die Kunde zu, 
 Daß ihr aus Talbots Schloß hinweggeführt, 
Und meinem Oheim übergeben worden –  
Des Himmels wundervolle Rettungshand 
Glaubt ich in dieser Fügung zu erkennen, 
Ein lauter Ruf des Schicksals war sie mir, 
Das meinen Arm gewählt, euch zu befreien. (536-542) 
 
Mortimer believes he has been chosen to free Maria, whose execution is looming, and the proof 
is that she has passed into the care of his uncle at Castle Fotheringhay. It is a logical operation 
that implies access to the mechanics of Himmel and Schicksal—Mortimer claims to recognize 
how these orders manifest themselves empirically, and moreover to have been selected by them. 
There is a double conceit that brings Mortimer close to the Schwärmer: to know (1) a 
transcendent order’s agenda, i.e. Maria’s liberation (where the analogue in Die Jungfrau von 
Orleans is the notion that God supports France); and (2) how it empirically pursues that agenda, 





(536-542) are from early in the play (I: 6), when Mortimer reveals himself to Maria as a recent 
but passionate convert to Catholicism and a double agent in Elisabeth’s court. Mortimer learns of 
Maria’s predicament from the Bishop at Rheims, where he has completed his conversion and 
come under the tutelage of the Cardinal of Lorraine, Maria’s uncle. One day (“diese Zeit” of line 
536) in the Bishop’s apartment he was struck by an image of Maria: 
Als ich mich umsah in des Bischofs Wohnung, 
Fiel mir ein weiblich Bildnis in die Augen, 
Von rührend wundersamem Reiz, gewaltig 
Ergriff es mich in meiner tiefsten Seele, 
Und des Gefühls nicht mächtig stand ich da. (502-506) 
 
The Bishop tells Mortimer who the woman is and explains the situation in England. This is 
Mortimer’s first knowledge of Maria. Two details of his narration of this moment are worth 
noting: first, he relates it as an actual encounter, not with a picture of Maria but with the woman 
herself—“Ich sah euch, Königin – Euch selbst! Nicht euer Bild!” (549-550); second, his 
description is steeped in the language of sensibility: “von rührend wumdersamem Reiz,” “des 
Gefühls nicht mächtig.”  This is not simply lyricism on Mortimer’s part: he is giving a faithful 
report of his own perceptions. He sees an image that he in some way experiences as a real 
presence (i.e., not a representation), and the register in which the whole event takes place is 
Sinnlichkeit. The sensuous component is not insignificant. We could easily imagine Mortimer’s 
resorting to the negative language of transcendence to describe the force of the image: that it 
transports him beyond himself, denies his powers of representation, confronts him with an ideal 
that he nonetheless cannot grasp. (This would be a sublime experience.) Instead, Mortimer goes 
in the opposite direction: presented with an image, he claims to experience directly what it 
represents. This slippage between different orders of meaning is a hallmark of Mortimer’s 
personality: he encounters Maria herself in her image; he perceives a providential agenda in the 





ephemeral to the concrete: image to body, divine to pragmatic. Mortimer claims to see the 
cohesion, the reflection of one order in the other. 
 But as with Johanna, Mortimer’s overall prerogative is not so eccentric as his reasoning. 
In terms of his stated intentions, his cause seems just enough, even noble: to depose a usurping, 
illegitimate monarch and restore England to its rightful sovereign. It is not insignificant that 
Mortimer’s ‘vision’ of Maria at Rheims is accompanied by a political argument, from the 
Bishop, for her martyrdom and legitimate claim to the English throne. As Mortimer recounts, 
 Drauf fing er an, mit herzerschütternder 
 Beredsamkeit mir euer Märtyrtum 
 Und eurer Feinde Blutgier abzuschildern. 
 Auch euern Stammbaum wies er mir, er zeigte 
Mir eure Abkunft von dem hohen Hause 
Der Tudor, überzeugte mich, daß euch 
Allein gebührt in Engelland zu herrschen. (515-521)   
 
The word “überzeugen” is surprising. Following the sequence of Mortimer’s own narrative: he 
(literally) witnesses Maria in the Bishop’s apartment; there follows a discussion of English 
politics with the Bishop; in the end, Mortimer is persuaded of Maria’s rightful claim to 
sovereignty. He jumps between wildly different modes: hallucination one moment, deliberation 
the next; total sensuous immersion, a kind of rapture (“des Gefühls nicht mächtig”) in the image, 
followed by ratiocination, rhetoric—“Beredsamkeit,” “wies er mir, er zeigte mir,” “überzeugte 
mich”—a rational exchange related to specific concepts of politics. And it is a political concept, 
legitimacy, that is Mortimer’s principal motive anchor throughout the play. Centrally, his is a 
struggle over the status of the English throne, with two additional axes: the broader power 
balance between Catholic and Protestant Europe, and his progressive fixation with Maria, not as 
a martyr or embattled monarch, but a sex object.   
 Mortimer’s erotic interest in Maria is one edge of a love triangle that underlies much of 





pines for Maria, and just as importantly, fears for his position at court. Believing he is plotted 
against by Elisabeth’s other advisors—“Denn Walsingham und Burleigh hassen mich, ich weiß, 
daß sie mir laurend Netze stellen” (1750-1751)—Leicester is looking for a way out, all of which 
he explains to Mortimer when the two privately confirm their mutual allegiance to Maria, and 
Mortimer delivers a letter from Maria to Leicester promising him “daß sie verzeiht, sich mir zum 
Preise schenken will, wenn ich sie rette” (1821-1822). Maria will marry Leicester if he rescues 
her, allowing him to escape his present situation at court. She also promises Verzeihung: we 
learn that, though romantically committed some years before (“Sie war mir zugedacht seit langen 
Jahren”), Leicester left Maria out of ambition for a more prestigious marriage, to Elisabeth: 
 Mein Ehrgeiz war es, der mich gegen Jugend 
 Und Schönheit fühllos machte. Damals hielt ich 
 Mariens Hand für mich zu klein, ich hoffte 
 Auf den Besitz der Königin von England. (1770-1773) 
 
Leicester then bewails 10 years of embarrassing, servile courtship of Elisabeth, all now futile: 
she has recently become engaged to the French Duke of Anjou; with nothing more to hope for at 
Westminster, Leicester needs an exit strategy. For him, this means returning to Maria—operating 
on her behalf, with a marriage to her as his horizon—which hardly seems like a sacrifice for 
Leicester: by his own account, he has always desired her, and it was simply “der Zwang der 
Zeiten” (1760-1761) that separated them initially. But we get the sense that, even still, desire 
itself means rather little to Leicester: he is always reckoning with circumstance, calculating, 
assessing his relative position, acting ultimately in the interest of that position. In this and other 
respects, he is a sort of parallel contrast to Mortimer: each desires Maria and elaborately deceives 
Elisabeth in order to “save and possess”—“retten und besitzen,” a phrase used by both men—the 
imprisoned queen, but their respective attractions and schemes are radically different. We could 





evident in their final encounter) and plots a heroic offensive against Fotheringhay, liberating 
Maria by force—he avows he is prepared to kill Paulet, his own uncle, if necessary—and 
installing her triumphantly on the throne; Leicester sees in Maria an opportunity to escape his 
precarious situation at court, and manipulates Elisabeth into granting Maria’s request for a face-
to-face meeting (II: 9), calculating that, once she has actually seen Maria in person, Elisabeth 
will be unable to advance the execution,21 and presumably, will allow her rival to leave England 
(with Leicester).22 
 This meeting (III: 4), another invention, is the centerpiece of Maria Stuart, both 
structurally—it occupies the middle act of a symmetrical drama: acts I and V take place at 
Fotheringhay and Maria is the principal character; likewise for acts II and IV and Elisabeth at 
Westminster—and substantively: contrary to Leicester’s prediction, the meeting is a disaster, 
especially for Maria, whose fate is virtually sealed by the end. Why? The meeting seems like an 
excellent opportunity for reconciliation: Elisabeth and Maria can actually see each other, 
something their historical counterparts never did, for the first time, and therefore experience one 
another as human beings rather than abstractions or symbolic allegiances. This is what both 
Leicester and Burleigh, despite wholly different approaches to statecraft, anticipate: the 
sympathy of proximity. Plus, it is a chance for the two queens to communicate directly, have an 
exchange about prospects for resolving their political situation. Maria at least begins in this 
spirit: she throws herself before Elisabeth and effectively disavows any claim to the throne 
																																																						
21 A presumption shared by court treasurer Burleigh, the play’s foremost proponent of Maria’s execution: “das Urteil 
kann nicht mehr vollzogen werden, wenn sich die Königin ihr genahet hat” (1525-1526). Leicester reproduces this 
language almost exactly in his exchange with Mortimer: “Das Urteil kann nicht mehr vollzogen werden, wenn sie 
sie gesehn” (1905-1906). 
22 As Mortimer and Leicester debate the best way to free Maria, their language is illustrative of this division between 
passion and interest: Mortimer is visibly impatient and uses words like “großmütig” to describe the prospect of 
breaking into Fotheringhay by force, and he seems to be seeking violence—“Gewaltsam will ich auftun ihren 
Kerker” (1847)—w here Leicester warns against “Wagnis” and dismisses Mortimer’s “Wagestück” as “zu 





(2244-2256). But Elisabeth is unmoved, “kalt und streng,” granting only “Ihr seid an eurem 
Platz” (2257). Maria continues to supplicate volubly, repeats her disavowal and asks only for 
freedom to leave England (2378-2402) when Elisabeth, emotionally remote and relishing her 
leverage, mocks Maria for her alleged promiscuity: “Der Ruhm war wohfeil zu Erlangen, es 
kostet nichts, die allgemeine Schönheit zu sein, als die gemeine sein für alle!” (2416-2418) Now 
Maria is sufficiently provoked to strike back (2421-2432), targeting Elisabeth’s mother, Anne 
Boleyn—notorious for numerous affairs—and reiterating with special venom the claim she was 
prepared to relinquish moments before: Elisabeth is an illegitimate child (of infamous Anne 
Boleyn) with, therefore, no rightful claim to the throne: “Der Thron von England ist durch einen 
Bastard entweiht, der Briten edelherzig Volk durch eine list’ge Gauklerin betrogen” (2447-
2449). Enraged, Elisabeth storms off, and Maria’s execution seems certain. 
 The meeting is a strange event, in part because its unraveling seems so petty and 
avoidable. But this feeling of contingency may have a theoretical corollary in Schiller’s concept 
of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung). Recall that, in the Ästhetische Erziehung, the play-drive 
induces reciprocal exchange, and in this way mediates the tension, between formality and sense, 
the respective faculties of cognition and feeling that together constitute human life. Schiller is 
emphatic in the treatise: these two regions, though we often find them in contention, need not be 
opposed—it is only through a “transgression of nature” that they destructively collide, “indem 
sie sich selbst missverstehen und ihre Sphären verwirren” (ÄE 13; 2). Misunderstanding and 
confusion, rather than some Manichean determinism, place form and sense in conflict, and it is 
the function of Spiel to maintain their natural accord, their Wechselwirkung. But because there is 
no determinism, the matter of instantiating reciprocal Spiel is one of circumstance—it has to 





We might read the queens’ meeting as such a failure. Several elements of Maria Stuart 
suggest a connection to the drive theory of the aesthetic letters, especially Schiller’s 
characterization of the queens and their denominational allegiances. On this count, Mortimer’s 
conversion narrative (I: 6) is critical: with little ambiguity, he frames his decision to leave the 
Protestant church of his youth as an escape from oppressive intellection: he rages against “das 
körperlose Wort,” the “enge[s] dumpfe[s] Buch,” the “Pflichten” of that belief, one that reviles 
“der Sinne Reiz.” Conversely, Mortimer’s path to Catholicism is one of “Begierde,” the sensuous 
ecstasy of Rome, finally sealed with the Cardinal’s dictum: “daß grübelnde Vernunft den 
Menschen ewig in der Irre leitet, daß seine Augen sehen müssen, was das Herz soll glauben, daß 
ein sichtbar Haupt der Kirche not tut” (477-481). This is a small manifesto of Sinnlichkeit, and it 
should be no surprise that Mortimer’s fixation with Maria begins and ends in the physical 
register: he stands “des Gefühls nicht mächtig” before her image at Rheims, and in their last 
meeting (III: 6), with Maria still reeling from the encounter with Elisabeth, Mortimer, clearly 
now unhinged and raving, yields entirely to his sexual craving and tries to rape her.  
Consistent with Mortimer’s framing of the denominational split in terms of intellect and 
sense, Schiller places Catholic Maria squarely in the region of the sensuous.23 He writes to 
Goethe in June 1799: “ich will [meine Maria] immer als ein physisches Wesen halten, und das 
pathetische muß mehr eine allgemeine tiefe Rührung, als ein persönlich und individuelles 
Mitgefühl seyn. Sie empfindet und erregt keine Zärtlichkeit, ihr Schicksal ist nur heftige 
Paßionen zu erfahren und zu entzünden” (KD 544). Two key points are that Maria is an 
																																																						
23 And frequently, sensual. This too is an intervention into history on Schiller’s part. Kari Lokke: “In order to fulfill 
his poetic aims, Schiller transforms the historical Mary, who, at death, was forty-four years of age, grey-haired and 
physically broken from eighteen years of captivity into a ravishing young beauty of twenty-five.” Kari Lokke, 
“Schiller’s “Maria Stuart”: The Historical Sublime and the Aesthetics of Gender,” Monatshefte 82 (Summer 1990), 





essentially physical being in the play, and it is her function to ignite and experience passions—
Mortimer’s obsession is the clearest example on stage, and the play is full of references to 
Maria’s well-known powers in the realm of affect, sensation, feeling. On the other side of the 
divide is Elisabeth: sexless—“the virgin queen”—and, in terms of the emotional profile she 
presents, barely human.24 It is telling that the sight of Maria is in no way endearing to Elisabeth – 
if anything the opposite is the case – as Leicester and Burleigh expect. Schiller removes from 
Elisabeth all vestiges of affective sensitivity while elevating her propensity – evident in the acts 
at Westminster – to manipulation and self-aggrandizement. Consistent (in the play’s thematic 
logic) with her Protestantism, Elisabeth gives us the grim, unqualified side of the Formtrieb.25  
 Nonetheless, the attempt at Wechselwirkung fails, and given her general disposition, it is 
not surprising that Elisabeth finally signs the death order (IV: 10), and Maria is executed (V: 10). 
But there is an interesting ambiguity concerning the ultimate fate of this document, which is in 
some ways the keystone of the play: Maria has been sentenced by a tribunal shortly before the 
action begins, and the whole question is whether Elisabeth will finalize the process with her 
signature. When they first meet, Mortimer explains to Maria with urgency, “Das Haus der Lords 
und der Gemeinen, die Stadt London bestehen heftig dringend auf des Urteils Vollstreckung, nur 
die Königin säumt noch” (579-582; my emphasis). That is, the play’s central tension must be 
resolved by a sovereign decision, which fact may have a formal, generic component: Franco 
Moretti has written that “tragedy presents a universe in which everything has its origin in the 
																																																						
24 Jeffrey Sammons: “While it was Schiller’s habit to heighten his historical figures and make them more attractive 
for his dramatic purposes… Elisabeth is positively reduced in size. Vain, erratic, and despotic though she may have 
been, she was at the same time courageous, resourceful, and often amiable—qualities Schiller denies her.” 
“Mortimer’s Conversion and Schiller’s Allegiances,” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology 72:2 (April 
1973), 159. 
25 During their encounter, Elisabeth’s sensitivities are on display only when Maria attacks her reputation, which 





decision of the king… In the world of tragedy the monarch is truly absolute.”26 Certainly in one 
respect Maria Stuart adheres to that formula: everyone is waiting for Elisabeth to sign the order, 
to decide. Yet even after she signs toward the end of act IV, she refuses to confirm her decision 
verbally to Davison (IV: 11), becoming evasive when asked to clarify her intentions. Davison, a 
minor court official, is afraid to set into motion so massive an event without express 
confirmation from Elisabeth, and he asks that she simply state out loud her approval of the 
execution. She will not, becomes angry and storms away, and Burleigh must arrive and tear the 
order from quaking Davison to deliver it himself. Later Elisabeth will absolve herself of all 
responsibility and rage against the hastiness of the execution (V: 14-15).  
Maria Stuart thus seems to present a twist to Moretti’s thesis: it is certainly a tragedy of 
absolutism—the whole drama is one of sovereign legitimacy; the basic tension is there can only 
be one—that hangs on the monarch’s decision, yet Elisabeth finds a way of both deciding and 
not deciding, affecting the event but shielding herself from accountability. She is an absolute 
sovereign undertaking a major display of power: executing another monarch. Yet she wants to do 
so with minimal visibility, allowing her order to travel through the institutional machinery 
surrounding her, and disavowing it after the fact. In this way she is definitively not absolutist in 
the definitional sense (of Bodin), instead anticipating quieter forms of government to come: 





Schiller’s General Wallenstein and an absolute monarch share an important conceit: each 
demands unqualified authority over a body of subjects. The difference is that, for Wallenstein, 
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this body is an army, not a state. As he explains to Questenberg—the emperor’s emissary, 
embattled in Wallenstein’s camp, where he has been sent with a royal directive for the General—
absolute authority was Wallenstein’s basic stipulation on assuming command:  
 Nur auf Bedingung nahm ich dies Kommando; 
 Und gleich die erste war, daß mir zum Nachteil 
 Kein Menschenkind, auch selbst der Kaiser nicht, 
 Bei der Armee zu sagen haben sollte. (Die Piccolomini, 1214-1217)27 
 
Wallenstein demands a control so total that not even his sovereign, the Austrian Emperor, is to 
influence the operations of his (imperial) army. Wallenstein’s formulation—“kein 
Menschenkind” may limit his authority—resembles Bodin’s definition of absolutist rule: no 
other human power can check the sovereign. But certainly from Schiller’s perspective as an 
historian, absolutism is a theory of government that no empirical monarch fully realized. 
Similarly, Wallenstein’s insistence on absolute control of his army only sets up his own downfall 
and the tragedy of the Wallenstein trilogy. On account of his military record, Wallenstein has 
been enlisted to lead an army in service of Austria’s interests in the Thirty Years’ War, in which 
capacity he has begun to stray, asserting greater and greater independence, to the Emperor’s 
discontent—hence Questenberg’s visit, to remind Wallenstein whom he serves, and deliver his 
latest assignment: to take Regensburg, “denn seine Majestät will Regenspurg vor Ostern noch 
vom Feind gesäubert sehn” (P 1188-1189). The Emperor’s attempt to intervene in his command 
is a problem for Wallenstein, who insists that the strength of their enemy, King Gustav of 
Sweden, lies in the indivisibility of his authority: “Was machte diesen Gustav unwiderstehlich, 
unbesiegt auf Erden? Dies: daß er König war in seinem Heer! Ein König aber, einer der es ist, 
ward nie besiegt noch, als durch seines gleichen” (P 1220-1224). Worth noting is that 
Wallenstein uses a title of political authority (König) to refer to a military leader’s function in his 
																																																						





army, and in substance—as well as the context of the argument with Questenberg—that function 
appears to come straight from the theory of absolutist rule: the leader of an (effective) army is 
subject to no outside power in conducting its operations, and that army is vulnerable only to 
another force with an equivalent, unqualified authority at its head. 
 But if, in line with Moretti’s formula of tragedy, Wallenstein stages the conceits of 
absolutism, it does so in order to immediately tear them down. For one, the whole exchange with 
Questenberg is moot: Wallenstein in fact plans to join the Swedes—the plan is to subdue the 
Emperor with his own army and enforce a continental détente in which Wallenstein himself will 
enjoy a greater share of the spoils. On several levels, Wallenstein is a drama in which nothing is 
absolute, or even really stable: personal allegiance, ideology, nationality, principle—all are 
subject to the whims of the war, which has developed an autonomous logic and itself become the 
end. Wallenstein will ultimately succumb to this logic: the ‘polity’ over which he claims 
sovereignty—the army—fractures, and he is murdered at the behest of Buttler, his aggrieved 
commander and former advocate. Such is consistent with the dramatic material: Schiller’s own 
historical treatise on the Thirty Years’ War “demonstrated,” quoting Krimmer, “that wars 
develop a dynamic of their own that is no longer subject to political authority and ethical 
imperative” (“Transcendental Warriors,” 103). There is a cluster of questions pertinent to this 
dynamic debated throughout the play: what is the purpose of the war? Do its combatants really 
want it to end? Does one wage a war to end a war? 
 The last suggestion may seem paradoxical or even absurd, but it has an eloquent 
proponent in the play: Max Piccolomini, who, like Mortimer in Maria Stuart, is the sole invented 
persona in a drama populated—in the case of Wallenstein, vastly—by empirical figures. Max is 





army. Roughly 20, he has effectively only known war, both as an overall condition—the play 
takes place in 1634: Max was a young child when the war began—and as his immediate 
environs: he was raised in military camps, often under the wing of Wallenstein himself (WT 
2142-2163), to whom Max is fiercely loyal, even as general sentiment begins to tend against 
him. Max defends Wallenstein against Questenberg in Die Piccolomini: “Ihr seid es, die den 
Frieden hindern, ihr! Der Krieger ist’s, der ihn erzwingen muß” (565-566). Ihr refers to the 
world for which Questenberg is a proxy—the political body of the empire, embodied in the 
Emperor—while Wallenstein is a Krieger, a warrior, and only a warrior can enforce 
(“erzwingen”) peace. The principle is peace through war—not, presumably, ‘softer’ alternatives, 
like diplomacy, engagement, compromise, etc.—at the discretion of the Krieger. Octavio, party 
to the exchange, regrets his son’s effusive militarism:  
Das Kind des Lagers spricht aus dir, mein Sohn.  
Ein fünfzehnjähr’ger Krieg hat dich erzogen,  
- Du hast den Frieden nie gesehen! Es gibt  
noch höhern Wert, mein Sohn, als kriegerischen, 
Im Kriege selber ist das letzte nicht der Krieg. (P 481-485) 
 
That war itself is not the end, that war should answer to something else, is one of two principles 
animating Octavio. The other is a fundamental loyalty to the Emperor, a commitment that 
withstands even the challenge of his friend Wallenstein. Father and son collide on this question 
in the final act of Die Piccolomini: Octavio reveals to Max Wallenstein’s plan to betray the 
Emperor, and pleads with his son not to follow. 
Ich klügle nicht, ich tue meine Pflicht, 
Der Kaiser schreibt mir mein Betragen vor. 
Wohl wär’ es besser, überall dem Herzen 
Zu folgen, doch darüber würde man 
Sich manchen guten Zweck versagen müssen. 
Hier gilt’s, mein Sohn, dem Kaiser wohl zu dienen, 






As he puts it, Octavio’s position is simple (“ich klügle nicht”): he serves the Emperor, and that is 
that. It is his duty, and we will see the term Pflicht used in the same way by Max later in the 
play: Pflicht lies squarely on the side of the Emperor—duty refers to one’s overall political 
allegiance. Personal allegiance, on the other hand, is a matter of the heart, and we see Octavio 
hedging here against a line of rhetoric Max will exploit and, ultimately, convolute in 
Wallensteins Tod. Twice Octavio mentions das Herz: “wohl wär’ es besser, überall dem Herzen 
zu folgen,” but this would sacrifice the greater goal; he concludes that, in this particular 
circumstance, they must serve the Emperor, regardless of what the heart “says”—“das Herz mag 
dazu sprechen, was es will.” Octavio knows there is a powerful emotional bond between Max 
and Wallenstein—Wallenstein helped raised Max; Max now refers to him as Freund—and he 
anticipates it, hoping to limit its affective appeal, before Max can commit himself to it. In this 
respect, Octavio is unsuccessful: as Max wavers between loyalties throughout Wallensteins Tod, 
das Herz invariably appears as his final seat of justification—until it fails him.  
The rhetorical career of Max’s heart is worth exploring in some detail. At the close of Die 
Piccolomini (V: 1), Octavio is in disbelief that Max, having learned of Wallenstein’s plan, can 
still support the General: “Ist’s möglich? Noch – nach allem, was du weißt, kannst du an seine 
Unschuld glauben?” Max responds forcefully, “Dein Urteil kann sich irren, nicht mein Herz” 
(2545-2547). Here the heart is a final arbiter, an intuitive power that pierces through veils of 
error, and Max plans to entrust himself to it: he will confront Wallenstein himself, and 
presumably, listen to what his heart tells him. This conversation takes place in Wallenstein’s Tod 
(II: 2), where Wallenstein confirms to Max that he plans to turn his army against the Emperor. 
The time has come for Max to choose sides: “Du mußt Partei ergreifen in dem Krieg, der 





invokes their friendship, their affective bond—he is speaking to Max’s heart; as such it is strange 
that Max’s resistance to Wallenstein rests precisely on this figure: “Zum ersten Male heut’ 
verweisest du mich an mich selbst und zwingst mich, eine Wahl zu treffen zwischen dir und 
meinem Herzen” (716-718). Max’s heart seems somehow to provide a counterweight to both 
Octavio and Wallenstein: it leads him to suspect Octavio’s judgment of Wallenstein, yet also 
prevents him from joining Wallenstein entirely. In any case, Max remains undecided—tormented 
may be a better word at this point in the drama—at the end of this exchange with Wallenstein. 
He returns to Octavio later in the same act (II: 7), continuing to insist he will follow his heart 
alone: “Verschwende deine Worte nicht vergebens, dem Herzen folg’ ich, denn ich darf ihm 
trauen” (1246-1247). Octavio questions the wisdom of that principle: “Und trau ich deinem 
Herzen auch, wird’s immer in deiner Macht auch stehen, ihm zu folgen?” Max replies, “Du hast 
des Herzens Stimme nicht bezwungen, so wenig wird der Herzog es vermögen” (1260-1263). 
Max states here what his earlier rhetoric only implied: his heart is a indepedent authority that will 
allow him to rightly choose between his father (and loyalty to the Emperor) and Wallenstein. 
But it is also in this exchange with Octavio that we are reminded of what Max’s heart 
really desires: anything but emotionally independent, Max is in love with Wallenstein’s 
daughter, Thekla, who figures significantly in his conflict of loyalty. In fact Max seems to 
imagine her as his arbiter: 
Sie soll mein Leiden sehen, meinen Schmerz, 
Die Klagen hören der zerrißnen Seele… 
Sie wird von gräßlich wütender Verzweiflung 
Die Seele retten, diesen Schmerz des Todes 
Mit sanften Trostesworten klagend lösen. (WT 1237-1243) 
 
This is a fresh dynamic in Max’s quest to decide: to trust his heart is not so much to rely on his 
own intuition as to defer to Thekla, the object of his love. Closer to Max’s own language here, he 





and “Verzweiflung” of his imminent decision. In act III of Wallenstein’s Tod, Max finds Thekla 
and tells her that he must leave Wallenstein’s camp (remember his Pflicht is to the Emperor—
müssen is the verb). “Ich muß, muß dich verlassen, Thekla – muß!”—but he refuses to do so 
until she grants him sympathy: “Nur einen Blick des Mitleids gönne mir, sag’, daß du mich nicht 
hassest” (2058-2061). But he is in such a rush to receive Thekla’s blessing that Max fails to 
notice Wallenstein is standing in the room; Thekla points him to her father, but Max insists his 
business is with her alone: “Ich hab’ es nur mit ihr allein. Hier will ich, von diesem Herzen 
freigesprochen sein, an allem andern ist nicht mehr gelegen” (2068-2070). Thekla must 
“absolve” him of his decision, whatever it is. In either case, the decision no longer seems his 
alone, and three scenes later, he finally gives up on his own Herz: 
 Das Herz in mir empört sich, es erheben 
 Zwei Stimmen streitend sich in meiner Brust, 
 In mir ist Nacht, ich weiß das rechte nicht zu wählen. 
 O wohl, wohl hast du wahr geredet, Vater, 
 Zu viel vertraut’ ich auf das eigne Herz, 
 Ich stehe wankend, weiß nicht was ich soll. (2279-2284) 
 
His heart does not simply represent one perspective but is itself internally split (“Zwei 
Stimmen”) and gives him no firm direction. He regrets he did not heed Octavio and question 
“das eigne Herz,” bemoaning further “uns alle bewegt der Wunsch, die Leidenschaft”—he calls 
out for “eine Stimme der Wahrheit… ein Engel” that will descend and vouchsafe to him the right 
choice (2295-2298). Of course he really means Thekla; he asks her “kannst du mich dann noch 
lieben, wenn ich bleibe? Erkläre daß du’s kannst und ich bin euer” (2307-2308). In a way, he 
reverses his initial request: where he first wanted Thekla to grant him sympathy despite his 
decision to leave and fight against her father—a kind of emotional sanction—he now promises to 





fight for Wallenstein or the Emperor—in which situation will Thekla love him? After much 
loquacity from Max, she tells him what he wants to hear: 
 Geh’ und erfülle deine Pflicht. Ich würde 
 Dich immer lieben. Was du auch erwählt, 
 Du würdest edel stets und deiner würdig 
 Gehandelt haben – aber Reue soll 
 Nicht deiner Seele schönen Frieden stören. (2342-2346) 
 
He has received a universal stamp of approval: she will love him no matter what he does. His 
decision follows immediately: “So muß ich dich verlassen, von dir scheiden!” (2347) There does 
not seem to have been much internal tension for Max surrounding the basic content of the 
decision: like Octavio, he is fundamentally loyal to the Emperor—the situation with Wallenstein 
simply presented a specific and very personally charged challenge to that loyalty. In this way, 
Thekla seems to have given Max a way out, tipped the scales in favor of the Emperor—their 
relationship commands enough of Max’s emotional world (his Herz) that, once Thekla has 
approved his Pflicht (she uses the term as well), he feels he has not too badly betrayed his 
emotions in pursuing it.  
But despite it all, Max still loses: neither Wallenstein nor any of Max’s former officers 
will grant him even the smallest parting courtesy before he is sent from the camp in disgrace, and 
in the next act he is dead in battle. Devastated, Thekla wants to know every detail of the incident. 
Her witness is a Captain in the Swedish regiment attacked by imperial cavalry troops under 
Max’s command. As he narrates (WT IV: 10), Max’s horsemen caught the Swedes by surprise, 
but in their haste to advance, left their own infantry reinforcements far behind; the Swedish 
soldiers were thus able to surround the outnumbered cavalry and wipe them out; Max, thrown 
from his horse and trampled, was the first to die. He was given a ceremony and mourned by the 






Denn viele sind bei uns, die seine Großmut 
Und seiner Sitten Freundlichkeit erfahren, 
Und alle rührte sein Geschick. Gern hätte 
Der Rheingraf ihn gerettet, doch er selbst 
Vereitelt’ es, man sagt, er wollte sterben. (3068-3072) 
 
“Er wollte sterben”—we can imagine why the Swedes reach this conclusion: Max’s assault was a 
tactical catastrophe. He stranded his cavalrymen, consigned them all to slaughter—hardly fitting 
an experienced military professional, an officer whose natural environment is warfare. From the 
standpoint of those on the receiving end of the attack, it looked like a suicide mission. The 
question then is why—did Max not get what he wanted in Thekla’s blessing? Contrary to what 
his outward relief suggested, was he not internally resolved?  
 In a certain sense, he was: he was able to honor his basic loyalty to the Emperor. But the 
fact that this is not enough suggests there is a problem with Max’s loyalty itself, with his faculty 
of commitment. At the outset, Max is fervently loyal to Wallenstein, making verbal overtures: 
“Was dank’ ich ihm nicht alles – o! was sprech’ ich nicht alles aus in diesem teuren Namen, 
Friedland! Zeitlebens soll ich ein Gefangner sein von diesem Namen!” (P 782-786) This kind of 
language is typical for Max, and as we’ve seen, he’ll go on to speak of his Herz with the same 
emphatic fealty: he will unconditionally follow his heart, though it seems to vacillate between 
Octavio and Wallenstein, and in the course of the drama he invokes it against both of them. 
Ultimately he defers utterly to his imperial Pflicht. Wallenstein, Herz, Kaiser—Max’s 
commitment is in every instance one-sided and total; he is a figure of constant imbalance. On 
this count, it is important to recall something from our discussion of Die Jungfrau von Orleans: 
das Herz is Schiller’s keyword for the world of Sinnlichkeit, affect, feeling. Given Schiller’s 
insistence in the Ästhetische Erziehung on balancing drives (Wechselwirkung), Max’s repeated 
invocations of his Herz invite the interpretation that he is trying to let his Stofftrieb decide for 





balance that drive with his formal impulses. We encounter Formtrieb not just in Max’s Pflicht 
(duty is an abstract principle) but also in the astrological fortune-telling that pervades the play: 
Wallenstein himself has a personal astrologer, and Max, somewhat surprisingly, avows that he is 
also a believer (P III: 4). It is hard to imagine a more transcendent (in the sense we’ve been using 
the term) mode of reasoning than astrology: it is literally supersensible just as the stars are super-
terrestrial; it is all symbolic forms and no concrete bodies. But again, whether it is private 
emotions or star science, Max seems only to be looking for something to defer to—his loyalty is 
a form of dependency, his arc in the play a series of one-sided commitments. As such, it is not 
surprising that there is an element of exhausted surrender to his pointless death: he has spent the 
whole play wasting his energy.  
 
* * * 
 
I have profiled Schiller’s three late histories with emphasis on a select group of elements: in Die 
Jungfrau von Orleans, the heroine’s sexuality, violence, and the triumphal spectacle of her death; 
in Maria Stuart, the figure of Mortimer, his love triangle with Maria and Leicester, and the 
queens’ confrontation in act III; and in Wallenstein I have focused largely on the trajectory of 
Max Piccolomini. These are all Schiller’s inventions. The historical Jeanne d’Arc was chaste and 
died a martyr at the stake; Mortimer is a fabrication, the empirical Leicester had no feelings for 
Mary Stuart, and the actual queens never met; and Max, like Mortimer, is Schiller’s creation 
entirely. I posed the question at the outset: is there any sort of group identity to these inventions? 





 A persistent question of Schiller scholarship involves the relationship between the late 
dramas and the rich body of aesthetic texts preceding them.28 The history plays discussed here 
help us specify that relationship—these plays are empirically grounded, but Schiller selectively 
intervenes with invented figures, relations and events that magnify theoretically resonant aspects 
of the material. Schönheit, das Erhabene, Anmut, Würde, Spiel, Schwärmerei—it is a 
commonplace that these are features of Schiller’s late dramas: they are just as certainly present in 
his early plays, other writers’ plays, as well as the texture of daily life if Schiller’s aesthetic 
categories have any general use at all. My claim is more precise: Schiller uses inventions in the 
context of history plays to bring out those theoretical dynamics, to present historical material in 
such a way that aesthetic concepts play a central role. His rationale is the doctrine of Spiel, by 
which opposed elements are brought into productive interplay. In this case, it is the 
historiographic Spiel I described earlier: empirical history with free invention standing in for 
Stofftrieb and Formtrieb, embodying their dominant modes—what is more passive than the past, 
more active than the creative imagination? For Schiller, Spiel calls for a reciprocal exchange, a 
point of contact between the passive material of empirical history and the inventive capacities of 
the mind. 
 History allows Schiller to localize his concepts, to give them more concrete weight: in 
Mortimer we see how a modern political Schwärmer reasons, how a seductive ideal of 
righteousness can transform a person, a lesson with obvious pertinence following the fervid 
virtue-politics of the Jacobins. But it is possible the instruction works in the other direction as 
well, that is, toward an understanding of history: just as the specific historical moment of the 
late-16th century frames the symbolic options available for Mortimer’s obsessive commitment, so 
																																																						
28 From the beginning, Schiller’s aesthetic writings have influenced reception of his subsequent history plays. See 





Mortimer and Johanna together form a kind of trans-epochal axis of Schwärmerei that allows us 
to trace the progression of this category from late Medieval to early modern Europe. Consistent 
with Schiller’s diagnosis of modernity as an age of Zerissenheit, late-Medieval Johanna’s 
Schwärmerei is a claim to grand unity, a total amalgamation of categories that obliterates 
divisions central to modernity—religion and nation, morality and law, even the distinction 
between sublimity and beauty that largely defines the aesthetics of modern philosophy—a 
unifying conceit communicated chiefly, as I’ve described, through Schiller’s inventions. There is 
no analogous pretense to unity with Mortimer, and his struggle is much more limited and 
partisan—he fights for this monarch with this claim to legitimacy—but he partakes in the same 
berserk search for transcendence as Johanna, the impossible to demand to actually experience an 
ineffable ideal. 
 Another difference involves our judgment as spectators: it is easier to condemn Mortimer 
than Johanna, an impression reinforced by scholarship on the plays, which tends to read Johanna 
as complicated and Mortimer as depraved.29 I believe Schiller invites this assessment, not just of 
Mortimer, but maybe Max Piccolomini as well. Certainly we would use somewhat different 
language to describe them—Max hardly seems “crazy” (Sammons) in the way Mortimer does—
but they have two important elements in common: they are fictive and suicidal. Duped by 
Leicester and surrounded by Elisabeth’s guard in act IV of Maria Stuart, Mortimer stabs himself 
while raving to an absent Maria. As I described already, Max’s death in a tactically botched 
attack is widely regarded, both by figures in the play and academic commentators, as a suicide 
mission. It is striking that, in a community of dramatic figures totaling nearly 100 between three 
plays, Schiller invents only two. Still more striking is that both characters commit suicide. This, I 
																																																						





think, is the invitation to judgment, or at least diagnosis: we are left considering what went 
wrong with Mortimer and Max, what idea Schiller thought worthy of creating an entire 
personage to express. Worth noting is that Mortimer and Max resemble not just each other in 
certain ways, but also the typical Jacobin: a man in his 20s with intense political commitments, 
and we get the sense that perhaps more important than the commitments themselves is the faculty 
for feeling committed, a sort of ongoing passion for some ideal. The lesson with Mortimer and 
Max involves the one-sidedness of this passion. They are monomaniacs—their principles admit 
of no compromise or negotiation, a fact which is perhaps most striking in the case of Max, whose 
faculty for dedication is such that he hyperactively attaches himself to Wallenstein, the Emperor, 
Thekla, his heart, etc. There is no sense of balance, no impulse to Wechselwirkung in Mortimer 
in Max. It is reasonable to call them antireciprocal figures: at any given point, each is 
responding to a single-entendre principle that, at least for that moment, enjoys total primacy. 
Mortimer and Max are prognostic cases of imbalance, instructive contrasts to the two-sided 
dynamic of Schillerian Spiel. Schiller gives us their suicides as if to suggest where complete one-
sidedness leads: depleted self-annihilation. 
 In other instances, Schiller seems to invite a judgment of history itself. The fictional 
meeting of the queens in Maria Stuart exemplifies the dramatic material of the late histories: 
high points of crisis, moments of crystallization in which broad political conflicts jump a level in 
intensity, become perceptible in immediate collisions. The denominational dispute over the right 
to rule England condenses into a face-to-face clash between the rival monarchs; in Wallenstein, 
the already fraught world of the Thirty Years’ War becomes feverish surrounding the betrayal 
and assassination of the General; and Die Jungfrau von Orleans interprets the most memorable 





interpretation, of selective rendering, is critical for Schiller: it is the point at which the plays open 
political history to judgment, but not in the sense of issuing a simple “right” or “wrong” to the 
moments he selects—the fictions are too subtle, the whole presentation too attenuated for that. 
Instead this sort of judgment amounts to a communication of contingency, of non-determinism: 
Schiller lost his initial teleological optimism to discover that political history, far from the 
inexorable forward march of enlightened values, is shaped by (often selfish and fallible) human 
decisions. Two major conclusions follow: first, history could have been different; second, 
present actors are responsible for shaping its trajectory—they cannot fall back on any sort of 
determinism. Both principles are on displays in the historical dramas, and again, the meeting in 
Maria Stuart is exemplary: we get a sense not only for the contours of the disagreement—and 
the underlying Trieb-dynamics (Schiller’s diagnosis), discussed above—but also its utter 
reversibility, the glaring opportunity for reconciliation. In this scene it is quite literally an issue 
of phrasing, of avoiding momentary insult. This is also something traceable to Spiel: the 
imbalance and alienation of the drives—probably the governing rubric of these history plays—is 
itself nothing predetermined, but contingent, a “transgression of nature,” a mistake. Therein lies 












Sublime Politics:  
 




In the summer of 1790, 28-year-old tutor and aspiring philosopher J.G. Fichte read Kant and was 
transformed. He felt he finally had a foundation on which to develop his own theoretical ideas, 
and he was especially enthusiastic about the moral philosophy Kant had presented in his 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) and Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1787). Thus 
the young Fichte, still without a university appointment and eager to prove himself, set an 
ambitious goal: to apply Kantian moral theory to the world of politics and social order, a world 
that, in the early 1790s, was fixated on the French Revolution of 1789. So it is no surprise that 
Fichte’s most developed work from this period bears the cumbersome (but very Fichtean) title 
Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums über die französische Revolution.1 The 
Beitrag is not a famous work: it is Fichte’s only book-length treatise not translated into English, 
and his pre-Jena (1794) writings as a whole are frequently overlooked.2 On the rare occasion that 
the Beitrag is engaged in scholarship on Fichte, it is usually in passing, along the way to more 
																																																						
1 For a helpful overview of Fichte’s early development and political philosophy see Frederick Beiser, 
Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism, 75-82. 
2 The third chapter of Slavoj Žižek’s goliath Less than Nothing (2012) is illustrative: at 60 pages devoted to Fichte, it 
is an example of uncommonly sustained and rigorous Fichte scholarship in English. It also operates on an inherited 
distinction between “early” (Jena, 1794-1799) and “late” Fichte (Berlin, 1799-1814) that gives no place to early 





significant works, and Fichte is taken at his word in the form of an “application” thesis: namely, 
that the Beitrag is Fichte’s straightforward attempt to apply Kantian moral principles to 
European politics after the French Revolution. In essence, this is an intertextual thesis: Fichte 
writes his text (the Beitrag) with one or several specific other texts in mind (Kant’s second 
Kritik, usually Rousseau’s Social Contract is mentioned here as well) and brings them to bear on 
a new object of concern (the Revolution). 
I am not saying this thesis is wrong—only that it may have the wrong texts. Underneath 
its moral exterior the Beitrag is fundamentally aesthetic in nature, advancing a critique of 
European politics indebted more to the Kantian sublime of the third Kritik (1790) than the 
categorical imperative. In fact I will call the Beitrag a hidden manifesto of the political sublime, 
hidden even from Fichte himself, who set out to write a treatise on political morality, and 
produced a document of aesthetic politics that rivals Schiller’s Ästhetische Erziehung as a 
specimen of these two orders’ conceptual interplay. And if the latter is Schiller’s defense of 
political moderatism from the standpoint of beauty and harmony, the Beitrag sees Fichte 
actualizing the radical political potential of the Kantian sublime in defense of revolutionary 
upheaval. One result for Fichte was the aspersive title “German Jacobin,” a burden throughout 
his years at Jena (1794-1799),3 though we’ll see there is some justice to the charge: if anything, 
the aesthetic politics of the Beitrag help to ground it. 
When I say the Beitrag embodies “aesthetic politics,” I do not mean this in the 
commonplace sense of an “art of statecraft” or the artistic-symbolic properties of state 
iconography; rather I am saying that an aesthetic concept, concealing itself as a moral concept, 
structures a theory of politics. Because my argument concerns the basic theoretical architecture 
																																																						





of the Beitrag, I’ve chosen to limit myself to roughly the first third of the text (about 50 pages), 
in which Fichte presents the conceptual underpinnings of the treatise. The centerpiece of this first 
section is a chapter titled “Hat überhaupt ein Volk das Recht, seine Staatsverfassung 
abzuändern?” (Beitrag 33-50) The short version of my argument is that the concept of the 
sublime allows Fichte to answer yes to this question in the precise and emphatic way that he does 
in that chapter, the “Vorrede” and the “Einleitung” to the book.4 The remaining chapters—one 
on social contract theory and three largely sociological sections on the nobility, privileged 
classes and the church—I leave for another occasion. 
 
 
Fichte and Aesthetics 
 
Like Kant, Schelling and Hegel, Fichte is a philosophical systems-builder: he attempts to 
construct a unified theoretical edifice that comprehensively accounts for the world in its 
multiplicity. This synthetic ambition lends the systems-builder the appearance of trying to talk 
about everything: nature, politics, science, ethics, religion, history, and for every German Idealist 
but Fichte, art. Kant has the Kritik der Urteilskraft, which David Wellbery calls the 
“Gründungsdokument” of philosophical aesthetics5; Schelling’s System des transzendentalen 
Idealismus (1800) famously culminates in the claim that art is the “one true and eternal organon” 
of philosophy; and Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik from the 1820s, though denying art 
the primacy it enjoys in Kant and Schelling, nonetheless remain a mainstay of modern aesthetic 
theory. Among the grand philosophical systems of German Idealism, Fichte’s alone is silent on 
art—there is no official “Fichtean aesthetics.”  
																																																						
4 The “Vorrede” and “Einleitung” are respectively pages 4-10 and 10-33 of the edition I cite throughout. 
5 David E. Wellbery, “Die Enden des Menschen: Anthropologie und Einbildungskraft im Bildungsroman (Wieland, 
Goethe, Novalis),” In Das Ende: Poetik und Hermeneutik XVI, ed. K. Stierle and R. Warning (Munich: Wilhelm 





Such at least is the rough critical consensus Paul Gordon disputes in Art as the Absolute 
(2015), a recent monograph on the role of aesthetics in German philosophies of the “absolute” 
between 1790 and 1830.6 While he acknowledges that Fichte’s philosophical system—
conventionally synonymous with the Wissenschaftslehre first presented in 1794 and reformulated 
over the next two decades—contains no explicit theorization of aesthetics, Gordon nonetheless 
directs our attention to a piece Fichte submitted (unsuccessfully) to Schiller’s journal Die Horen 
in 1795, “Briefe über Geist und Buchstaben in der Philosophie.” Schiller rejected Fichte’s essay 
in part because, while the title refers to philosophy, the content is largely a discussion of art. This 
is only a problem, Gordon argues, if one conceives of philosophy and art as innately distinct, a 
commonplace Gordon contests with his idea of an “aesthetic absolute,” a kind of symbiotic 
exchange between art and aesthetics and the philosophical category das Absolute between 1790 
and 1830. For Gordon, that link is on display in Fichte’s letters on the spirit and letter in 
philosophy, and though this isn’t the place to walk through Gordon’s exposition in detail, I want 
to emphasize two points: first, Gordon draws “Fichtean aesthetics” out of an early and somewhat 
marginal essay; second, in Fichte et al., Gordon connects art and aesthetics to a philosophical 
category of transcendence: the absolute, super-sensible, a grand final state that absorbs and 
effaces all limitation and division.7 
I’d like to follow Gordon in developing an aesthetic interpretation of Fichte around a 
lesser-known, early text; but while Gordon discusses an essay that is clearly aesthetic in 
substance, I address a text that is only latently so, while masquerading as straight political 
																																																						
6 Gordon devotes chapters to Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, with framing sections on Plato and 
Nietzsche. What I quote here comes from chapter 3 on Fichte unless otherwise noted. 
7 Discussing Fichte’s “Briefe” Gordon writes “The artwork is thus here defined as the immersion in something 
absolute in which the subject/spectator becomes lost in the reality of an object/work that is the reality of the 
subject/spectator,” and later “This is why the absolute—which can only refer to a synthesis of subject and object, 
thought and reality (nature), is synonymous with being alive, and why art, which stands in relation to the merely 





philosophy. But I need to define what I mean by “aesthetic” in this context, and this involves the 
second point I take from Gordon, on transcendence. As we’ve seen, largely due to the influence 
of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft, German aesthetic theory in the 1790s is dominated by the 
concepts of beauty (Schönheit) and the sublime (das Erhabene). To do “aesthetics” in this milieu 
is to theorize these two poles and their relationship. As I described in chapters one and two, 
Schiller develops a theory of politics with aesthetic beauty as a conceptual nucleus, and here I 
argue Fichte’s Beitrag presents the other side, a politics framed by the aesthetic concept of the 
sublime. This is challenging, in part because the sublime is trickier than beauty: it can easily 
seem to negate the whole discursive field that gives rise to it, especially because true sublimity 
opposes bodies, pleasure, delightful images and most other things conventionally associated with 
the term “aesthetics.” But precisely that is the world sublimity is designed to transcend—while 
beauty is the mode in which opposites are unified and a pleasant accord prevails among 
differences, in sublimity, all that prevents our spiritual and moral elevation is obliterated. If the 
ethos of beauty is harmony, for the sublime it is conflict and victory.  
Typical for the time is to transpose the scene of this conflict to the philosophical debate 
about faculties of cognition: reason, understanding, desire, imagination, etc. In this context, 
beauty harmonizes intellectual and sensuous faculties, as is apparent in Schiller. But sublimity 
attempts to secure the primacy of the mind—meaning together reason, spirit, morality—and 
physical powers, unlike in Schiller’s politics of beauty, have no rightful claim to circumscribe 
the work of rationality, or really a claim to anything at all. Limiting the encroachments of sense, 
physicality, bodily faculties—this is perhaps the central prerogative of the Beitrag, where the 








The Sublime Occasion 
 
David James has already drawn attention to a central peculiarity of the Beitrag: it is a 200-page 
treatise devoted to justifying the French Revolution—with little sustained discussion of the 
French Revolution.8 Fichte is aware of the dissonance, which he not only confirms but avows in 
the opening sentences of the “Vorrede”: “Die französische Revolution scheint mir wichtig für die 
gesammte Menschheit. Ich rede nicht von den politischen Folgen, die sie sowohl für jenes Land, 
als für benachbarte Staaten gehabt… Das alles ist an sich viel, aber es ist gegen das ungleich 
Wichtigere immer wenig” (Beitrag 4; my emphasis). Fichte proposes to assess the French 
Revolution independent of its political consequences: the empirical course of events in France, 
though “an sich viel,” is meaningless next to what makes the Revolution really significant (its 
moral consequences). The Beitrag was written and published in 1793—the year Louis XVI was 
executed, the Jacobins came to power and the Reign of Terror began—so Fichte’s move to 
dismiss the “politischen Folgen” probably seemed politically outrageous, if not insane. At the 
very least, it likely confirmed his conservative critics in their equivalence of revolutionary 
politics and intellectual depravity: ignoring violence can easily seem like advocating it.9 In fact 
Fichte’s gesture here is programmatic: the Beitrag is a protean work, and one of its many faces is 
an attack on empiricism, whose practitioners (per Fichte) obsess over historical particulars at the 
expense of more significant theoretical questions. The critique of empiricism is part of the 
																																																						
8 David James, Fichte’s Republic: Idealism, History and Naturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 72-73.  
9 “Given the counterrevolutionary mood prevailing in Germany at the time, the publication of such controversial 
views [in the Beitrag] could be seen by some only as an act of provocation and defiance… From the moment he was 
first considered a candidate for an appointment at Jena, his political sympathies were seen as grounds for 
suspicion… Much of the opposition Fichte was to encounter at Jena… had more to do with his reputation as a 






Beitrag’s broader polemic against (in James’ apt phrasing) “historical objectivity” in favor of 
“moral subjectivity.”10 From the standpoint of moral subjectivity, history is useful only to the 
extent that it contributes to the moral enrichment of the subject. (Which makes Fichte’s dismissal 
of violence all the more remarkable, though as we’ll see, destruction is an important facet of 
sublime-political morality.) The study of history is simply an occasion for the subject’s 
development, i.e. the realization of its moral powers, so there is no point in attempting to most 
accurately comprehend history for its own sake—that is empiricism, and in the world of the 
Beitrag, complicit in egoism, monarchism, and various related evils Fichte’s political thought is 
designed to combat. 
 Nonetheless, it seems counterintuitive that Fichte would launch an attack on the 
empiricism of the concrete using something empirically concrete, the manifest event of the 
Revolution, as his point of departure. If the point is to inculcate moral impulses in his readers, 
why doesn’t Fichte just state moral principles? Why does he need something empirical at all, let 
alone as his starting point? This choice—to expound a moral position as the second, resultant 
point of a movement beginning in the arena of empirical experience—is our first major indicator 
that sublimity is doing conceptual work in the Beitrag: this double movement is precisely the 
structure of the sublime, in which we convert a harrowing experience into our own subjective 
transcendence via supra-experiential principles. In the sublime situation, experiential 
“objectivity” yields to James’ “moral subjectivity”: encountering something overwhelming or 
terrifying in the world, we take recourse to our own internal subjective foundation in moral 
reason; self-subjectivizing in that way, we elevate ourselves above what previously threatened 
us, and the concomitant rush of “negative pleasure” is what Kant calls the sublime. The pleasure 
																																																						





is “negative” because indirect, secondary: we need the initial displeasure in order to set the 
sublime process in motion. We can’t simply auto-transcend and get the sublime feeling without 
first passing through a corresponding moment of vulnerability. In other words, sublimity is a 
conceptual process that denotatively requires a first experience: something must happen that 
enables sublime elevation as a possible response. Fichte’s Beitrag replicates this two-part 
structure: the precise moral instruction he offers is possible only after a specific event, the 
Revolution. Seen in this light, it is understandable that Fichte ignores the “politischen Folgen” of 
the event: they are simply part of its empirical manifestation, the first, concretely historical 
moment of the Revolution; Fichte is interested in its second moment, the moral elevation all of 
Europe can experience in properly judging the Revolution.  
 An implicitly sublime logic seems to be a way for Fichte to bypass consideration of the 
Revolution’s empirical details. But even so, for the situation as a whole to qualify as sublime, 
some of those details are relevant: not just any experience can induce the sublime process. The 
Revolution must be threatening in such a way that it is an opportunity for moral elevation. We 
know from Kant that the initial, experiential moment of the sublime falls into two categories: the 
mathematical sublime confronts us with something so enormous that our powers of 
representation break down trying to grasp it, while the dynamic sublime manifests in a danger so 
immediate and immense that we experience an overwhelming sense of frailty and fear.11 The 
most obvious connection between the French Revolution and sublimity involves the second type. 
Certainly among critical perspectives on the Revolution, the dynamic sublime has a strong 
																																																						
11 In Kritik der Urteilskraft, the basic tension driving the mathematical sublime is reason’s demand that the mind’s 
representative powers—imagination, understanding, intuition—present something infinite as an object of positive 
knowledge; when it becomes clear that this is impossible, the mind exalts in its own “supersensible faculty” 
(übersinnliches Vermögen) (KU B 85). The operative element of dynamic sublimity is Furcht and the mind’s ability 





presence: the Revolution is imagined as an encroaching danger that threatens to engulf the entire 
European political order, and especially in 1793, after the execution of Louis and the rise of the 
Jacobins, the unrepentantly violent nature of that danger becomes clear—it is easy to picture 
beheadings across the continent. Already in 1790, Edmund Burke writes, “many parts of Europe 
are in open disorder. In many others there is a hollow murmuring under the ground; a confused 
movement is felt, that threatens a general earthquake in the political world.”12 It is telling that 
Burke’s metaphor of choice for political instability, an earthquake, is a threatening natural event 
much like those Kant uses to illustrate the dynamic sublime (volcanoes, hurricanes, crashing 
oceans, etc.).  
For Burke, it is not just any political turmoil, but especially the “popular commotion” of 
revolution that seems comparable to an earthquake (Reflections 112). He is not alone in using 
this trope, and by 1793 there is a well-established tendency to characterize the Revolution in 
terms redolent of the dynamically sublime.13 But there is also a mathematically sublime element 
to the event that is central to Fichte’s argument in the Beitrag: very simply, the Revolution is 
something we cannot understand. Or more precisely, the analytical procedure we have been 
applying to politics—empiricism grounded in values derived from historical precedent—is 
completely incapable of grasping or even signifying the Revolution: it is a total break, not only 
in political history, but also in the basic structure and possibilities of knowledge. Fichte advances 
the example of Rousseau, who, though once dismissed by the empiricists as a Träumer, has come 
																																																						
12 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 156. 
13 See the introduction and chapter on Burke, Paine, and Wollstonecraft in Ronald Paulson, Representations of 
Revolution (1789-1820) (1983). Something interesting happens to the figure of light, obviously the chief image of 
the Enlightenment and, as Jean Starobinski describes in 1789, The Emblems of Reason (1973), the metaphor of 
choice for French revolutionaries promoting their movement (Starobinski 41-52; trans. Barbara Bray 1982). But in 
Burke’s Reflections, the Revolution is characterized as a blinding light: like direct sunlight on the eyes it 
overwhelms sensuous experience and comprehension, and thus fits the category of the sublime (Paulson 59). In 





to inspire a generation of “junge kraftvolle Männer, die seinen Einfluss in das System des 
menschlichen Wissens nach allen seinen Theilen, die die gänzliche neue Schöpfung der 
menschlichen Denkungsart, die jenes Werk bewirken muss, ahnden, bis sie sie darstellen 
werden” (Beitrag 27; my emphasis). Creating a new form of thought—nothing less, for Fichte, is 
the task of the young revolutionaries, and it is part of the reason the empirical traditionalists are 
so fiercely opposed to the whole process: the core of what is happening in France, what the 
Revolution is really about, cannot be integrated into their manner of signifying and 
understanding the world. Fichte addresses them directly: “durch Rousseau geweckt, hat der 
menschliche Geist ein Werk vollendet, das ihr für die unmöglichste aller Unmöglichkeiten 
würdet erklärt haben, wenn ihr fähig gewesen wäret, die Idee desselben zu fassen.” And later: 
“Ihr werdet noch oft nöthig haben, euch die Augen zu reiben, um euch zu überzeugen, ob ihr 
recht seht, wenn wieder eine eurer Unmöglichkeiten wirklich geworden ist” (Beitrag 27). The 
empiricist confronts the Revolution not just as something to oppose—i.e. as something that 
simply conflicts with the empiricist’s interest or desire14—but as the impossible, something 
outside the horizon of available knowledge, an object of disbelief. This is exactly where the 
mathematical sublime puts us: cognitive breakdown, in which our productive faculties of 
knowledge have nothing to tell us. 
Part of this effect, for Fichte, is the way the Revolution poses fundamental questions 
about the values that underlie political life. The hallmark of empiricism, of course, is to answer 
all questions with reference to tradition: what has worked before? What precedents have 
remained strongest? What conventions can we rely on? The Revolution (in Fichte’s presentation) 
																																																						
14 If the Revolution is overwhelming to me because I oppose it and fear that it will spread, I am in the ambit of the 
dynamic sublime, which for Kant corresponds to the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen), while the 
mathematical sublime corresponds to that of cognition (Erkenntnisvermögen) (KU B 80). In the former case, the 





dismisses experience entirely, instead asking what is just, right, true—all without any sort of 
contextual or experiential qualifier. The Revolution communicates at the level of the 
philosophical a priori. For Fichte, this manner of questioning, as well as a kind of political 
activity that genuinely accords with it, is unprecedented in European history: again addressing 
empiricists directly, he asks “wie, wenn ihr auf einen Fall kommt, der in eurer Geschichte noch 
nicht da gewesen ist, was macht ihr dann? Ich fürchte sehr, dass das bei der Frage von den 
Mitteln, den einzig wahren Zweck einer Staatsverbindung zu erreichen, wirklich der Fall sey” 
(Beitrag 23). Fichte knows this is empiricism’s weak spot: what can an analytical practice 
grounded on experience possibly say about something that has no precedent in experience? Such, 
he suggests here, is the case concerning the basic question of the Revolution: what is the “one 
true purpose” of the political order, and how do we achieve it? 
 Fichte’s claim is that this question, properly understood, lies outside the analytical 
purview of empiricism. And if we accept Fichte’s portrayal of pre-revolutionary political thought 
as, effectively, entirely empiricist,15 the moment in which the Revolution poses its question—
that of the purpose of the state—should produce an effect equivalent to the mathematical 
sublime: before 1789, our cognition of history is essentially empirical, a posteriori, and because 
it is unassimilable into that cognitive scheme, the Revolution effectively obliterates it. There is 
now space for a “gänzliche neue Schöpferung der menschlichen Denkungsart,” one that is 
adequate to the enormous and unprecedented reality of the Revolution.  
None of which is to discount the dynamically sublime aspect of the Revolution: instead, 
the immediate threat of uncontrolled destruction combines with the Revolution’s unique 
cognitive pressures to make it a kind of total package of sublime trauma—it simultaneously 
																																																						





threatens our lives and embarrasses our intellectual forms.16 In David Martyn’s reading of the 
sublime, it is something we fail to both “see” and “think”: there is sensuous as well as cognitive 
breakdown, physical and mental powerlessness at once.17 From the standpoint of the whole 
sublime process—both moments—this makes the Revolution an ideal specimen: it threatens to 
overpower our bodies and minds, we cannot “see” or “think” it, and the greater the initial void, 
terror, desperation of the first moment, the more exultant the release in the sublime elevation of 
the second.18 We are unburdened of the anxieties that induced the process, which in this case are 
formidable: an ongoing threat of death at any time (anyone could be an “enemy of the people”); 
an unprecedented political phenomenon that defies our empirical categories of understanding; 
and a provocation—“why does the state exist?”—that brings those categories to the point of 




The Purpose of the State 
 
The Beitrag is a critique of a certain political status quo: 18th century European monarchy, an 
institution that, according to Fichte, promotes neither the livelihood of its subjects nor any real 
civic ideal, but only itself: “Die Tendenz aller Monarchien ist nach Innen uneingeschränkte 
Alleinherrschaft, und nach Aussen Universalmonarchie” (Beitrag 43; original emphasis). Fichte 
claims this is both the a priori and experiential truth of monarchy (“eine durch Gründe a priori 
																																																						
16 There is no reason to believe the mathematical and dynamic sublimes are mutually exclusive, and in fact they 
have been fruitfully connected, e.g. in Paul de Man’s argument that there is a passage from mathematical to dynamic 
sublimity on the model of tropological language passing over into the performative mode. See “Phenomenality and 
Materiality in Kant” and “Kant and Schiller” in Aesthetic Ideology. 
17 David Martyn, Sublime Failures: The Ethics of Kant and Sade (Wayne State University Press, 2002), 164.  
18 While beauty is tied to a “Gegenstand des Wohlgefallens,” Kantian sublimity derives from “das, was in uns, ohne 
zu vernünfteln, bloß in der Auffassung, das Gefühl des Erhabenen erregt, der Form nach zwar zweckwidrig für 
unsere Urteilskraft, unangemessen unserm Darstellungsvermögen, und gleichsam gewalttätig für die Einbildungkraft 





und durch die ganze Geschichte bestätigte Wahrheit”): monarchy wills only itself, in (internally) 
absolute and (externally) universal form. Fichte equates monarchy with power for the sake of 
power, and its program (we would say its “policy”) is simply extension, consolidation and 
maintenance of that power. In this view, all political authority emanates from the person of the 
monarch and a state’s internal politics are determined accordingly; but the drive for total 
authority also pushes outward, and Fichte’s absolute monarch has a systemic and unavoidable 
craving for new territory, resources and populations to rule. “Alleinherrschaft eures Willens im 
Innern, Verbreitung eurer Grenzen von Aussen” (Beitrag 41; original emphasis)—this paradigm 
has brought Europe to an uncomfortable détente that, for Fichte, represents the “letzter 
Endzweck” of the pre-revolutionary political order: continental balance of power, “das 
Gleichgewicht von Europa” (Beitrag 42). Of course, each monarchy’s innate drive to expand and 
conquer conflicts with its stated commitment to maintain continental equanimity, with the result 
that all praise and indulge the “community of European states” while biding time and amassing 
enough strength to overtake the others (Beitrag 43). 
In Fichte’s portrayal, the ideational anchors of pre-revolutionary European politics are 
grim indeed: a shallow equilibrium, monarchial integrity, momentarily checked ambition. 
Principles like freedom and equality have no place in this kind of Realpolitik, which Fichte 
diagnoses with reference to a philosophical doctrine of faculties: 18th century Europe is 
dominated by “sinnlicher Genuss” (Beitrag 41), sense-pleasure. Fichte is hardly alone in this 
characterization, but what makes the Beitrag distinctive is just how rigorously and systematically 
it expounds the evils of pleasure. Fichte sees it at work in the smallest acts of avarice, all the way 
up to the very framework of international politics. (Realpolitikal competition is the result of 





general principle commands that we simply do what we want, what is gratifying, pleasurable, 
what satisfies immediate appetites, never that we engage a more ideal register and ask what is 
right, what we should do. Fichte takes the strong inverse position: only what is right matters, and 
“Genuss hat an sich gar keinen Werth; er bekommt einen, höchstens als Mittel zur Belebung und 
Erneuerung unserer Kräfte für Cultur.” Sense-pleasure itself has value only as an expedient for 
culture, which Fichte here defines as “Uebung aller Kräfte auf den Zweck der völligen Freiheit, 
der völligen Unabhängigkeit von allem, was nicht wir selbst, unser reines Selbst ist” (Beitrag 
37). Complete freedom—this is Fichte’s political purpose, his banner against morally and 
civically denuded monarchism. 
For Fichte, freedom is the task and telos of the state, and cultural activity is the 
instrument for its development. It is important to emphasize the relationship between culture and 
sensibility in Fichte’s conception here: though he cannot deny there is a certain sensuous aspect 
to human life—indeed he sees it as the determining element of European monarchy—he 
circumscribes it entirely with the realm of culture. “Nichts in der Sinnenwelt, nichts von unserem 
Treiben, Thun oder Leiden, als Erscheinung betrachtet, hat einen Werth, als insofern es auf 
Cultur wirkt,” which is a more specific way of saying that sensuousness can only be a means and 
never an end: “alles, was uns zu sinnlichen Wesen macht [ist] nicht selbst Zweck, sondern bloss 
Mittel für unseren höheren geistigen Zweck” (Beitrag 37). As part of this general program, 
Fichte prescribes a two-tiered campaign against Sinnlichkeit: first, it must be “tamed and 
subjugated” (“bezähmt und unterjocht”), no longer giving commands, as he says it does in the 
world of monarchy, but obeying ours (“sie soll nicht mehr gebieten, sondern dienen; sie soll sich 
nicht mehr anmaassen, uns unsere Zwecke vorzuschreiben, oder sie zu bedingen”); second, 





dass man alle ihre Kräfte aufsuche, sie auf alle Art bilde, und ins unendliche erhöhe und 
verstärke” (Beitrag 38). This Fichte calls Cultur der Sinnlichkeit, and together with Bezähmung 
it forms the overall procedure by which we become free: “Durch die höchste Ausübung dieser 
beiden Rechte des Ueberwinders über die Sinnlichkeit nun würde der Mensch frei, d.i. bloss von 
sich, von seinem reinen ich abhängig werden” (Beitrag 39; Fichte’s emphasis). 
 Freedom through the overcoming of Sinnlichkeit—this is also the model of freedom at 
work in the sublime, the hallmark of which is reason’s victory over sense. And this is indeed 
where Fichte is headed with his notion of Cultur:  
Diese Cultur zur Freiheit nun ist der einzig – mögliche Endzweck des Menschen, insofern er ein 
Theil der Sinnenwelt ist; welcher höchste sinnliche Endzweck aber wieder nicht Endzweck des 
Menschen an sich, sondern letztes Mittel für Erreichung seines höheren geistigen Endzwecks ist, 
der völligen Uebereinstimmung seines Willens mit dem Gesetze der Vernunft. Alles, was 
Menschen thun und treiben, muss sich als Mittel für diesen letzten Endzweck in der Sinnenwelt 
betrachten lassen, oder es ist ein Treiben ohne Zweck, ein unvernünftiges Treiben. (Beitrag 39; 
my emphasis) 
 
Sensibility, though naturally unfree, can nonetheless be used, up to a point, in the service of 
freedom: this is culture, which can then take us a certain distance toward our ultimate human 
purpose (“Endzweck des Menschen”), the coincidence of our will and the rational law 
(“Uebereinstimmung seines Willens mit dem Gesetze der Vernunft”). It is a sequence of means 
and ends: Sinnlichkeit is overcome and provides material for Cultur, exercise of which helps us 
approximate freedom; the consummate stage of Cultur is not an end in itself, but simply the final 
means (“letztes Mittel”) on the path to the total rational will. The process is homologous with 
that of sublimity, in which we begin sensuously moored in a way that is limiting, threatening or 
both (Sinnlichkeit), do some sort of work on that material situation (Cultur), and end up 
contentedly and triumphantly embodying the moral-rational law (Uebereinstimmung). Important 





critical factor differentiating sublimity from beauty, in which sensuousness, worthwhile in its 
own right, enters into mutual exchange with reason. 
 This sublime template structures Fichte’s interpretation of human civilizational history: 
pre-revolutionary European politics is still caught in the sinnlich phase, but this is not to say 
there has been no progress in controlling sensibility19—intensely Protestant Fichte singles out 
“Jesus und Luther, heilige Schutzgeister der Freiheit” for special praise in this respect, 
prophesying “bald wird der Dritte, der euer Werk vollendete… zu euch versammelt werden” 
(Beitrag 50). This “third” is presumably Kant, whose critical philosophy completes the work of 
freedom (Cultur) carried out in earlier eras by Jesus and Martin Luther. And Fichte’s choice of 
the verb vollenden here suggests we may not just be at another stage, but the final stepping-off 
point, where Sinnlichkeit disappears and culture yields to the moral law. This entails a radical 
break with the 18th century monarchial order, which may have advanced us somewhat beyond 
the Middle Ages (when there was no Protestantism), but is nonetheless bound to a political spirit 
of privilege, interest and ignorance that Fichte considers thoroughly sinnlich. The final step is to 
embrace a politics of unqualified freedom and moral idealism. For Fichte, the simultaneous event 
of the French Revolution and Kantian philosophy means that world-historical moment has come. 
It is a decisive elevation-point, the terminus of a history that has steadily un-mired itself from 
Sinnlichkeit through culture and is ready to jump into morality—which is to say, a history 
conceived as sublime. 
 There is more to say about this developmental—later I will call it “asymptotic”—
component of Fichte’s sublime politics, but first I need to address a conceptual problem related 
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schlechterdings nicht stille stehen kann, nicht anders zu erwarten. Die sinnlichen Kräfte der Menschheit sind 






to morality and aesthetics. As I’ve said, I am arguing that aesthetics, rather than morality, is the 
discourse that underlies Fichte’s Beitrag. The problem is that, in Kant—the reference point for 
both Fichte’s moral theory and the concept of the sublime—morality and sublimity overlap 
considerably, most obviously in the fact that the sublime process terminates in the moral law, 
which stands as the transcendent end-point of our elevation above sensuous existence that is the 
essence of sublimity. Moreover, the two properties in the Beitrag I’ve so far connected to the 
sublime—(1) an experiential occasion for moral transcendence and (2) the processual 
overcoming of Sinnlichkeit—hardly contradict Kantian moral theory. My argument is only worth 
making if there is some substantive difference between political morality and an aesthetic 
politics grounded on the sublime; if “morality” and “the sublime” are effectively the same thing, 
this chapter is a long-winded paraphrase. I need to present some element of Fichte’s politics in 
the Beitrag left undiscovered by a straight moral reading. Another way to pose the question is 




Judgment and Universality 
 
The crucial factor turns out to be judgment. Morality and aesthetics involve distinct procedures 
of judging, and those procedures in turn correspond to separate models of human universality. 
Less abstractly, “one should X” as a judgment construes what it means to be human in a different 
way than “X is sublime.”  This is Alenka Zupančič’s argument in Ethics of the Real (2000): 
“When we are judging an aesthetic phenomenon, we do not, according to Kant, postulate 





an (aesthetic) “universality other than the universality of law.”20 Judgment in line with the moral 
law postulates (“postulieren”) universal agreement while aesthetic judgment requires it 
(“ansinnen”); Kant himself describes the first process as “logisch” and the second as predicated 
on securing the “Beitritt” of others.21 That is to say, moral judgment issues from the hermetic, 
conceptual space of the categorical imperative: universality is a logical precondition any maxim 
has to meet if it would accede to the level of moral law—this is what it means to “postulate” 
universal agreement. Conversely, aesthetic judgment does not presuppose this agreement, 
whether logically or otherwise: it must construct or, as Zupančič prefers, “constitute” it: aesthetic 
judgment “constitutes its own universality… in our judgment we constitute the ‘universe’ within 
which this judgment is universally valid” (Ethics 155). 
 Whereas moral law is axiomatically universal, aesthetic judgment must “constitute its 
own universality,” i.e. foster consensus around its pronouncement. In the world of the third 
Kritik, that pronouncement will take one of two basic forms: “X is beautiful” or “X is sublime.” 
In either case, aesthetic judgment needs to seek out some unifying ground, some element shared 
by all judging subjects around which universal Beitritt can congeal. If the judgment is “X is 
beautiful,” that unifying ground is pleasure in the harmonious free play of cognitive faculties; in 
the case of a sublime judgment, per Zupančič, it is “precisely moral agency,”22 by which she 
means the formal capacity of moral determination and action. Sublime judgments are a sub-class 
																																																						
20 Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2000), 155. It should be pointed out that 
Ethics of the Real is hardly a neutral exegesis of Kant, nor does it purport to be. I believe Zupančič’s psychoanalytic 
reading keeps the question of cognitive faculties in full view while also addressing the sort of satisfaction involved 
in processes like the sublime. 
21 The relevant section is § 8 of Kritik der Urteilskraft: “Das Geschmacksurteil postuliert nicht jedermann 
Einstimmung (denn das kann nur ein logisches allgemeines, weil es Gründe anführen kann, tun); es sinnet nur 
jedermann diese Einstimmung an, als einen Fall der Regel, in Ansehung dessen er die Bestätigung nicht von 
Begriffen, sondern von anderer Beitritt erwartet.” (B 26). 
22 “Yet by thus requiring [as aesthetic judgment does] agreement from everyone, we are forced to rely on something 






of aesthetic judgments that ground their own universality on the universality of moral agency. 
This is the link between sublimity and morality that was difficult to understand at the end of the 
last section: in Fichte’s Beitrag, sublimity employs morality to establish its own universal 
validity. But this does not mean they amount to the same thing, and Zupančič’s reading helps us 
understand more clearly the stakes of the difference between morality itself and an aesthetic 
position that terminates in (or universalizes itself through) the moral law. 
 The critical distinction is that between moral law and moral agency. The former is a 
concrete prescription, the tangible output of the categorical imperative’s moral-analytical 
procedure. This law simply tells me what or what not to do; moral agency is my power to do it. 
For Zupančič, this agential power, rather than any specific maxim, is the moral dimension of the 
sublime. Kant writes in Kritik der Urteilskraft that sublimity “hat seine Grundlage in der 
menschlichen Natur, und zwar demjenigen, was man mit dem gesunden Verstande zugleich 
jedermann ansinnen und von ihm fordern kann, nämlich in der Anlage zum Gefühl für 
(praktische) Ideen, d.i. zu dem moralischen” (B 111-112). Here Kant is distinguishing between 
beauty, the sense for which he regards as contingent on cultural conventions,23 and the sublime, 
which rests on a predisposition (“Anlage”) to moral ideas that is part of human nature 
(“menschliche Natur”). Nowhere does Kant say that sublimity has anything to do with actually 
acting morally—rather, the point is that the sublime activates this inclination toward moral ideas; 
it stimulates moral feeling (“Gefühl”). 
 This feeling, this capacity for moral determination, is related to the overarching 
symmetry of the sublime process, i.e. that the final moral elevation I experience is proportional 
in degree to the severity of the initial stimulus (KU B 76). In Zupančič’s reading, a result of this 
																																																						





linkage is that the moral agency awakened in sublimity can be imposing and even horrific in its 
power:  
a confrontation with something that is terrifying ‘in itself’… strikes the subject as a kind of 
bodying forth of the cruel, unbridled and menacing superego – the ‘real or reverse side’ of the 
moral law (in us) … the devastating force ‘above me’ easily evokes a devastating force ‘within 
me’. The feeling of the sublime develops through this metonymy. It is clear that the ‘devastating 
force within me’ cannot really refer to the moral law in the strict sense, but it corresponds very 
well to the agency of the superego, that is, to the law equipped with the gaze and voice which can 
‘make even the boldest sinner tremble’. (Ethics 156) 
 
Again we have the distinction between “moral law in the strict sense” and a more general moral 
“agency” at work in the sublime. Note that Zupančič refers to the moral law “in us”: whereas the 
moral law of the categorical imperative terminates in a pattern of morally correct behavior—in 
this way it is externally oriented—the kind of morality operative in the sublime concerns an 
internal force, the subjective capacity to formulate and impose the law.  
In the next section, we will see why this “devastating force within me” is of particular 
concern in the case of the French Revolution (and the aesthetic politics of the Beitrag), but for 
the moment it is worth exploring in some detail just how well Fichte’s text aligns with 
Zupančič’s argument about moral agency and the sublime. To begin: for a polemical work, the 
Beitrag contains remarkably few prescriptions. Fichte rails against monarchy and empiricism but 
does not oppose them with his own set of commandments. Instead, the Beitrag is designed to 
expedite a process of Selbstdenken: 
…denn ich wollte nicht, dass [der Leser] auf mein Wort meine Behauptungen annehmen, sondern 
dass er mit mir über die Gegenstände derselben nach denken sollte… Was für mich freilich 
Wahrheit wäre, weil ich mich davon überzeugt hätte, wäre für ihn doch nur Meinung, Wahn, 
Vorurtheil, weil er nicht geurteilt hätte… Alles unser Lehren muss auf Erweckung des 
Selbstdenkens abzielen. (Beitrag 7; my emphasis) 
 
Rather than telling his readers what is right, Fichte wants to bring them a certain distance so that 
they are better able to judge (“urteilen”) for themselves. The verb here is not incidental: the full 





though he obviously wants to bring them to his line of thinking (in favor of the Revolution), it is 
telling that he attempts to do so not by giving intellectual or behavioral prescriptions, but by 
appealing to an inner moral law: 
Wir begehren demnach nach einem Gesetze zu beurtheilen, das von keinen Thatsachen entlehnt, 
und in keinen enthalten seyn kann… Wo denken wir es aufzufinden? Ohne Zweifel in unserem 
Selbst, da es ausser uns nicht anzutreffen ist: und zwar in unserem Selbst, insofern es nicht durch 
äussere Dinge vermittelst der Erfahrung, geformt und gebildet wird… sondern in der reinen, 
ursprünglichen Form desselben; - in unserem Selbst, wie es ohne alle Erfahrung seyn würde… So 
etwas finden wir, nun wirklich an jenem Gesetze des Sollens. (Beitrag 18; my emphasis) 
 
The major tension running through the Beitrag concerns standards of judgment: what criteria, 
what principles should we use to orient ourselves in political history? The book is a polemic 
against laws of experience (“Erfahrungsgrundsätze”), mired in falsehood and interest as they are, 
and in favor of precisely this moral law (“Gesetz des Sollens,” elsewhere “Sittengesetz”) Fichte 
claims any of us can locate, not in some general moral-philosophical apparatus (e.g. the 
categorical imperative), but in ourselves as moral agents. Fichte describes it as a fact of inner 
experience (“innere Erfahrung”) that this law is there, exactly the presupposition involved in the 
Kantian sublime: moral agency is part of human nature; it is the motive core animating every 
rational subject. Which is not to say that moral core cannot be obscured—that it is customary in 
politics to do so is the whole polemical standpoint of the Beitrag. But Fichte’s corrective is not to 
formulate the moral law and state it for his readers, but to foster affirmative consensus 
surrounding the French Revolution by appealing to their innate moral agency—which is to say, 
following Zupančič, he offers a sublime judgment in favor of the Revolution. 
Also evident in the last passage is Fichte’s commitment to a model of selfhood that is 
split between empirical (“durch äussere Dinge vermittelt der Erfahrung, geformt und gebildet”) 
and “pure, primordial” manifestations, which deepens the resonance with Zupančič’s reading of 





anxiety, requires the subject to regard a part of herself as a foreign body, as something that 
belongs not to her but to the ‘outer world’”—this is the empirical self that Fichte, consistent with 
Zupančič’s description, calls “fremdartiger Zusatz” (Beitrag 18), whereas the “pure” self 
(Zupančič again) “is already situated in a place of safety, from which we can enunciate this kind 
of elevated judgment and even renounce that part of ourselves that we find small and 
insignificant” (Ethics 152). Part of what makes the sublime pleasurable is the sense that we have 
overcome our “everyday needs” and awakened some greater (and in some way “truer”) power in 
ourselves. This is exactly what Fichte wants from Europe after 1789; in fact it is the very point of 
studying (and more importantly judging) history: “wir werden in der ganzen Weltgeschichte nie 
etwas finden, was wir nicht selbst erst hineinlegten: sondern dass [die Menschheit] durch 
Beurtheilung wirklicher Begebenheiten auf eine leichtere Art aus sich selbst entwickle, was in ihr 
selbst liegt” (Beitrag 4; my emphasis). 
 We judge history in order to become the moral agents we only potentially are in a world 
corrupted by empiricism. That becoming-moral involves a move toward the (specifically 
aesthetic) universal and away from the particular. Again, while morality simply postulates the 
universal validity of a maxim, aesthetic judgment requires that a universe of subjects overcome 
multitudinous conflicting standards and reach consensus. In this respect, Fichte’s bitter 
vituperations against cultural relativism (Beitrag 13-15) seem like an appeal for aesthetic 
judgment: Fichte claims urgently we need to locate “ewige Gesetze” (Beitrag 11), 
“allgemeingültige Grundsätze” (Beitrag 14), eternal and universal principles to guide our lives 
and structure human society. (Fichte is hardly alone in this respect, but the Beitrag does not 
simply posit or abstractly “support” moral universality—his sublime politics offers a more 





problem: relativism results from Sinnlichkeit as a cultural paradigm. For Fichte, sense and 
experience localize and atomize phenomena, tastes, conceptual distinctions, standards of right 
and wrong—no universal claim is possible if our judgments derive solely from empirical data 
and tradition. Instead we should employ a non-empirical faculty of judgment that abstracts from 
cultural differences and activates the one true human universal: moral agency. Fichte sees the 
French Revolution as an opportunity to judge without prescriptive, particularizing content, to aim 
at eternal laws and ignite a universal power of moral action that overcomes the fractured quasi-
subjectivity of the empirical present. This is exactly the prerogative of sublime judgment. 
 In brief review, I’ve described three important points of concurrence between the Beitrag 
and Zupančič’s reading of the sublime: (1) instead of offering concrete maxims à la the direct 
moral law, Fichte seeks to constitute a community of judging subjects by appealing to moral 
agency; (2) the form of universality involved in that process is not the analytic generality of the 
categorical imperative, but consensus-building with reference to eternal rational laws; (3) a 
model of subjectivity split between the empirical, everyday self and the pure, moral self which 
must overcome it. The first two points especially help explain how the Beitrag can engage 
Kantian morality as a conceptual register without in fact emerging from Kant’s moral philosophy 
proper: morality has a specific position in the sublime process, but as internal agency (not 
external law) and consensual (not logical) universality. But this raises an important question: if 
the sublime compels us to constitute a universal community via moral consensus, what happens 




Could the categorical imperative compel us to be violent, even to kill? Almost certainly not: 





test of logical universality, and thus cannot rise to the status of moral law. But if the issue is 
rousing and consolidating moral agency, violence can play a central, even indispensable part, and 
in this respect the Beitrag and the Terror converge. 
It is important to note that, if the Beitrag were simply an application of the moral law to 
politics, violence would be inconceivable in its program, because the moral law terminates in a 
pattern of logically universalizable behavior. As I’ve said, it is impossible to universalize a 
violent maxim, because it logically eliminates all subjects. So if the argument of the Beitrag is in 
fact structured in line with the moral law, Fichte should regard the very prospect of politically 
useful violence as absurd. We find this is not the case: in the “Vorrede,” Fichte writes 
“gewaltsame Revolutionen zu verhindern, giebt es ein sehr sicheres [Mittel]; aber es ist das 
einzige: das Volk gründlich über seine Rechte und Pflichten zu unterrichten. Die französische 
Revolution giebt uns dazu die Weisung und die Farben zur Erleuchtung des Gemäldes für blöde 
Augen” (Beitrag 5). Taking the statement in reverse: the French Revolution is an occasion to 
educate the people on its rights and duties, and that education is the only certain means of 
preventing violent revolution. Fichte acknowledges that some revolutions are violent, and while 
he is suggesting a way to avoid that eventuality, he hardly takes a stand against it. In fact, the 
logic of his claim suggests that, unless the people is sufficiently educated, there will be violent 
revolution. Why should this be the case? Is it that politically uneducated people become violent 
in times of upheaval? Or are politically uneducated people more likely to resist truly 
emancipatory change, so much so that they have to be forcefully brought into line in the name of 
what is politically right?  
There is reason to believe Fichte has the second case in mind: later in the treatise, while 





urtheilen”), Fichte bemoans that, while many readily incline to generosity, few are prepared to be 
righteous: “O, es ist ein tiefer, verborgener, unaustilgbarer Zug des menschlichen Verderbens, 
dass sie immer lieber gütig, als gerecht seyn… Aber wir sind grossmüthig, wir suchen sein 
eigenes Beste, und wollen ihn auf den Weg desselben, sey es auch durch gewaltsame Mittel, 
zurückführen” (Beitrag 29; my emphasis). This is a significant statement: Fichte is leaving the 
door open for violence, for the sake of those receiving it. The aggressors “suchen sein eigenes 
Beste,” and their willingness to secure that “Beste” violently reflects, not savagery or bloodlust, 
but “Grossmut,” magnanimity. Note the pronouns: Fichte is part of a collective first-person wir 
that comprehends justice and has the large-hearted courage to compel (violently, if necessary) 
the wayward ihn to the path of righteousness.  
This should sound grimly familiar in 1793, and even conceivably sarcastic—that is, if 
Fichte’s treatise did not make overwhelmingly clear his allegiance to the ongoing course of the 
French Revolution. It is apparent that Fichte is not being ironic if we return to the “Vorrede,” 
where he argues “das aufgestellte Gemälde,” repeating his aesthetic metaphor for the Revolution, 
“dient nicht bloss zum Unterrichte; es wird zugleich zu einer scharfen Prüfung der Köpfe und 
der Herzen” (Beitrag 5; my emphasis). The notion of a social “test” is baleful in any era, 
uniquely so in the year the Terror began. And if the call for a Prüfung makes modern readers 
uneasy, Fichte does not disabuse them: developing his position, he claims some people are 
simply egoists who fear the entry of truth into collective life; further, “gegen das letztere Uebel 
giebt es kein Mittel. Wer die Wahrheit fürchtet, als seine Feindin, der wird sich immer vor ihr zu 
verwahren wissen” (Beitrag 6). These people are unrecoverable: enemies of the truth always find 
a way to hide from it. Fichte becomes still more forceful: “So lange du dich nicht zu dieser Liebe 





erste Vorbereitung zur Liebe der Gerechtigkeit um ihrer selbst willen; sie ist der erste Schritt zur 
reinen Güte des Charakters” (Beitrag 6; my emphasis). Another moment in the Beitrag’s drama 
of pronouns: you (individual) are useless to us (the revolutionary Volk, including Fichte), unless 
you display “Liebe der Wahrheit.” The Revolution is a Prüfung in the sense that it reveals to us 
who loves and who does not love truth. The test is only necessary because, as Fichte asserts, 
there are a significant number of people in the second category, and (again as Fichte asserts) 
these people are useless to the revolutionary cause. So if the Prüfung proceeds smoothly and we 
know who can and cannot be integrated into the cause, what happens to those who can’t? 
Obviously the Jacobins have an answer, and there is little in the Beitrag that contradicts that 
answer. 
Quite the reverse: for one thing, Fichte and the Jacobins alike are fixated on internal 
character. Fichte’s Prüfung shows us those with “Güte des Charakters”; the Jacobins relentlessly 
politicize virtue and vice themselves. Note that neither interest really concerns, or at least has to 
concern, an observable pattern of behavior: at stake, instead, is the state of a person’s internal 
subjectivity. In this sense, both align perfectly with Zupančič’s reading of the sublime: the point 
is consolidating a community of moral subjects, awakening in each person a power of moral self-
determination. What is unique in Fichte and the Jacobins is the shared presumption that some 
people won’t make the cut, either because they cannot or refuse to be moral agents. This schism 
has a basis in the concept of the sublime itself: sublimity is premised on a rational, moral realm 
transcending an order of quotidian everydayness. Fichte as well as the Jacobins might say some 
are simply too ingrained in that everyday, in things as they are, to be viable candidates for 
transcendence. After all, the status quo is as entrenched as it is because of the manifold 





immediate pleasure—which in sum makes the situation easy to deduce for Fichte (and 
Robespierre), who equate any defense of the present order with egoism and other low-order 
commitments. In any case, the operative distinction here, between the empirically given and the 
morally transcendent, is also what drives the sublime.  
Fichte takes the additional step of connecting these categories to different social groups: 
there are “empirical world” people and revolutionaries. But that large-scale social division is at 
best a necessary and not a sufficient condition for political violence. There must be some 
additional impetus to target and attack a group, in this case the “empirical world” people. We 
find that impetus, or at least a mechanism that constantly stokes and renews it, in a distinctive 
asymptotic logic present in both Fichte and the Terror. For Fichte, universal moral subjectivity is 
an Endzweck that can never in fact be materially realized: “Lasst euch doch diese erquickende 
Aussicht nicht durch den misgünstigen Gedanken verleiden, dass das doch nie in Erfüllung 
gehen werde. Freilich, ganz wird es nie in Erfüllung gehen… der sichere Grund beruht auf dem 
nothwendigen Fortgange der Menschheit – sie soll, sie wird, sie muss diesem Ziele immer näher 
kommen” (Beitrag 49). The point is not that we ultimately fulfill the Endzweck, only that we 
continually strive (while never fully succeeding) to fulfill it. Fichte thinks this constant striving is 
what makes humans unique—“das einzige Vorrecht, welches ihre Thierheit vor anderen Thieren 
auszeichnet, das Vorrecht der Vervollkommnung ins unendliche” (Beitrag 49)—but in the 
context of forming a political community, especially in 1793, it is easy to see the dark side of this 
conviction. Keep in mind that, for Fichte, the Endzweck itself has to do with formation of a 
univocal political body, in which one and all exhibit “Uebereinstimmung seines Willens mit dem 
Gesetze der Vernunft.” Fichte’s Prüfung makes unambiguous that the idea is to constitute this 





subjectivity. But as became clear in France as Fichte was writing the Beitrag, this distinction is 
unsustainable as such: when universality and unity are the maxims of a group in power, there can 
be no simple coexistence with separate groups, even if they are outwardly peaceful; difference 
itself is a threat and, in the name of the governing unity-impulse, must be eliminated. Those 
outside the moral community become enemies, and part of the drama of the Terror involved the 
flexibility of that designation: depending on how those in power construe themselves and their 
outside, anyone could be an enemy.24 
This was an ongoing process of classification and elimination determined by the 
Jacobins’ own asymptotic commitment: the community of the virtuous had always to be further 
perfected and purified of political degeneracy; true unity in virtue could only ever be infinitely 
approximated. As Keith Baker describes, the Jacobins’ governing paradigm of popular 
sovereignty demanded not only unity among public officials, but in the overall community of 
political subjects as well.25 The result was a “constant impetus to achieve unity by way of 
exclusion” of newly designated “counter-revolutionary” groups; “successive denunciations, 
purges within the popular movement, and demands for revolutionary justice against the enemies 
of the nation lengthened the list of distinguishing characteristics of suspects indefinitely” (Baker 
856). The “essential logic of the Terror” was to “impose unity on the other whenever it was 
found lacking” (Baker), and what was especially frightening was that the Jacobins could always 
find a lack, even in active revolutionaries like Danton. This model is asymptotic: the Jacobins 
will guillotine people until the political community was unified in virtue; but because “unity in 
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whose categories were completely fluid and manipulable at will by those in power.” “Rousseau,” Critical Dictionary 
of the French Revolution, 837; original emphasis. 
25 “The will of the sovereign nation had to be as unitary as it was inalienable: the body of the people had to bear the 
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virtue” is an ideal that can only be infinitely approximated—at what point could we definitively 
say it exists?—reality is never quite adequate to it, and in the case of the Terror, there are always 
more people to kill. Likewise, the work of building a universal moral community per Fichte’s 
Beitrag is never complete (“geht nie in Erfüllung”), yet humanity “muss diesem Ziele immer 
näher kommen.” 
The asymptotic form is also a hallmark of sublimity. In § 27 of Kritik der Urteilskraft, 
Kant describes the feeling of the sublime as a pleasure awakened by the failure of sensuous 
faculties to measure up to the ideas of reason. Kant calls this an ongoing process of “Bestrebung” 
that, though the “Übereinstimmung” it aims for is constitutively impossible to reach, “doch für 
uns Gesetz ist” (KU B 97). Significantly, in the same section, Kant describes sublime feeling as a 
kind of violence (Gewalt): sublimity exposes to the subject to reason’s demand that it produce a 
totality, not just in thought, but in intuition (“Zusammenfassung der Vielheit in die Einheit, nicht 
des Gedankens, sondern der Anschauung”); the impossibility of this demand is form of violence 
against that subject’s powers of representation that, though clearly “zweckwidrig” to the subject 
itself, “für die ganze Bestimmung des Gemüts als zweckmäßig beurteilt wird” (KU B 100). That 
is, harming the subject serves a higher-order end; it is pardonable violence pursuant to a 
commandment of reason. 
We get two important points from this exposition in § 27: a model of infinite 
approximation and a justification for violence. Zupančič connects each aspect to a respective 
mode of Kantian sublimity: “If the dynamically sublime embodies the cruelly inexorable and 
lethal aspect of Kantian moral agency, the mathematically sublime, which aims at infinity and 
eternity, brings forth the dimension of the ‘infinite task’ imposed upon the subject of the moral 





formulation, the mathematically sublime is explicitly asymptotic: we infinitely approach the 
“pure moral act,” and my argument, extending Zupančič somewhat, is that the dynamically 
sublime effectively acts as the engine of this asymptotic approach. I mean that the Bestrebung 
and Gewalt Kant describes in § 27 are connected, are part of the same process, and this 
connection is on display in the Terror. I argued earlier that the French Revolution triggers both 
types of sublimity: in provoking widespread fear and panic, it engages the dynamic sublime; in 
overwhelming empirical modes of understanding politics, the mathematical. Zupančič claims the 
first corresponds to the “cruelly inexorable and lethal aspect” of moral agency, the second to the 
never-ending task pure moral action. Are these not exactly the stated means and ends of Jacobin 
political ideology? Such is Robespierre’s basic position throughout his mid-Terror orations: the 
work of making the polity (purely) virtuous demands the stringency of violent measures, that we 
overcome any natural leniency—or, be “cruelly inexorable”—and do what we must in the name 
of political morality. This is what I mean when I say the dynamically sublime is the “engine of 
the asymptotic approach”: operating in the mode of the dynamic—per Zupančič, being cruel and 
lethal—is how we get closer to completing the task imposed by the mathematical sublime. In this 
case, violent purges bring the community ever closer to virtue. But because this process is 
essentially asymptotic in nature—the task can only be approximated and never achieved—there 
is always additional space for the dynamically sublime to operate, i.e. more demand for cruel, 
lethal moral agency. In this way sublimity guarantees the structural perpetuity of the Terror. 
In a word, the sublime, the Terror, and Fichte’s Beitrag all involve asymptotic processes 
with an impossible Übereinstimmung at the end: in the sublime, between faculties of sensuous 
representation and an idea of reason; in the Terror, between the actually existing people and an 





Fichte’s political vision takes its basic imperative from the sublime: to make something 
materially real, the will of his fellow citizens, adequate to a rational ideal. The same ambition 
structures the Terror. How unjust, then, is the epithet “German Jacobin” for Fichte? 
 
Sublime Politics 
Regardless of the Beitrag’s exact proximity to Jacobinism, the slightest flirtation with political 
violence means Fichte has departed irreconcilably from Kant. The Gewalt of the third Kritik is 
highly figurative, a sort of discomfort or strain imposed on the normal functioning of cognitive 
faculties, and Kant’s revulsion at the violent excesses of 1793-94 is well documented.26 This is 
part of the peculiarity of the Beitrag: expressly, devotedly Kantian in its framing, it ultimately 
aligns with the phase of the French Revolution Kant most detested. It is a way of giving political 
mass murder a Kantian dress, ostensibly via the moral law, but really through the sublime.  
This is sublime politics, and Fichte’s Beitrag is its first systematic (though implicit) 
expression in German thought. The issue of violence helps us further define its intellectual-
historical moment: sublime politics emerges as an extension and partial reversal, maybe 
perversion, of Kantian philosophy. One possibility is that Fichte, who writes the Beitrag when he 
is still young and has not been familiar with Kant for all that long, does not yet know how to 
negotiate the architectonic. He makes a category error: he professes to work from the moral law 
of practical reason, but instead operates with a model of moral agency derived from Kant’s 
concept of the sublime. Sublime politics emerges when this category mistake is made with 
political and social order as the object of consideration. Here is the second major contextual 
element: the French Revolution and the question it raised—pertinent in any revolution but 
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especially so in 1793-94—of whether violence is a justifiable part of political change. The 
episode of the Jacobins made the terms of the question even more onerous: can political ideals 
justify violence, even against non-combatants, even en masse? At the very least, the Beitrag errs 
on the side of yes, against Kant.  
In the case of Fichte’s sublime politics, a purportedly Kantian enterprise contains two 
important points of tension with Kant himself: first, mistaking an aesthetic concept for a moral 
concept (third Kritik for second Kritik); second, using that aesthetic concept as a theoretical 
defense for violence. Which brings us to the first crucial point I want to propose regarding 
sublime politics as a paradigm: it is a form of political thinking—and in the case of the Jacobins, 
action—that is especially amenable to violence; and relatedly, violence in sublime politics is not 
just an acceptable means, but can easily be an end.  
This process begins by projecting a philosophical debate onto the social body in the form 
of a popular test. In the Beitrag, it is a test to distinguish “lovers of truth” from those cravenly 
beholden to the present order. In sublime politics generally, I submit (and Fichte’s treatise 
eventually takes us here) the popular tests reveals two classes of people: one affiliated with 
morality and the faculty of reason; the other embedded in sense-experience and only really 
“knowing” via Kantian Anschauung and Verstand, both of which fail the test as faculties of 
knowledge because they are empirically grounded. The popular test of sublime politics is 
either/or: you are either rationally moral or not. Recall sublimity’s prerogative of community-
formation: the point is not to represent the social body in its multiplicity, but to constitute a body 
of moral agents. Sublime politics attempts to build a political community around these agents, 
and the popular test is its means of identifying them. Right away, we can see several lines of 





is either morally virtuous or sensuously degenerate, but at least potentially both, and the point is 
to configure these opposed tendencies in such a way that the person becomes free. For Schiller, 
there is a spectrum of conflict and reciprocity between sense and reason, rather than some 
logically prior Manichean choice between them. The task of aesthetic education is to work on 
behalf of reciprocity, to facilitate the mutual enlivening of the categories. But proponents of 
sublime politics would dispute the premise that sense can in any way enliven reason: they would 
insist this is an absolute conflict and a necessary choice. 
Making the right choice is sublime politics’ conception of freedom: autonomy, 
independence from the sensory. In the Kantian sublime, an individual separates itself from a 
threatening natural world via recourse to the faculty of reason; likewise, sublime political 
subjects break from a social situation they consider degenerate by calling on their shared moral 
agency. This break makes them independent of that situation and free to reckon by their own 
laws, i.e. the laws of reason. Fichte’s lovers of truth have invoked eternal principles and no 
longer participate in the epistemic or cultural world of empirical traditionalists. The Jacobins 
claimed to have severed utterly French history from its antecedent arc. A radical break and a new 
start, governed by reason alone—this is the pretense in Fichte’s Beitrag, the Jacobin government, 
and sublime politics alike. I want to call this its transcendent character, in contrast to a certain 
immanent disposition in Schiller’s aesthetic education, in which the terms of a conflict—here, 
between formality and sense—are granted and then reworked, reconfigured such that, ultimately, 
the poles reinforce one another. This is freedom for the politics of the beautiful: negotiating 
division, a higher accord via reconciled positions. Schiller wants to avoid one-sidedness at all 
costs, but sublime politics insists one side is in fact correct, and freedom qua rational-moral 





social order must come to conquer the present one, while a politics of beauty would insist on 
gradualism, negotiation, cultivation, deliberation. To use a dramatic metaphor: progress in the 
politics of the beautiful is a long one-act play in which, through a series of exchanges and 
encounters, the characters move past their differences, come together and build a better world; in 
sublime politics there are two acts: unambiguous depravity in the first, courageous moral order in 
the second. 
In 1919’s Politische Romantik, Carl Schmitt criticizes what he calls romantic 
“occasionalism,” the view by which any event is simply an occasion for awakening the romantic 
artist’s creative powers.27 Sublime politics is occasional as well: it requires an external event to 
induce a process of subjective awakening. Sublimity itself begins with trauma from the outside 
world, and Fichte’s Beitrag loses its anchor without the event of the French Revolution. At first 
glance, this would seem to dilute the political sublime, to make it externally dependent. But 
sublime politics converts this dependency into urgency: its evental, occasional structure makes it 
a politics of the moment.28 Crucially, this is an unprecedented, exceptional moment—central to 
Fichte’s account of the French Revolution is that it lies constitutively outside the epistemic 
parameters of antecedent history. The sublime political moment suspends the status quo. In the 
tabula rasa that results, it imposes the principles of reason. If those principles appear to call for 
violence, so be it: it is after all an exceptional circumstance and this does not amount to a 
permanent justification for violence. But the necessity of the moment provides its own 
justificatory paradigm, one that may well praise and even demand violence as a sign of 
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commitment, a security measure, an attempt to unify and purify the populace. All of these are 
present in the Terror. In contrast, aesthetic education works in long developmental arcs, vast 
networks of effects that intertwine over centuries. Schiller hopes to prepare the ground for 
freedom long in the future; sublime politics seizes an occasion and demands that freedom now. 
Occasionalism, transcendence, a popular test—three conceptual anchors that help us 
understand the violent tendency, if not essence, of the political sublime. The test divides the 
political body; the logic of transcendence construes that division as an irreconcilable conflict in 
which the right side must prevail; and the radical occasion justifies the exceptional, the doctrine 
by any means necessary. In this framework there is a chosen group and a problem group: 
Jacobins and conservatives, truth-lovers and empiricists, but these hardly exhaust the 
possibilities. The chosen group must elevate itself, somehow realize its rational-moral vocation, 
and due to the exceptional occasion, there are no conventional restrictions on how it chooses to 
do that. We can see how well violent elimination of the problem group satisfies these situational 
demands: materially, the problem group can no longer interfere with the moral transformation of 
public life; moreover, the chosen group now has clearer symbolic evidence of their commitment 
to principle—the more extreme an action, the greater the proof it offers. The image of sublime 
politics is pure moral agency in action, the immediate social execution of Vernunft. Violence 
becomes a token of this purity, this immediacy, this unqualified service to the needs of the 
moment. 
Finally, it seems difficult, given the way I’ve described sublime politics here, to imagine 
an actual sustainable government designed around the political sublime. In part, I think this is the 
point. Sublime politics is not politics as usual and has no interest in administration, governance, 





political sublime materializes only in moral-agential action. In this way, we can say that sublime 
politics is anti-representational. Just as the Kantian sublime involves the breakdown of all 
powers of positive representation, in the world of the political sublime, nothing can stand for or 
even figure the popular moral will.29 The notion of representative bodies of government, with 
politicians speaking for popular constituencies, is dead in the water if sublimity is the operating 
concept of politics. Instead we get a kind of hyperactive model of direct democracy, with a 
roaming, embattled popular will constantly seeking occasions for its moral enactment. How 
“democratic” this arrangement is can be debated. What is less debatable, I think, is that it will be 
violent.  
 
* * * 
A last issue involves the specificity of what I’ve called “sublime politics” in Fichte. At first 
glance, the political principle of the Beitrag—overcoming a corrupt material world by creating a 
higher moral community—may not seem terribly unique. Platonism, stoicism, asceticism, 
Christianity—any number of “higher-world” discourses might generate a similar vision of 
politics. What makes Fichte’s Beitrag “sublime” and not simply “transcendent” or generally anti-
sensuous in the manner of these other worldviews? 
 To begin, the argument of the Beitrag is much more localized and precise. Fichte will go 
on later in his career to become a philosophical systems-builder, but for the purposes of the 
Beitrag, he limits himself to the event of the French Revolution. Of course, the symbolic and 
moral consequences he draws from this event are immense, but the text itself is nonetheless 
																																																						
29 See especially Huet, “Performing Arts.” Anti-representational from the start, the Terror progressed into an 






inextricable from its immediate circumstances—Fichte writes and publishes the Beitrag in 1793, 
in real time as the Revolution enters its violent phase—in a way that, for instance, the 
Wissenschaftslehre is not. As we saw in the “Vorrede,” Fichte frames the Beitrag, not so much 
as the introduction of a system of thought, but as an intervention into a specific ongoing debate, 
and more precisely, as an occasion to judge an event. The Beitrag is a judgment, not a system—
an assessment of a specific object, rather than an encompassing worldview. Fichte opens the 
Wissenschaftslehre with the internal self-examination of the Ich—something that can, and indeed 
must, happen independent of external circumstances30—but the Beitrag is inseparable from the 
occasion of the French Revolution, which it uses to advance general moral principles.  
This occasionalism is a core element of sublimity. If Fichte wanted to write a manifesto 
against Sinnlichkeit, he could easily do that directly, i.e. he could present his principles as 
universally valid statements. But as we’ve seen in the Beitrag, whatever political universality 
Fichte arrives at in this text lies at the end of a distinct process, the first moment of which is the 
occasion of the Revolution. Fichte’s argument is that the occasion must be properly registered: 
while the event initially seems traumatic for European society, both as a physical threat and an 
epistemic challenge to previous conceptions of politics, Fichte insists the Revolution is the 
jumping-off point for Europe’s moral elevation. It is a matter of properly converting the occasion 
of the Revolution, grasping and responding to it in a way that captures its transcendent potential. 
Thus the urgency of Fichte’s text: as he makes clear in the “Vorrede,” he hopes the public at 
large, not just academics, will pass around the Beitrag and discuss its conclusions (Beitrag 4-5). 
Constituting a community of morally like-minded subjects is how the Beitrag arrives at 
																																																						
30 Fichte’s “Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre” begins: “Merke auf dich selbst: kehre deinen Blick von 
allem, was dich umgiebt, ab, und in dein Inneres – ist die erste Forderung, welche die Philosophie an ihren Lehrling 





universality—put another way, Fichte imagines the process of properly responding to the 
Revolution will put people in touch with the universal moral principles that, according to his 
view of human nature, lie innately within them.  
But again, he conceives this as the result of a sequence of steps: occasion; trauma; 
conversion; moral transcendence. This is much more precise than a broad metaphysical or 
theological opposition to the material world; it is a specific scheme that aligns squarely with the 
Kantian sublime. The Revolution threatens both the physical safety of Europeans and the 
integrity of their political-theoretical categories, i.e. it is both dynamically and mathematically 
sublime. But true to the calculus of sublime aesthetics, the severity of the initial threat is directly 
proportional to the ultimate moral payoff: the Revolution is uniquely promising precisely 
because of the unprecedented challenge it poses to European society. Much like the subject of 
the Kantian sublime rises above an immediate fear and thus consolidates its own moral 
autonomy, so Fichte hopes Europe will overcome its counterrevolutionary impulses and accede 











Büchner’s Critique of Aesthetic-Political Idealism:  
Der Hessische Landbote and Dantons Tod 
 
It is a truism that Büchner is a materialist contra idealists like Schiller and Fichte. This statement 
alone says very little. My basic argument in this chapter is that Büchner’s departure has less to 
do with “idealism” as a large-scale intellectual-historical category than the specific forms of 
idealism at work in Schiller and Fichte. What these respective idealisms share is the connection 
between aesthetics and politics. That is, Schiller and Fichte elevate conceptuality over materiality 
in ways that are inseparable from specific aesthetic-political commitments: in Schiller’s case, the 
failings of European political history are diagnosed under the rubric of Schönheit, which also 
frames their idealized dramatic representation in Schiller’s late history plays; for Fichte, the 
empirical moment of the French Revolution is the final jumping-off point for humanity’s 
transition to pure morality—an argument that presumes the processual logic of the sublime. The 
“ideal” category is, in the first instance, an aesthetic representation; in the second, a moral 
condition derived from an aesthetic concept. In both cases, empirical political history—the 
history of European politics as it has taken place—is the “problem” category, a condition to be 
overcome. Schiller’s dramatic rendition of European history and Fichte’s transcendence of it 
both stand against the facts of this history, as its elevated, transfigured, idealized version. 
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 This is Büchner’s first point of departure: empirical history does not need to be 
transformed or signified in some way that makes it ramify on a higher register. There is no 
supervening order determining the course of history, nor is there a deeper logic—there is no 
concept or scheme at work. I claim this commitment is on display in Der Hessische Landbote, 
which, rather than engaging a large-scale teleological arc of history à la Schiller and Fichte, 
confines itself to the previous 45 years, and the fate of European monarchy in this period. There 
is a marked lack of interpretation in Büchner’s recounting of European politics since 1789. 
Where Schiller and Fichte signify this politics, Büchner reports on it. Rather than pointing to 
some higher (or lower) order, Der Hessische Landbote presents history as an observable 
sequence of events that terminates in the political present: the attempt to consolidate a 
democratic resistance against French and German monarchies after 1830. As it stands in 
Büchner’s pamphlet, the goal of this resistance is to instate genuine representative democracy in 
Europe. Two other principles from Der Hessische Landbote are important for us here as well: 
first, the maxim that revolution is justifiable only as a means, not an end; and second, a 
conception of “the people” very much at odds with the aesthetic-political idealisms of Schiller 
and Fichte. For the latter (and the Jacobins) “the people” refers to an abstract political entity, a 
conceptual construction, a unity that stands (ideally) above the variegated mass of actual human 
beings making up a polity. But Der Hessische Landbote is directed at precisely this multiform 
mass of people as such—adduced in their material individuality but constituting a larger political 
body. I call this a conception of the people as a concrete multiplicity, versus the abstract unity 
“people” underlying, Schiller, Fichte, Robespierre—virtually all of antecedent political thought. 
 Non-idealized history, a critique of revolution as a political end, the people as a concrete 
multiplicity—all elements are at work, not just in Der Hessische Landbote, but also in Büchner’s 
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first drama, Dantons Tod. The first section below addresses the play from the standpoint of 
historical representation, where Büchner makes his clearest interventions in the aesthetic-
dramaturgical legacy embodied (in Büchner’s own account) by Schiller. Like Schiller, Büchner 
incorporates empirical history as well as invented contented in Dantons Tod, but there are 
important differences on both counts. First, Büchner’s representation of “history as it was” is 
magnified by his then-revolutionary use of citation: Büchner quotes transcripts of speeches by 
Robespierre and Danton at length, adding a level of empirical reality unprecedented in literary 
representations of history.1 But Büchner does not hesitate to intervene freely alongside this 
historical exactitude: some speeches (St. Just) and figures (Marion) are wholesale inventions, the 
effect of which, rather than conceptualizing the empirical material (like Schiller), is, I argue, to 
create a profusion of discourses, and thus to emphasize the wider intellectual and ideological 
resonance of the French Revolution. Büchner uses invented material to write in logics like 
eroticism, theodicy, even idealism itself, without ever suggesting any of these is a kind of master 
key to understanding the play. Other formal techniques in Dantons Tod, especially its episodic 
structure and Büchner’s use of montage, only heighten the sense of the historical material’s 
malleability, its capacity to be reconfigured and positioned in new relationships. 
 Section two focuses on Der Hessische Landbote and highlights the political principles I 
mention above. With these and the aesthetic-technical themes from section one in mind, the final 
section returns to Dantons Tod. Ultimately, I approach the play as the site of a specific aesthetic 
politics that criticizes Schiller’s politics of beauty and Fichte’s sublime politics alike. Beauty and 
sublimity are aesthetic concepts Schiller and Fichte use to idealize political history, a process 
Büchner critically stages in Dantons Tod via (1) the titular figure, whose (ultimately futile) 
																																																						
1 See Rüdiger Campe, “Zitat,” in Büchner Handbuch (Weimear: Metzler, 2009), 274-75. 
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attempts to balance radical politics and sensual comforts, ambition and pleasure, align well with 
principles of Spiel and Wechselwirkung that are the core of Schiller’s politics of beauty; and (2) 
the Jacobins, whose oratorical and practical justification of the Terror consistently invokes the 
category of the sublime, which in Dantons Tod is inextricable from the idealist conception of 
history as the progressive overcoming of material by thought. This is the double critique of 
aesthetic-political idealism in Danton Tod. After reconstructing it, I conclude with the long-
standing scholarly question of whether the play itself has a politics.2 I suggest it does, and the 
way it engages in dramatic polemic against Schiller and Fichte gives us a clue to drawing this 
politics out. The key is starting with the aesthetics of the play. Büchner’s critique of aesthetic-
political idealism in Dantons Tod traces a political situation, the Terror, back to principles of 
idealist aesthetics and historicism, i.e. it imagines these principles at work in politics. We are 
presented with a form of politics caught between the disengaged pleasure of Spiel and the moral 
fanaticism of the sublime, the two poles of what I call “idealist aesthetics,” and that is subsumed 
at all points under the macrohistorical grand arc of rational political progress, which I 
subsequently refer to as “idealist historicism.”3 But if we start from a different set of principles, 
deriving from Büchner’s aesthetic and historiographic decisions in Dantons Tod, what kind of 





2 Rüdiger Campe: [es gibt] “keinen Konsens darüber, welche Position im Drama die des Autors ist. Einigkeit besteht 
auch nicht, ob dem Stück eine solche Stellungnahme überhaupt zuzuschreiben ist.” “Dantons Tod,” in Büchner 
Handbuch, 19. 
3 By this term, I do not mean to include the historicism of Ranke, which developed in large measure against Hegel’s 
philosophy of history. While both schools adopt periodic segmentation of history, for idealist historicism, these 
periods are not so much separable and unique, as they are for Ranke, but integrated as progressive phases into one 
universal history. I claim this latter view is Büchner’s target in Dantons Tod, which, in its use of historical 
documents and primary sources, adopts some of the methods of Ranke’s historicism. 
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Dantons Tod: Aesthetics 
 
Dantons Tod takes place over roughly ten days in spring 1794. It is the radical phase of the 
French Revolution: the Jacobins are in power, led by Robespierre and St. Just; the Constitution 
has been suspended; Terror has been the prerogative of government under the Committee of 
Public Safety since the previous summer; mass political killings will continue until the 
deposition and execution of Robespierre, St. Just, and the remaining Jacobin leadership in late 
July 1794. The play begins immediately following the execution of the Hébertist sect on March 
24 and concludes with the guillotining of the Dantonists on April 5. We follow the fate of 
Danton and his supporters from initial speculation and suspicion to arrest, imprisonment, trial 
and death, alongside which we also witness the internal dynamics of the Jacobin club as its 
members determine their old allies—Danton is a revolutionary hero for his role in the September 
1792 massacres—should go the same way as the Hébertists.  
When it comes to the play’s representation of history, there are two ostensibly opposed 
aesthetic principles at work: one the one hand, there is what we might call a mimetic principle 
with respect to historical content, pursuant to which Büchner reproduces this material with 
unprecedented precision via citation; but there is simultaneously a non-mimetic principle with 
respect to dramatic form and invented content—the episodic, non-integrated structure of the 
play, as well as material Büchner simply creates. The prerogative of this second principle is to 
manipulate and reconfigure empirical history, rather than reproduce it. Schiller’s historical 
dramas are also simultaneously mimetic and non-mimetic in this sense. But as we saw in chapter 
two, for Schiller, dramatic representation of history is framed at the outset by concepts from the 
Ästhetische Erziehung, especially Spiel. Thus, empirical and invented material enter into mutual 
exchange to produce a larger, integrated unity (the drama) that is itself part of Schiller’s overall 
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vision of European history as the interplay of drives. As I argued there, one function of these 
historical dramas is diagnostic, to show an imbalance of forces at work behind the tragedies (so 
to speak) of political history, and thus to indicate a hypothetical, a possibility, how things could 
and perhaps should have been. Büchner has nothing but contempt for this conceit: “Wenn man 
mir übrigens noch sagen wollte, der Dichter müsse die Welt nicht zeigen wie sie ist, sondern wie 
sie sein solle, so artworte ich, daß ich es nicht besser Machen will, als der liebe Gott, der die 
Welt gewiß gemacht hat, wie sie sein soll” (WB 272). This is from the famous letter of July 28, 
1835 to his family, where Büchner identifies Schiller by name as the representative of 
“Idealdichter” who write plays populated by “Marionetten” with “affektiertem Pathos,” not real 
people “von Fleisch und Blut” (WB 272-73).4  The non-idealist writer represents people and the 
world as they are, not as they should be, nor subsumed under some other concept. This also holds 
for dramatic representation of history: 
[D]er dramatische Dichter ist in meinen Augen nichts, als ein Geschichtsschreiber, steht aber 
über Letzterem dadurch, daß er uns die Geschichte zum zweiten Mal erschafft und uns gleich 
unmittelbar, statt eine trockne Erzählung zu geben, in das Leben einer Zeit hinein versetzt, uns 
statt Charakteristiken Charaktere, und statt Beschreibungen Gestalten gibt. Seine höchste 
Aufgabe ist, der Geschichte, wie sie sich wirklich begeben, so nahe als möglich zu kommen. Sein 
Buch darf weder sittlicher noch unsittlicher sein, als die Geschichte selbst. (WB 272; original 
emphasis) 
 
These are famous lines, but it is easy to miss the complexity of what Büchner is describing here. 
On the one hand, he stays true to his maxim that the dramatist represents the world as it is (or in 
this case, was); but what that means is not simply to give “dry narration” (“trockne Erzählung”) 
or descriptions (“Beschreibungen”) of some historical episode, but to deliver the life, characters 
and forms behind it (“das Leben einer Zeit,” “Charaktere,” “Gestalten”). These elements—life, 
																																																						
4 The case against aesthetic idealism stated here appears again, famously, in Büchner’s novella, Lenz: “Da wolle 
man idealistische Gestalten, aber Alles, was ich davon gesehn, sind Holzpuppen. Dieser Idealismus ist die 
schmählichste Verachtung der menschlichen Natur” (WB 76), holds forth Büchner’s Lenz. In this passage, argues 
Paul Celan in his “Meridian” speech, “Büchner’s aesthetics finds expression.” In Celan, Collected Prose, 41. 
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character, form—make history and the world what it is, and in giving us history a “second time” 
via drama (“uns die Geschichte zum Zweiten Mal erschaffen”), the playwright aims at this 
cluster of forces, not simply an external description of it. This principle opens the door to formal 
invention, to experimenting with the configuration of his historical material—not, like Schiller, 
under the rubric of a concept like Schönheit, but to more fully express the Leben, Charaktere and 
Gestalten of a period.  
The immediate context of Büchner’s letter is criticism of Dantons Tod, which he had 
finished five months earlier.5 Many were scandalized by the play’s vulgarity and apparent 
amorality, to which Büchner responded that the French revolutionaries were themselves vulgar 
and amoral: “Ich kann doch aus einem Danton und den Banditen der Revolution nicht 
Tugendhelden machen!” (WB 272) And as we already saw, Büchner insists a history play can 
only be as moral or amoral (“darf weder sittlicher noch unsittlicher sein”) as the times it depicts. 
But as we also saw, Büchner does give himself allowance to go beyond simply “narrating” or 
“describing” this time—in fact he would likely argue those techniques do not touch the Leben of 
history he is trying to locate. Nonetheless, at first glance, Büchner’s Leben seems close to 
Schiller’s Schönheit—isn’t it just another conceptual rubric for organizing the text? The question 
in either case is whether the material exists for the sake of the concept, or vice versa. Put another 
way: is the point of a history play to provide a kind of historical experience, or is the content a 
means to some other end? For Schiller, it is the latter: even though he is interested in 
disseminating historical knowledge, what is relevant in this history, as well as the way it is 
framed are equally conditioned by the prior, overriding conceptual apparatus of aesthetic 
education. In this framework, history plays are a means of promoting Schillerian Totalität des 
																																																						
5 See Campe, “Dantons Tod,” Büchner Handbuch, 19-20. 
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Charakters and a more integrated future moral community. But Büchner insists the “Dichter ist 
kein Lehrer der Moral, er erfindet und schafft Gestalten, er macht vergangene Zeiten wieder 
aufleben, und die Leute mögen dann daraus lernen, so gut, wie aus dem Studium der Geschichte 
und der Beobachtung dessen, was im menschlichen Leben um sie herum vorgeht” (WB 272). 
Here we get a sense for how Büchner’s Leben is different than Schönheit or Spiel in Schiller: the 
latter are essentially tests for relevance or guides for manipulating historical material, while 
when Büchner talks about “reviving past ages” (“er macht vergangene Zeiten wieder aufleben”), 
he does not mean for the sake of some external idea, but so that people can more clearly 
experience history itself. He likens the literary work’s effect to Studium or Beobachtung of 
history, which here takes precedence over any conceptual or moral program. 
With this idea in mind, we can more easily understand Büchner’s departures from 
historical record and the narrative conventions of drama alike. As Harro Müller reminds us, for 
all its rich and precise empirical content, Dantons Tod is decidedly “poetic/metapoetic” in its 
structure and form.6 For Müller, the play is above all “ästhetische Arbeit am Revolutionsbegriff 
und den damit verbundenen anthropologischen Fragestellungen” (“Relektüre,” 61.; my 
emphasis). Schiller would certainly be amenable to this formulation, but again, the point for 
Büchner is to aesthetically represent the Revolution itself, not represent it for the sake of 
morality, beauty, etc. But the difficulty here is with the term “Revolution itself.” Recall Büchner 
is not interested in presenting a straightforward narration of description of the Revolution—
instead he structures his portrayal aesthetically, and radically so, with a “schwindelerregende, 
verwirrende” (Müller) montage of empirical and invented materials, and a non-linear, episodic 
																																																						
6 “Büchner [mischt] dokumentarische, mimetisch-repräsentative mit poietischen Verfahren, verknüpft also 
vorgefundene mit erfundenen Texten… deren Gesamtzusammenhang wiederum poetisch/metapoetisch strukturiert 
wird.” “Dantons Tod: Eine Relektüre,” in Commitment and Compassion, 61. 
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narrative shape. But this aestheticization is different from that of an Idealdichter, does not 
introduce a distortion of history, but instead reproduces its Leben. In Campe’s formulation, 
Dantons Tod is supposed to achieve “den paradoxen Zusammenfall von künstlerischer 
Schöpfung und reiner Wiedergabe” (“Dantons Tod,” 25). Somehow, creation and reproduction 
coincide. 
Fundamentally, the issue concerns what is being reproduced—what specifically 
constitutes “history”? Important to remember is that Büchner’s conception of history is 
drastically different than, even consciously opposed to Schiller’s.7 As Silke-Maria Weineck 
points out, the kind of idealist drama Schiller writes “implies a corresponding integrative theory 
of history” (“Sex and History,” 353), in which historical events can be intelligibly configured in 
logical relation to one another, and an overarching macro-historical picture emerges. This is 
indeed what we saw in chapter two. In Büchner, there is no macrohistory, there are no 
unambiguous trajectories—there is no linearity. Instead, Dantons Tod almost inverts this maxim: 
dispensing with any synoptic pretense of showing large swaths of political history, Büchner’s 
play focuses on a precise moment—the execution of the Dantonists—and all the discursive 
richness involved in that moment. The drama foregoes historical breadth for depth of detail in 
reproducing the concrete, everyday, personal, political, sexual, linguistic, representational 
nuances at work during two weeks of the Terror. All these elements are not only present, but 
positioned in relationship to the events that will later be written up as “history”—in this sense, 
the play shows us the network of discourses at work behind the historical record. This ambition 
is related to the episodic structure of the play, which Müller prefers to call a “Zustandsdrama,” 
																																																						
7 In Dantons Tod, Büchner “noticeably departs from the organic model that underlies Aristotle, and by extension the 
classicist, Schillerian, or idealist historical drama that calls for the integration of its elemetns into a coherent, linear 
order.” Silke-Maria Weineck, “Sex and History,” The German Quarterly (2000), 353. 
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composed of a series of moments rather than a linear narrative. In the case of Dantons Tod, we 
notice “Büchners dramaturgische Technik, Figuren nur in einer Szene auftreten zu lassen, 
obwohl sie im Diskursuniversum des Stückes wichtige Positionen markieren” (“Relektüre,” 61). 
That is, figures that appear only once nonetheless make significant contributions to the 
“discursive universe” of the drama. Especially significant are the prostitute Marion (I: 5), who 
advocates a kind of de-individuated eroticism that not only complements the epicureanism of the 
Dantonists but also, as Weineck has shown, entails its own (anti-idealist) conception of history; 
and also Payne (III: 1), whose prison dialogues bring in debates on theodicy and the role of evil 
in history. 
Eroticism and theodicy are influential discourses in relation to the French Revolution, 
and Büchner’s strategy is to write them in via stand-alone scenes. It is worth remembering also 
that, though Payne is based on the empirical Thomas Paine, who was in fact imprisoned by the 
Jacobins, Marion is a wholesale invention on Büchner’s part, as is St. Just’s speech to the 
National Convention (II: 7), where idealist historicism is most expressly written into Dantons 
Tod. We’ll consider the speech in more detail in section three, but for the moment, it bears 
mentioning that St. Just justifies the Terror with reference to the term Weltgeist, a “codeword” 
(Weineck) allusion to Hegelian philosophy, and therefore an anachronism. Similarly, Campe 
detects traces of Heine’s Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland, published the 
year before Büchner wrote Dantons Tod, in the counter positioning of Danton and Robespierre.8 
That is, Büchner retrojects to fill out the discursive universe of the play, incorporating elements 
of its ideational legacy in Hegel and Heine. Where Büchner is at his most inventive, both 
formally and in terms of the content he creates, it is in service of this universe: we see a system 
																																																						
8 The operative distinction is Heine’s between Spiritualismus and Sensualismus, embodied respectively by 
Robespierre and Danton, whose political positions Büchner’s text “verschärft.” Campe, “Dantons Tod,” 26-27. 
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of ideas comprising politics, sexuality, religion, history, etc. with a point of concentration in a 
specific moment of the Terror. It is a larger window of intellectual and political history 
condensed, via specific aesthetic techniques, into the unfolding—itself represented via 
discontinuous montage—of two weeks. But again, we are not dealing with grand arcs à la 
Schiller and Fichte: in terms of the theoretical and discursive environment of the play, the 
window is effectively Rousseau to Heine, with some elements of Spinoza via Payne; and when it 
comes to the more concrete system of political history evoked by the drama, we can start in 1789 
and continue to 1834, when Büchner started work on it. This particular span of history—the 45 
years separating the beginning of the French Revolution and attempts to mobilize against French 
and German monarchies in the early 1830s—is crucial not only for Danton Tod9 but also Der 
Hessische Landbote, written and disseminated in 1834, where Büchner reconstructs his own 
century as the aftermath of 1789. We’ll turn there now for a clearer sense of the substance of 
Büchner’s politics. 
 
Der Hessische Landbote: Politics 
 
Büchner completed the first version of Der Hessische Landbote in March 1834, and the highly 
incendiary pamphlet was distributed in two instantiations in July and November.10 As a result, 
Bücher was pursued by the authorities of the Grand Duchy and took refuge in Darmstadt toward 
the end of the year. There he dedicated himself to studying historical sources on the French 
Revolution, and in January-February 1835, completed Dantons Tod. Even if, as Dietmar Till 
suggests, “für die Büchner-Forschung ist der Hessische Landbote kein zentrales Werk” 
																																																						
9 Campe, “Dantons Tod,” 18: “Büchners Darstellung dieser Episode der Revolution ist bestimmt durch die Lage der 
Entstehungszeit des Dramas (1834/1835). Die Julirevolution von 1830 in Frankreich in ihre Auswirkungen auf die 
deutschen Staate beeinflussten die Sicht Büchners und seiner Zeitgenossen auf die Revolution von 1789 nachhaltig.” 
10 Dietmar Till, “‘Deutschland ist jetzt ein Leichenfeld, bald wird es ein Paradies seyn’: Die Rhetork der Revolution 
im Hessischen Landboten,” Georg Büchner Jahrbuch (2012), 9. 
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(“Rhetorik,” 6), I claim it nonetheless has an important relationship to Dantons Tod: first, as the 
drama’s immediate predecessor, not just in Büchner written corpus, but also as the act that 
makes him a fugitive, the condition in which he writes Dantons Tod; second, as a statement of 
political principles that are worked through aesthetically in the play. These principles relate to 
Büchner’s immediate situation: the 1830 deposition of Charles X in France by Louise-Philippe 
and the attendant geopolitical consequences for Europe.11 Though billed as a Revolution, 1830 is 
a false victory for radicals. As Büchner writes in Der Hessische Landbote, with Charles removed 
from the throne, “da wendete dennoch das befreite Frankreich sich abermals zur halberblichen 
Königsherrschaft und band sich in dem Heuchler Louis Philipp eine neue Zuchtrute auf” (WB 
225; original emphasis).12 Büchner’s point of departure in the pamphlet is that 1830 simply 
exchanged one tyranny for another; all the latter had to do was make itself seem palatable by 
comparison to the people: 
In Deutschland und ganz Europa aber war große Freude, als der zehnte Karl vom Thron gestürzt 
ward, und die unterdrückten deutschen Länder richteten sich zum Kampf für die Freiheit. Da 
ratschlagten die Fürsten, wie sie dem Grimm des Volkes entgehen sollten und die listigen unter 
ihnen sagten: Laßt uns einen Teil unserer Gewalt abgeben, daß wir das Übrige behalten. Und sie 
traten vor das Volk und sprachen: Wir wollen euch die Freiheit schenken, um die ihr kämpfen 
wollt. – Und zitternd vor Furcht warfen sie einige Brokken hin und sprachen von ihrer Gnade. 
Das Volk traute ihnen leider und legte sich zur Ruhe. – Und so ward Deutschland betrogen wie 
Frankreich. (WB 225) 
 
In Büchner’s account, the deposition of Charles in France nearly becomes a flashpoint for the 
rest of Europe, an occasion to overthrow a whole host of monarchies, including a number of 
especially repressive German principalities. That is, in 1830, there is a significant revolutionary 
																																																						
11 Till, “Rhetorik,” 4-5: “Im Juli 1830 wird in Paris der Bourbonenkönig  Karl X. gestürzt (der zuvor die 
Pressefreiheit aufgehoben, die eben gewählte Abgeordnetenkammer aufgelöst und das Zensuswahlrecht verschärft 
hatte) und durch den Bürgerkönig Louis-Philippe ersetzt. Diese Vorgänge sind heute als Julirevolution von 1830 
bekannt. Sie hatte in ganz Europa heftige Nachwirkungen, die im Kontext des repressiven politischen Klimas der 
Restaurationszweit gesehen werden müssen: Es gab Aufstände, unter anderem in Polen, aber auch im 
Großherzogtum Hessen-Darmstadt, wo sie im März 1833 im sog. “Frankfurter Wachensturm” kulminierten.” 
12 I cite from the “November-Fassung” of Der Hessische Landbote in Werke und Briefe throughout. 
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force comprising disenfranchised peoples across Europe, and corresponding potential for a major 
reconfiguration of European politics. Monarchy could be decisively on its way out. Instead, the 
revolutionary body is essentially tricked, led to believe that a better monarchy is preferable to a 
more radical alternative. As Büchner tells it, the princely caste of Europe makes a series of 
piecemeal concessions with no wide-ranging structural changes to political life, and the masses 
are placated. Thus the situation in Büchner’s Germany: constitutional government in which the 
constitutions are nothing but “leeres Stroh” obfuscating a political order no less exploitative and 
unequal than before the Revolution of 1830. Among the various iniquities Büchner identifies in 
his own principality of Hessen-Darmstadt is the legally codified unaccountability of the Grand 
Duke, Ludwig II: “Nach den Artikeln [der Verfassung des Großherzogtums] ist der Großherzog 
unverletzlich, heilig und unverantwortlich. Seine Würde ist erblich in seiner Familie” (WB 225). 
What good is a constitution when it simply enshrines the privileges of monarchy? This is the 
situation in Hessen-Darmstadt: political power is hereditary, not determined democratically, and 
the head of state is in no way meaningfully answerable to the people. As Der Hessische 
Landbote lays out in vivid (and famously, statistical) detail, one result of this arrangement is a 
brutal system of taxation that keeps the citizens of Hessen-Darmstadt poor, with no recourse 
inside the political order. Thus the need for a revolutionary uprising, the end to which Büchner 
writes Der Hessische Landbote. 
 So stated, the situation behind Der Hessische Landbote is not so difficult to understand. 
But as I’ve mentioned, it is important to be clear about the principles at work here: first, Büchner 
advocates revolutionary action for the sake of instating a representative democracy—that is, 
revolution is not an end in itself; second, Büchner’s conception of “the people” is a distinctive 
one, in which this term does not refer to an abstract, univocal entity (in the manner of most 
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political though preceding Büchner) but rather to what I’ve called a concrete multiplicity of 
tangible human beings. Both ideas become clear toward the end of the pamphlet, where 
Büchner’s voice enters the predictive mode, foretelling a great insurrection and one democracy 
finally replacing Germany’s 34 small monarchies. Büchner’s vision for that future government is 
as follows: “Die besten Männer aller Stämme des großen deutschen Vaterlandes werden, berufen 
durch die freie Wahl ihrer Mitbürger, im Herzen von Deutschland zu einem großen Reichs- und 
Volkstage sich versammeln, um da… christlich über Brüder zu regieren” (WB 231). He is 
describing a representative democracy: localities elect representatives to make decisions on their 
behalf in a national assembly. In bringing this kind of government about, Büchner writes, the 
revolution exchanges the interests of 34 “idols” (“Götzen”) for the will of the people and the 
common good.13 What is striking is that Büchner, unlike Fichte and the Jacobins, aligns 
revolution with representative rather than direct democracy. And not just revolution: 
programmatic mainstays of Jacobinism like “der allgemeine Wille” and “das allgemeine Wohl” 
are, in Büchner’s vision, best served by a system of representative assembly, rather than 
spontaneous, direct exertions of popular volition.  
 In advocating revolution as a means for instating representative democracy, Büchner 
diverges from Fichte and the Jacobins, who, though also politically radical, reject political 
representation altogether. Not incidentally, as we’ve seen, Fichte and the Jacobins also reject 
aesthetic representation (favoring, in their respective ways, sublimity); conversely, Büchner’s 
next writing project after Der Hessische Landbote is a literary work. But it is not simply that 
Büchner and the other radicals fall on different sides concerning the question of representation—
the very idea that true political progress can be institutionalized appears to separate them as well. 
																																																						
13 “Dann wird statt des Eigenwillens der 34 Götzen der allgemeine Wille, statt der Eigensucht einer Rotte von 
Götzendienern dass allgemeine Wohl im deutschen Vaterlande walten.” Büchner, Werke und Briefe, 231-33. 
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To revisit chapter three, Fichte’s Beitrag prophecies an anarchic state of pure morality, where no 
governing apparatus is necessary to direct to the people, who, having wholly incorporated the 
moral instruction of the French Revolution, need no external constraint. Likewise, the Jacobins 
come during their time in power to advocate a state of permanent revolution, rejecting the idea 
that eventually, the radical phase of their movement must be codified into a more stable and 
everyday political structure. This discrepancy between revolution as an ongoing condition versus 
a transition to a different form of institutionalized government is a core issue in Dantons Tod. 
We can see where Büchner falls in Der Hessische Landbote, which is simultaneously a call to 
armed insurrection and a defense of structured, representative government. Finally, it is worth 
pointing out that this also means Büchner clashes with Schiller (and Kant), who oppose 
revolutionary praxis entirely, regardless of its end. Büchner advocates representative democracy, 
but he is not a gradualist, and his approach is in no way “top-down.” it is up to the German 
people to secure its own freedom: “Das ganze deutsche Volk muß sich die Freiheit erringen” 
(WB 227). 
 At first glance, this statement could easily be made by Fichte or a Jacobin. But when 
Büchner says Volk, he means something very different, i.e. he is referring to something 
completely non-abstract. Rather than some trans-historical, primal political entity (like le peuple 
for Robespierre and St. Just), Büchner’s deutsches Volk is the concrete, empirical community of 
people living in Germany. And still more concretely, the primary addressee of Der Hessische 
Landbote is an oft-overlooked section of the Volk of Hessen-Darmstadt: its farmers. As Till 
writes, Büchner’s rhetorical strategy in Der Hessische Landbote is unprecedented among the 
many incendiary Flugschriften of the Vormärz era: rather than addressing fellow revolutionaries, 
opponents, or engaging in legal-constitutional debates, Büchner’s pamphlet addresses the 
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farmers themselves—“setzt unmittelbar bei den notleidenden Bauern selbst an”—avoiding the 
pitfalls of previous pamphlets that were too elevated, abstract or indirect, “anstatt sich den 
drängenden Problemen der Bauern zuzuwenden” (“Rhetorik,” 11). Der Hessische Landbote 
discusses less the theoretical rights of Hessian citizens than the manifest conditions of Hessian 
farmers and laborers. Especially heinous among these conditions are farmers’ taxes: the 
pamphlet is famously rich and precise in statistical detail on annual amounts paid in direct and 
indirect taxation, fines, fees, etc., by Hessen-Darmstadt’s poorest members to its corrupt and 
wholly undemocratic government. Büchner even identifies how much of that money goes to 
which ministries, administrative functions and bodies.14 That is, Büchner’s approach is to be as 
precise as possible about the economic circumstances of the Volk, which, for the rhetorical 
purposes of Der Hessische Landbote, are those materially disadvantaged by the standing order in 
Hessen-Darmstadt, especially farmers. 
 This understanding of “the people” is directly at odds with Fichte and the Jacobins, who 
approach das Volk and le peuple respectively as categories that one qualifies for by passing a 
certain moral-political test. When Robespierre and St. Just talk about the people of France, they 
do not mean the concrete living citizens of France, but an idealized polity possessed of 
revolutionary virtue. Similarly, Fichte does not shy away from advocating a social Prüfung to 
determine which members of the community have the requisite moral integrity to truly advance 
the movement. Even Schiller’s aesthetically integrated Menschheit is still a superior, projective 
version of humanity as it now is. But this latter humanity is exactly what Büchner aims for: as 
with his representation of history, Büchner does not proceed from the question of how the people 
of Hessen-Darmstadt should be, but rather where they are. In this case, the matter is largely one 
																																																						
14 “Für das Ministerium der Finanzen 1,551,502 fl.”; “Für das Militär wird bezahlt 914,820 Gulden”; “Für das 
Staatsministerium und den Staatsrat 174,600 Gulden,” etc. Büchner, Werke und Briefe, 215-17. 
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of socio-economic degradation—the enormity of the Grand Duchy’s material exploitation of its 
people is Büchner’s point of departure. That is, Der Hessische Landbote starts with a present 
circumstance, rather than positing an ideal. After its famous opening motto—“Friede den Hütten! 
Krieg den Palästen!”—and a brief introductory paragraph in which “das Volk” is synonymous 
with “Bauern und Handwerker,” Büchner starts immediately in with figures: “Im Großherzogtum 
Hessen sind 718,373 Einwohner, die geben an den Staat jährlich an 6,363,364 Gulden,” a total 
Büchner then breaks down into several categories of payment (WB 211). Statistical 
representation of Hessen-Darmstadt’s exorbitant socio-economic disparities is the red thread 
through Der Hessische Landbote—Büchner’s task is to organize and display numerically the 
present situation of Hessian farmers and laborers. Significant among these disparities is that of 
population: “Ihrer sind vielleicht 10,000 im Großherzogtum und Eurer sind es 700,000 und so 
verhält sich die Zahl des Volkes zu seinen Pressern auch im übrigen Deutschland” (WB 233). 
This figure is at the beginning of the pamphlet as well: relevant for the Volk of Hessen-
Darmstadt is its number, roughly 700,000. Büchner mentions the population not just to clarify 
the ratio of “Bauern und Handwerker” to “Fürsten” and “Beamte” (70 to 1, thus driving home his 
point about economic inequality) but also as a raw number: a specific quantity of people 
(718,373) paying a specific amount of taxes (6,363,364 Gulden). He approaches the Volk as a 
population, an aggregate of individuals.  
This is what I mean when I say Büchner conceives of the people as a “concrete 
multiplicity.” Der Hessische Landbote addresses itself to a manifest, empirical community of 
individuals that does not resolve into a theoretical “One”: it is not really the people but people, 
plural—in this case, just over 700,000. For Fichte, Schiller and Robespierre alike, any given 
farmer or worker counts politically as a member of one popular body—at some level, each 
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system of idealism terminates in a conception of “the people” as an abstract unity. Whether 
political virtue, moral transcendence or aesthetic equilibrium, some conceptual mechanism 
integrates a multitude of individuals into The People, singular. It is this unifying trait that signals 
their membership in the political community. But Büchner takes that differentiation as a starting 
point. Affirming concrete multiplicity means apprehending the people (1) in terms of their 
present material conditions (not possible, ideal conditions); and (2) as a collective, multitudinous 
body that does not resolve into a conceptual unity. In this instance, it is a discrete population of 
German farmers and laborers experiencing political and economic exploitation at the hands of 
the Grand Duchy. Looking at the polity in this way is incompatible with approaching it as a 
unified entity in the manner of Fichte, Schiller or the Jacobins. At least Büchner’s texts suggest 
as much: we’ll see in Dantons Tod that efforts to impose unity on the people, the guiding idea of 
the Terror, tend to either disengage from or militate against the differentiated reality of citizens’ 
everyday lives. That is, people as they carry their daily existence—or in the case of the 
Büchner’s play, as they try to find something to eat—are often simply a distraction, if not a 
political problem to be eliminated, when the task at hand is to consolidate an abstract 
community. 
We’ll turn in detail to Dantons Tod in a moment. A last note on Der Hessische Landbote: 
Büchner assesses the situation in Hessen-Darmstadt after the Revolution of 1830 as part of a 
trajectory—not a grand arc of history in the style of Fichte or Schiller, but a discrete series of 
geopolitical events. The point of origin is the outbreak of the first French Revolution 45 years 
earlier. Halfway through the pamphlet, having spelled out in detail present-day conditions in 
Hessen-Darmstadt, Büchner pivots from 1834 to 1789: “Im Jahr 1789 war das Volk in 
Frankreich müde, länger die Schindmähre seines Königs zu sein” (WB 223) begins a condensed 
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narrative of recent European history, in which Büchner traces a progression from the initial, 
representative phase of the French Revolution through to its culminating perversion in Napoleon, 
the Bourbon restoration, and finally the illusory upheavals of 1830. This is the political context 
of Der Hessische Landbote and Büchner’s political activity as whole: the very tangible struggle 
between monarchy and the forces that resist it. The various phases of the French Revolution of 
1789, the Napoleonic wars and subsequent European monarchies of the early 19th century are all 
respective stages of this larger conflict. In this view, the role of 1789 is more consequential than 
symbolic: Büchner does not signify the French Revolution, but rather traces its immediate 
afterlife. Der Hessische Landbote describes the enclosed historical system of 1789-1834. In 
Büchner’s work, we can think of this as the window of resonance of the French Revolution. 
While the events of this period are identified explicitly and politically in Der Hessische 
Landbote, Dantons Tod evokes them—as we’ve seen, though confined to a handful of days in 
1794, the play still manages to integrate much of the French Revolution’s subsequent echo in 
early 19th-century European politics and culture. The next and final section explores at greater 
length Büchner’s conversion of political principles into aesthetic representations in Dantons Tod. 
 
 
Dantons Tod (II): Aesthetics and Politics 
 
Dantons Tod is, on the one hand, a critique of idealism and the specific aesthetic politics at work 
in figures like Schiller and Fichte; simultaneously, it is a platform to creatively develop a number 
of political ideas from Der Hessische Landbote. Büchner’s innovative formal techniques, 
especially citation and montage, help these and other prerogatives coexist smoothly in the play. 
Section one above has given us a sense of how this is accomplished at the level of the drama’s 
form. It is also important to consider how these specific priorities and polemics manifest 
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themselves in the events and statements from 1794 Büchner chooses to depict (or invent). Again, 
the aesthetic-political idealism Büchner targets has two faces: Schiller’s politics of beauty and 
the political sublime that animates Fichte and the Jacobins, each of which receives a separate 
critique in Dantons Tod. Likewise with the political principles Büchner lays out in Der 
Hessische Landbote: as we’ll see, the play is an opportunity to very directly depict the people as 
a “concrete multiplicity” rather than some abstractly unified will, and the whole drama revolves 
around the question of whether revolution is a means to creating a future democratic society, or 
itself is already the permanent incarnation of that society. 
 At the beginning of the play the Hébertist faction has just been guillotined (March 24, 
1794), and the question among the remaining revolutionaries is whether the Revolution—
understood as the radical phase, marked by violence since the September massacres of 1792 and 
now mid-Terror—is ever supposed to end. Is the goal to finally stop guillotining people and 
begin the work of constructing institutions necessary to long-term governance? Or are the 
guillotine and radical virtue precisely these institutions? It is a question that would have seemed 
abstract and hardly urgent in the immediate wake of revolutionary triumphs like September 
1792, for which Danton is recognized as a hero, but the situation is different now that the 
Revolution has entered what Ulrich Port calls its “Katzenjammer.”15 That is, the “Ekstase” of 
early revolutionary victories has entered its hangover phase, a “Depressionspunkt” from which 
Dantons Tod begins. The splintering of the revolutionary movement is one effect of this 
depression. The play opens on the Dantonists leisurely gambling and processing the fate of the 
Hébertists, fellow revolutionaries whose execution was precipitated by their tension with the 
Jacobins. It is clear immediately where the Dantonists fall on the question of permanent 
																																																						
15 Ulrich Port, “Vom ‘erhabenen Drama der Revolution’ zum ‘Selbstgefühl’ ihrer Opfer: Pathosformeln und 
Affektdramaturgie in Büchner’s Dantons Tod,” Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie (2003), 213. 
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revolution: Philippeau insists “Wir müssen vorwärts,” asking rhetorically “Wie lange sollen wir 
noch schmutzig und blutig sein wie neugeborne Kinder, Särge zur Wiege haben und mit Köpfen 
spielen?” (WB 9) Less graphically, Hérault claims “Die Revolution ist in das Stadium der 
Reorganisation gelangt. Die Revolution muß aufhören und die Republik muß anfangen” (WB 9). 
This is the basic position of the Dantonists, and their most consequential for the course of the 
play: the revolutionary phase of political change in France is at an end; it is time to 
institutionalize the French republic. Philippeau expresses more affectedly part of what is driving 
this sentiment: the Revolution has devolved into wild bloodshed, and the Dantonists want the 
violence to stop. This is the perspective Danton himself brings to Robespierre later in the first act 
(I: 6): “Wo die Notwehr aufhört fängt der Mord an, ich sehe keinen Grund, der uns länger zum 
Töten zwänge” (WB 24). In other words, conditions in France no longer call for extraordinary 
measures—without any clear external threat and thus no immediate need for self-defense 
(“Notwehr”), the guillotine is simply murder (“Mord”). Robespierre disagrees: “Die soziale 
Revolution ist noch nicht fertig, wer eine Revolution zur Hälfte vollendet, gräbst sich selbst sein 
Grab” (WB 24). Unlike the Dantonists, Robespierre considers the Revolution only half-finished: 
the monarchy may be toppled, but the “social revolution” is ongoing. What this means is that 
revolutionary values, specifically political virtue (Tugend, a ubiquitous term for Robespierre), 
have not yet permeated the populace. “Das Laster muß bestraft werden, die Tugend muß durch 
den Schrecken herrschen” (WB 24)—the Revolution is now about eradicating vice from the 
people, for which terror is the means.  
 Where Danton and his followers want to start constructing the French republic, 
Robespierre insists the Revolution must continue to impose virtue on the people. We could say 
the political focus of the Dantonists is institutional while for the Jacobins it is moral. As 
 
188		
Robespierre makes clear in his speech to the Jacobin club (I: 3), in a revolutionary republic, the 
vice of the aristocracy is simultaneously moral and political: “Das Laster ist das Kainszeichen 
des Aristokratismus. In einer Republik ist es nicht nur ein moralisches sondern auch ein 
politisches Verbrechen; der Lasterhafte ist der politische Feind der Freiheit” (WB 17). There is a 
blending of categories: political freedom, as the Jacobins understand it, is synonymous with a 
specific conception of virtue, and thus directly threatened by vice. Recall Frederick Beiser’s 
definition of republicanism as model of politics that ties liberty to the people’s moral character. 
The Jacobins in Dantons Tod approach their own infantile republic in much the same way. A 
thoroughgoing “social revolution,” in which the citizen becomes uniformly tugendhaft, is a 
necessary element of the government they want to build. And it is significant that Beiser 
introduces the concept of republicanism in order clarify the political thought of Schiller, one of 
our aesthetic-political idealists. Though, as I’ll argue, the specific moral-political conflation of 
Büchner’s Jacobins is more reminiscent of Fichte, they share a basic conceit with Schiller as 
well: the project of morally improving the people. This idea manifests itself with certain 
differences in Fichte, Schiller and the Jacobins—who respectively elevate the Volk with sublime 
transcendence, aesthetic education and virtuous terror—but in all cases the fundamental 
principle, that this elevation does in fact have to take place, is the same. 
 The connection between the Jacobins of Büchner’s play and Fichte deserves more 
comment, if only because Büchner draws attention to the centrality of the sublime in Jacobin 
rhetoric. Today, it is easy to see on casual survey of Robespierre’s speeches that he insistently 
referred to and framed the Revolution as a sublime event—the term is a mainstay of his 
oratory—but this is something Büchner would have uncovered in Thiers or another source on the 
French Revolution. That is, sublimity enters Dantons Tod chiefly via citation, especially in the 
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speech to the Jacobin club I just mentioned, which includes Robespierre’s famous phrase “das 
erhabne Drama der Revolution” (WB 16). This is an important illustration of how Büchner 
presents political history in the play: he shows the ideas at work—in this case, aesthetic-political 
ideas. Dantons Tod confronts us with the aesthetic politics of sublimity as a concrete practice in 
the empirical course of the French Revolution. As we saw (implicitly) in Fichte, the concept of 
the sublime operates as a justification and a frame for political violence.16 Fichte’s idea of a 
social Prüfung is perfectly consistent with Robespierre’s insistence on a continuous social 
revolution—the Lasterhafte have to be rooted out. And there is an additional level to the sublime 
“test” at work in Büchner’s depiction of the Jacobins: it is not simply a test in the sense of 
sorting virtuous and non-virtuous citizens, but also a test of conviction, of commitment to radical 
political change at all costs. (Recall the fashionable “whatever-it-takes” mentality of Žižek and 
Badiou.) As Robespierre remarks to Danton, the Revolution is only half complete, and what kind 
of revolutionary wouldn’t want to complete it? This is the core of the Jacobins (stated) case 
against the Dantonists in the play—in giving up on the total completion of the Revolution, they 
are traitors against it. This premise allows the Jacobins to flip their opponents’ critique of the 
Terror: mass guillotining is righteous, not only as a substantive means to eliminate aristocratic 
vice, but also as an external sign of commitment to a higher political purpose—again, at all costs. 
In this sense, violence constitutes a not only good but necessary phase, insofar as it is the 
decisive indicator of commitment, in radical political change.  
The specific affirmation of violence (not just its defense) is stated succinctly by the 
Jacobin representative from Lyon just before Robespierre’s speech: “Barmherzigkeit mordet die 
																																																						
16 As Müller remarks of St. Just in the play: “An dieser Figur werden die mörderischen Konsequenzen gezeigt, die 
materiale Geschichtsphilosophie und idealistische Erhabenheitsästhetik erzielen können, wenn sie im 
Ausnahmezustand auf politischem Felde praktisch werden” “Relektüre,” 53. 
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Revolution. Der Atemzug eines Aristokraten ist das Röcheln der Freiheit. Nur ein Feigling stirbt 
für die Republik, ein Jakobiner tötet für sie” (WB 15). Note the paradoxical reversal: mercy is 
murder—of the Revolution. The test of a true radical (a Jacobin) is not just to sacrifice oneself 
for the cause, but specifically to kill for it. To not kill in the name of the Revolution is to kill the 
Revolution. This conclusion involves the important corollary that the very physical existence 
(“Atemzug”—simply drawing breath) of enemies of the Revolution is the “death knell” 
(“Röcheln”) of radical freedom. Aristocrats constitute an existential rather than a substantive 
threat.17 That is, they need to be killed rather than simply removed from power. And what, in the 
eye of a Jacobin, is the mark of an aristocrat? How does one pick out Laster?  
There is a consistent theme through Dantons Tod, expressed well by Lacroix to Danton 
(I: 6), as they try to parse Robespierre’s remarks in the Jacobin club: “Und außerdem Danton, 
sind wir lasterhaft, wie Robespierre sagt d.h. wir genießen, und das Volk ist tugendhaft d.h. es 
genießt nicht” (WB 23; my emphasis). Laster is pleasure: enjoyment, luxury, e.g. the drinking 
and carousing for which the Dantonists have become known (and resented) in Paris, where most 
of the citizens are too poor to feed their families, let alone gamble in brothels. Not that 
widespread poverty is the fault of Danton’s group, nor that the Jacobins know what to do about 
it. Rather, as Müller points out, a grounding reality against which the play unfolds is that no 
one—“weder Robespierre noch Danton oder das Volk selbst”—has a solution to Paris’ economic 
misery, from which the guillotine acts as a popular distraction and “Instrument zur Kontrolle des 
Volkszorns” (“Relektüre,” 55). We see this principle on vivid display in the second scene of act 
I, where several starving Parisians clamor for more beheadings. In the words of one citizen: “Die 
																																																						
17 Müller draws attention to the “either/or” nature of Robespierre’s logic: “Seine Lehre ist die folgende: Das 
politische System wird streng gemäß dem Code revolutionär/konterrevolutionär, tugendhaft/lasterhaft 
durchmoralisiert und anschließend gemäß der Logik des Entweder/Oder, der Freund/Feind-Konzeption (C. Schmitt) 
sortiert und guillotiniert.” “Relektüre,” 54. 
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paar Tropfen Bluts vom August und September haben dem Volk die Backen nicht rot gemacht. 
Die Guillotine ist zu langsam. Wir brauchen einen Platzregen” (WB 13). “August und 
September” refer to the Insurrection of August 10 and the September Massacres, major 
upheavals of 1792 still regarded as important symbolic victories by revolutionaries in 1794. They 
were also very visible instances of political violence by advocates of the Revolution against their 
political enemies, roughly 2,000 of whom were killed between August 10 and September 7, 
1792. But as we see in Dantons Tod, those body counts are likened to mere drops of blood that 
failed to sufficiently nourish the people. The present pace of guillotining is “zu langsam,” when 
what’s needed is a “downpour” (“Platzregen”). It is not incidental that Büchner’s “Dritter 
Bürger” uses a dietary figure here: the guillotine has become a stand-in for the people’s real 
issue, hunger. Or as the “Erster Bürger” puts it, in a word: “Unsere Weiber und Kinder schreien 
nach Brot, wir wollen sie mit Aristokratenfleisch füttern” (WB 13). That is, the starving citizens 
have internalized the revolutionary government’s recourse to the symbolic nourishment of the 
Terror—their leaders cannot literally feed them, so it provides the ersatz satisfaction of killing 
aristocrats.  
But there is an additional dimension here: remember that those carrying out the Terror 
define virtue as non-enjoyment: where the vice-ridden indulge their appetites, the abject retain 
their civic integrity. The question then arises: if by some economic miracle the starving members 
of the Volk were suddenly able to eat well and enjoy their lives, could they still be virtuous? Or is 
civic virtue, as the Jacobins understand it, inextricable from some degree of suffering, or at least 
physical denial? Famously prudent Robespierre, nicknamed “the incorruptible,” suggests as 
much, as does the fate of the Dantonists in Büchner’s play. After all, they are undeniably 
members of the revolutionary movement, and Danton is considered a hero for his role in the 
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September Massacres. But in the new political environment of the Terror, their Genuß condemns 
them. This is an important coincidence between the Jacobins and Fichte, who, like Robespierre, 
fixates on enjoyment as a cardinal political evil. In Fichte’s sublime politics, pleasure binds 
political subjects to earthly reality and thus inhibits moral transcendence. This is a model of 
transcendence in which pain and violence are necessary stages: sublime elevation follows a 
collision and an overcoming of material by morality. As we saw in chapter three, sublimity as a 
paradigm of politics requires a violent confrontation between “moral” and “extra-moral” groups, 
in which violence is a technique of purification, or as Büchner’s St. Just has it, rebirth and 
“Verjüngung” (II: 7). As Müller argues, framing the Terror is this way is directly consistent with 
sublime aesthetics: “Das äußerst blutige Geschäft der Menschheitsverjüngung wird innerhalb des 
Tragödienkonzepts zugleich ästhetisch legitimiert. Dazu dient das Konzept der Erhabenheit” 
(“Relektüre,” 53).  
Again, Büchner presents political history as a consequence of specific aesthetic-political 
ideas: in not only understanding but conducting their revolutionary government, the Jacobins 
apply the aesthetic rubric of sublimity, framing the Revolution as a tragic drama that terminates 
in moral transcendence, i.e. the civic rebirth of the French people. What is distinctive about 
Dantons Tod is that it shows the act of framing itself: we see the Jacobins at work situating the 
Revolution discursively, deciding in real (dramatic) time what values it aligns with and what it 
condemns. We see also that these decisions have a foundation in concrete power struggles, in 
division and competition within the revolutionary movement. That is, we witness the fine-
grained and often dubious process of positioning the Revolution in a wider field of political, 
historiographic, aesthetic, theological and other discourses. 
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As Dantons Tod represents it, the discourse of idealism is not just political and aesthetic, 
as in Robespierre’s framing of the Revolution as sublime, but historiographic as well: St. Just’s 
speech (II: 7) is effectively a manifesto of idealist historicism. This is one point in the play where 
Büchner sees fit to invent: not only is the speech itself undocumented, but as we already saw, 
Weineck and Port draw attention to the fact that St. Just’s use of the term “Weltgeist” (WB 41) is 
an anachronistic writing-in of Hegelian philosophy of history. Port calls St. Just’s insistence that 
the world spirit is guiding events in France “parodierter Hegel” (“Pathosformeln,” 214), and as 
Weineck reminds us, Hegel is the “single most important figure in the development of idealist 
historicism,” a historiographic paradigm extremely influential in the 1830s and against which 
Dantons Tod is written (“Sex and History,” 352). Again, in order to carry out this specific 
critique, Büchner has to augment the historical record in the interest of drawing out a 
homology—namely that the Terror anticipates idealist historicism as its practical political 
expression. Robespierre and St. Just are the concrete foreshadowing of Hegel.  
Büchner’s play does not just show the realization of idealist historiography in its 
depiction of the Terror, it also presents alternatives to it. The clearest example, following 
Weineck, is not so much the Dantonists—who, as we’ll see, practice their own form of 
idealism—but the (invented) figure of Marion, through whom Büchner writes in the discourse of 
eroticism.18 Marion appears only once during the play (I: 5): Danton has visited her for sex, and 
instead she tells him the story of her first lover, whose suicide she calls  
der einzige Bruch in meinem Wesen. Die andern Leute haben Sonn- und Werktage, sie arbeiten 
sechs Tage und beten am siebenten, sie sind jedes Jahr auf ihren Geburtstag einmal gerührt und 
denken jedes Jahr auf Neujahr einmal nach. Ich begreife nichts davon. Ich kenne keinen Absatz, 
keine Veränderung. Ich bin immer nur Eins. Ein ununterbrochenes Sehnen und Fassen, eine Glut, 
ein Strom… Es läuft auf eins hinaus, an was man seine Freude hat, an Leibern, Christusbildern, 
																																																						
18 Weineck: “Dantons Tod is very consciously a post-Hegelian play, indeed an attack on Hegelian historicism—an 
attack, moreover, that is launched from the site of eroticism.” “Sex and History,” 355. 
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Blumen oder Kinderspielsachen, es ist das nämliche Gefühl, wer am Meisten genießt, betet am 
Meisten. (WB 20) 
 
Marion’s first lover killed himself out of jealousy: by her own account, once introduced to sex, 
“ich wurde wie ein Meer, was Alles verschlang und sich tiefer und tiefer wühlte. Es war für mich 
nur ein Gegensatz da, alle Männer verschmolzen in einen Leib” (WB 19). This is an eroticism 
that does not recognize the uniqueness of any individual partner, much as Marion’s view of time 
does not acknowledge differentiation or progress (“kein Absatz, keine Veränderung”). 
Everything is simply one, “nur Eins,” and the only question is how one derives pleasure 
(“Freude”) from existence. Satisfaction in sex, religion, flowers or children’s toys (“Blumen oder 
Kinderspielsachen”)—for Marion, it is all the same basic phenomenon. 
But the monologue is more than a statement of personal idiosyncrasy. As Weineck 
argues, it is also a compressed, multidimensional polemic against the idealist understanding of 
history that runs through the rest of Dantons Tod. First, formally, Marion and her story are “non-
integral” components of the drama in that they are never repeated or referred to again—this kind 
of “excess,” of which Payne’s theodicy discourse is another example, “constitutes the most 
remarkable departure from the demands of traditional plot” in Büchner’s play (Weineck 353). 
Exactly this plot convention—that all elements of the story are at some level integrated with each 
other—is the one most closely homologous with idealist historicism, which presupposes the 
analogous total integration of all historical events. Moreover, the de-individuated, fatalistic 
conclusion of Marion’s monologue strikes at a core premise of revolutionary politics, whether 
Jacobin or Dantonist: the very “concept of History. Her specific position is… marked as a site 
that can reflect and deflect the ideology and the language of History, i.e., the very language that 
Robespierre, St. Just, and, often enough, Danton speak” (Weineck 354). This is the language of 
heroic individuals directing the course of historical events, one Büchner draws attention to as 
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language, among many places, in St. Just’s speech, where significant revolutionary dates are 
compared to punctuation: “Jedes Glied dieses in der Wirklichkeit angewandten Satzes hat seine 
Menschen getötet. Der 14. Juli, der 10. August, der 31. Mai sind seine Interpunktionszeichen,” 
and continuing the metaphor, he insists, “Wir werden unserm Satze noch einige Schlüsse 
hinzuzufügen haben, sollen einige Hundert Leiche uns verhindern sie zu machen?” (WB 41) This 
is the Revolution conceived as a sentence that must be completed, regardless of the body count. 
But Marion’s monologue proceeds from the axiom that this kind of closure is impossible, as is 
any sort of “progress,” even change itself, because life is one continuous substrate of desire (“Ein 
ununterbrochenes Sehnen und Fassen, eine Glut, ein Strom”). 
We can see why Marion’s perspective is irreconcilable with Hegel, whose view of history 
relies on the progressive integration and Aufhebung of the past, and the Jacobins, who are 
obsessed with imposing a higher order of virtue on a recalcitrant political world. Both swear by 
the kind of “Veränderung” Marion simply denies. More complicated is the relationship between 
Marion’s view of the world and Danton’s. Danton often refers to himself as “epikuräisch”—
epicurean, or more straightforwardly in this context, pleasure-seeking. Chief among those 
pleasures, for Büchner’s Danton, is sex, a constant fixation for him, even at the direst 
moments—shortly before the execution, he compares his imminent guillotining to slipping out of 
a lover’s bed: “Ich will mich aus dem Leben nicht wie aus dem Betstuhl, sondern wie aus dem 
Bett einer barmherzigen Schwester wegschleichen. Es ist eine Hure, es treibt mit der ganzen 
Welt Unzucht” (WB 61). Danton’s notorious promiscuity precedes and incriminates him in 
street-scene debates over the validity of his punishment, in which his defenders desert him over 
accusations that “[er] schläft bei euren Weibern und Töchtern, wenn er betrunken ist” (WB 57). 
At first glance, this would seem to align Danton with Marion: an “ununterbrochenes Sehnen und 
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Fassen” appears to be an important part of how each approaches and experiences the world. But 
this is a partial affinity at best. While Marion and Danton share a preoccupation with sex and 
sexuality, they have incommensurable conceptions of history and their own individual positions 
in that history. For Marion, “History” as such does not exist, only an ongoing, unalterable flux of 
desire and release—there are no phases, no progress, neither development nor regression, etc. 
Not so for Danton, who remains committed, at least nominally, to the ideals of the Revolution 
(and thus the idea of political progress), as well as safeguarding his own legacy as a 
revolutionary hero. When asked by the revolutionary tribunal to state his name (III: 4), he 
answers, “Die Revolution nennt meinen Namen. Meine Wohnung ist bald im Nichts und mein 
Namen im Pantheon der Geschichte” (WB 47). Danton’s avowal that his name will be in the 
“pantheon of history” obviously implies that such a pantheon exists—that is, that there is a kind 
of posterity or final truth to history, that the real heroes will one day be revealed. This is much 
the same idealist historicism that animates the Jacobins—they only disagree about who the 
heroes are. 
With Danton, we have a kind of balancing act: he wants simultaneously to indulge his 
“epicurean” appetites and secure his place in revolutionary history.19 In a word, his agenda is 
both physical and ideal: his conceit is to follow both revolutionary principles like freedom and 
equality as well as his own sensuous desires, a concatenation the Jacobins (successfully) 
condemn as Laster. In his early conversation with Robespierre in act I, Danton defensively 
claims that everyone is epicurean to different degrees: “Es gibt nur Epikureer und zwar grobe 
und feine” (WB 24), but it is possible there is another element at work here. I mean that Danton’s 
attempts to operate under simultaneously physical (sexual) and ideal (revolutionary) maxims 
																																																						
19 Weineck, “Sex and History,” 357: “Danton, in spite of his mental and physical escapades, insists on his place in 
history again and again. He clamors for a part in Robespierre’s “erhabenes Drama.””  
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suggest a kind of perverted aesthetic education. Recall the centrality of reciprocity in Schillerian 
aesthetics: the play-drive is necessary to instate formal reconciliation between ideality and 
sensuousness. In a state of Spiel, no single drive can predominate, but rather, much like with 
Büchner’s Danton, physicality and ideality operate together, effectively dividing their respective 
zones of influence. Or this at least is Danton’s pretense.  
There are two ways we can think of Danton as an echo of Schiller’s politics of beauty: 
first, in a more clearly polemical, satiric sense, Büchner can be inviting us to view Danton’s 
awkward balancing act as a concrete and accurate expression of Schillerian Spiel—the idea can 
be that this is one possible result of using aesthetic education as a frame for life and political 
action; alternatively, the play may invite a reading of Danton, not so much as an aesthetically 
well-educated Schillerian, but as a figure engaged with the same problematic Schiller addresses 
in the Ästhetische Erziehung. I mean that Büchner may effectively place Danton on the same 
theoretical terrain as Schiller, in the sense that Danton’s basic issue is how to reconcile his 
competing tendencies—some “epicurean” and related to physical desire; others ideal-political—
into an integrated form of living in the world. There is still a critical edge to viewing Danton in 
this way: even if he is aesthetically uneducated, his drive to “have it both ways” still resonates 
with the guiding premise of Schiller’s Spiel; he can still strive for a form of ideality, even if he 
misunderstands the nature of it.  
This striving, this pursuit of an ideal, is what connects Danton formally with Robespierre.  
Crucial to remember is that both are consumed by the Revolution they claim to represent. There 
is a larger power at work that obliterates ideological formations like the politics of beauty and 
sublimity, that is neither assimilable to their models of history, nor susceptible of being directed 
in any way the Dantonists and Jacobins imagine. Put another way, Dantons Tod is play about the 
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self-delusion of aesthetic-political idealism: the problem for Danton and Robespierre is not that 
they cannot find the solution to their political situation, but that this situation, in its full historical 
and material reality, is essentially outside their comprehension and control. 
 
 
* * * 
 
This brings us to the question I posed at the beginning: does Dantons Tod itself have a politics, a 
“Stellungnahme” (Campe)? The short version of my answer is yes, and if we want to find its 
politics, we must look to the play’s aesthetics. This, after all, is Büchner’s critical approach to 
idealism: he draws political implications from its aesthetic principles. Whether the reciprocal 
functioning of drives (Danton) or ideality’s triumph over material (Robespierre, St. Just), 
Büchner connects mechanism of idealist aesthetics—beauty’s Spiel; sublimity’s transcendence—
to disastrous or hopeless forms of political activity. The question, then, is whether Dantons Tod 
has a positive counterpart to this critique of idealism, a question I propose to frame as follows: 
do Büchner’s aesthetic decisions, especially his formal innovations as a playwright, suggest their 
own form of politics, or a specific political worldview? I want to focus on two aspects here: 
Büchner’s street scenes, and his use of montage. 
 If Dantons Tod has a politics, it must have a conception of “the people,” which I suggest 
we find in the play’s street scenes. That is, Büchner’s model of das Volk in Dantons Tod is his 
presentation of actual people on the streets of Paris. The image is not a kind one: of the play’s 
six street scenes, two especially (I: 2 and III: 10) depict Parisian citizens as starving, hysterical, 
frenzied, and easily susceptible of manipulation. Significantly, as Port observes, the first of these 
scenes (I: 2) involves a marked contradiction between the language of Simon, the theater 
souffleur who introduces the scene, and the conditions around him: 
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Die in seinen Tiraden herbeizitierten und durcheinander geworfenen Heroes und Heroinen des 
Römerdramas (Virginius, Lucrecia/Virginia, Porcia), Leitbilder einer Tod bzw. Freitod endenden 
familiären Opferökonomie, stehen in offensichtlichem Widerspruch zu den höchst profanen 
Subsistenzproblemen der Pariser Straße im Jahre sechs der Revolution. (“Pathosformeln,” 211) 
 
Surrounded by actually starving Parisians, Simon holds forth on the heroic figures of Roman 
drama. It is a gesture we see replicated throughout the play, by the Dantonists and Jacobins alike, 
who are constantly drawing analogies between themselves and their political idols from 
antiquity. For Port, there is a parodic element at work here, directed not just as the conceit of a 
lost age of great figures, but also at recent German tragedy’s susceptibility to it (e.g. Schiller and 
ancient Greece).20 But this flight to antiquity is related to a politics of the present: as Port notes, 
the language of political heroism stands in glaring contradiction to the real circumstances of the 
people these modern-day “heroes” claim to represent. To confront the economic situation of 
Paris would require doing exactly what the Jacobins refuse, and the Dantonists appear powerless, 
to do: disengage the Revolution and start constructing durable institutions of government. 
Instead, the revolutionaries address the people figurally or conceptually, at a remove from their 
real lived conditions. Campe argues Büchner’s street-scenes show the people in a specific role: 
to be spoken for, not engaged as a concrete entity.21 The one choice excludes the other, a reality 
on vivid (if convoluted) display in the exchange between Robespierre and several citizens that 
concludes the play’s first street scene. At first, the Jacobin concept of popular sovereignty 
appears to be caught in a bind: 
 ALLE. Totgeschlagen! totgeschlagen! 
 ROBESPIERRE. Im Namen des Gesetzes! 
 ERSTER BÜRGER. Was ist das Gesetz? 
 ROBESPIERRE. Der Wille des Volks. 
																																																						
20 Port: “Simons Pathos… erweist sich als doppelt addressierte Parodie, die nicht nur der heroischen Semantik 
antiker Sujets, sonder ebenso der Artifizialität klassischer deutscher (sprich Weimaraner) Tragödien gilt.” 
“Pathosformeln,” 211. 
21 “Ohne eine sie sozial zusammenfassende Identität auszubilden, ist das Volk in Büchners Volksszenen sprachlich 
und politisch Bezugspunkt und Gradmesser der Versuche, in seinem Namen zu sprechen.” “Dantons Tod,” 34-35. 
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ERSTER BÜRGER. Wir sind das Volk und wir wollen, das kein Gesetz sei; ergo ist dieser Wille 
das Gesetz, ergo im Namen des Gesetzes gibts kein Gesetz mehr, ergo totgeschlagen! (WB 14) 
    
The Jacobins’ pretense is to govern solely based on the will of the people, which prompts this 
Parisian to state his will directly to Robespierre—if it is true that revolutionary law emanates 
from the popular will, his statement should have legal force. But Robespierre counters with an 
important specification: “Volk deine Streiche dürfen deinen eignen Leib nicht verwunden, du 
mordest dich selbst in deinem Grimm… Deine Gesetzgeber wachen, sie werden deine Hände 
führen, ihre Augen sind untrügbar, deine Hände sind unentrinnbar. Kommt mit zu den 
Jakobinern” (WB 14). Effectively, Robespierre’s argument is that the (empirical) people do not 
fully understand their own situation, and therefore—though law is technically defined as the 
“Wille des Volks”—there are nonetheless revolutionary “Gesetzgeber” who guide (“führen”) the 
people, preventing their self-injury (“den eignen Leib verwunden”). This kind of paternalism is 
perfectly consistent with the chain of equivalences we saw in chapter one that make up Jacobin 
ideology: sovereignty emanates from the will of the people, but the revolutionary government 
represents this will (i.e. the “Wille des Volks” is not something actually articulated by the 
people), and the Committee of Public Safety effectively is the government. Ultimately, the 
people’s “Gesetzgeber” determine their will. 
 This conception of popular sovereignty follows the formula of idealism: the “material” 
people are subordinated to a representative construct of the popular will, which should soften the 
contradiction of Büchner’s street scenes—for the Jacobins, actual people are not the ones who 
count. But it is hard to argue there is any softening for the viewer, who instead is confronted with 
the mismatch between revolutionary rhetoric and practice. This is an indirect argument for a 
definition of the political community along the lines of Der Hessische Landbote, i.e. as a 
concrete multiplicity. Büchner makes it a point to show everyday citizens of revolutionary 
 
201		
France in their full abjection and desperation, which decision itself contributes to the ostensible 
“ambivalence” of the play: it is impossible to ascribe a straightforwardly heroic role to Danton or 
his followers, in large part because they indulge in various luxuries while most of Paris starves. 
The Jacobins in Büchner’s play are deranged, but the Dantonists are hardly unambiguously 
“good.” But this, again, is part of the drama’s critique of aesthetic-political idealism: whether in 
a beautiful or sublime mode, it still ignores the real lived conditions of the people it claims to 
represent. 
 This critique finds powerful articulation in act II, in Danton and Camille’s exchange 
about the discrepancy between creative artifice and reality. Camille’s famous exclamation “ach, 
die Kunst!” marks off a trenchant indictment of art understood as “ein Ideal,” in which actual 
experience is ostensibly elevated through stilted linguistic forms and stiff, lifeless movements. 
His language is reminiscent of Büchner’s critique of idealist aesthetics in his family 
correspondence as well as in “Lenz”: “Schnitzt Einer eine Marionette, wo man den Strick 
hereinhängen sieht, an dem sie gezerrt wird und deren Gelenke bei jedem Schritt in fünffüßigen 
Jamben krachen, welch ein Charakter, welche Konsequenz!” (WB 33) This is how Camille sees 
theater, and—not incidentally in a play with such frequent street scenes—he exhorts people to 
abandon playhouses in favor of the street: 
Setzt die Leute aus dem Theater auf die Gasse: ach, die erbärmliche Wirklichkeit! Sie vergessen 
ihren Herrgott über seinen schlechten Kopisten. Von der Schöpfung, die glühend, brausend und 
leuchtend, um und in ihnen, sich jeden Augenblick neu gebiert, hören und sehen Sie nichts. Sie 
gehen in’s Theater, lesen Gedichte und Romane, schneiden den Fratzen darin die Gesichter nach 
und sagen zu Gottes Geschöpfen: wie gewöhnlich! […] 
DANTON. Und die Künstler gehn mit der Natur um wie David, der im September die 
Gemordeten, wie sie aus der Force auf die Gasse geworfen wurden, kaltblütig zeichnete und 
sagte: ich erhasche die letzten Zuckungen des Lebens in diesen Bösewichtern. (WB 33-34) 
 
Turning to the street, for Camille, returns us to the creation (“Schöpfung”) of which art is just a 
poor copy, the work of a “schlechten Kopisten.” Consuming aesthetic products—he mentions 
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theater, poetry and novels—Camille sees as a way of disengaging from a far more vibrant and 
complex given world, “die glühend, brausend und leuchtend… sich jeden Augenblick neu 
gebiert.” Danton extends the argument to visual art with the example of Jacques-Louis David, 
party artist of the Jacobins, whose iconic Death of Marat galvanized support for the extreme 
wing of the Revolution and is still universally recognizable. It is worth considering in detail the 
picture Danton creates: victims of a massacre thrown into the street to die, and David, coldly 
observing and sketching them, capturing their last twitches of life (“ich erhasche die letzten 
Zuckungen des Lebens”), to produce his famous revolutionary images.  
We can make a direct political analogy: just as, in this exchange between Camille and 
Danton, aesthetic images are a way of not only bypassing the manifest reality of Schöpfung, but 
also becoming desensitized to it (David feels no compassion for the dying people he sketches), 
so too is the political ideal of the Volk a way for the revolutionaries to (1) avoid confronting the 
empirical people of Paris and (2) indiscriminately guillotine any member of the people suspected 
of political opposition, with no sense of humane restraint or mercy. We could think of this as a 
specifically idealist form of populism—“idealist” in the sense that it subordinates real people to 
an idea of “the people”—that is simultaneously aesthetic and political. That is, the specific 
aesthetic and political processes of representation at work here involve the same distancing from 
reality. Büchner’s alternative in Dantons Tod is to represent the people in their lived condition, 
i.e. as a concrete multiplicity. 
 While Büchner’s street scenes accomplish this specific representational task, his use of 
montage draws out the wider political resonance of the French Revolution. I follow Campe in 
referring to “montage” as the way Büchner arranges empirical (citational) material and invented 
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content, with some priority paid to both.22 As we’ve already seen, Büchner combines rigorous 
historical research, via Thiers and other sources available to him, with certain wholesale 
creations like Marion and St. Just’s speech to the Convention. I suggested above that, though not 
empirically grounded, these inventions nonetheless fill out the discursive universe at work in the 
events the play depicts. After all, to name one example, the affinity between Jacobin politics and 
Hegelian historicism would not be explicable until after Hegel, and Büchner dramatizes 
Robespierre and St. Just from this larger perspective. Similarly, with Marion’s eroticism, 
Büchner may perceive its germaneness to the story of Dantons Tod without finding that 
connection expressed to his satisfaction in the empirical sources. That is, a discourse like 
Marion’s eroticism may be latent in the Terror, and Büchner invites his viewers to consider the 
relationship—in this case, between the conceits of heroic political idealism and the competing 
image of an infinite, faceless “Sehnen und Fassen.” These juxtapositions are often direct, perhaps 
most conspicuously, as Weineck has noted (“Sex and History,” 358), in the case of St. Just’s 
speech, which aligns neatly with Robespierre’s address to the Jacobin club: both are long, 
involved expositions of Jacobin political ideology that attempt to frame the events of the play. 
Robespierre’s speech, following immediately on the play’s first street scene, anchors act one, 
while St. Just’s concludes act two. The first half of the drama is dominated by Jacobin rhetoric. 
The difference, of course, is that Robespierre’s speech is comprised almost entirely of 
transcriptions from the empirical Robespierre’s oratory, while Büchner creates St. Just’s entirely. 
The effect, I suggest, is to position the two speeches on the same continuum, to draw a parallel: 
																																																						
22 “Montage ist in diesem rein technischen Sinn sogar notwendige Ergänzung zum Zitat: Sie schneideit das zu 
Zitierende im Ausgangstext aus, übersetzt es und setzt es in die andere Gattung, das andere Medium, um und klebt 
es schließlich im Zieltext mit anderen Stücken zusammen… In jedem Fall ist die (quellenkundliche) Montage in 
Dantons Tod, Schneide- und Klebetechnik im Dienst des performativen Zitats, das Geschichte auf die Bühne und 
zum Sprechen bringt… Im Stück wird das noch einmal dadurch deutlich, dass die historischen Worte auch 




if St. Just’s imagery, written by Büchner—of the revolutionaries’ heroic destiny; of an 
equivalence between natural disasters and morally necessary violence; of the Revolution as a 
linguistic sequence; of a Weltgeist—seems consistent with Robespierre’s, that is because it is 
consistent: Büchner is inviting a connection between the specific rhetorical dressing of the Terror 
and the idealist philosophy of history still to come. 
 In this way, Büchner’s combination of empirical and invented content serves a specific, 
historically based form of political critique. But there is also an affirmative dimension to this 
strategy. Consider Dantons Tod in relation to Schiller’s history plays: while Schiller also 
consciously fuses documented history with his own fictions, he always does so, as we say in 
chapter two, under the rubric of Spiel. That is, Schiller treats empirical and invented content as 
potentially divergent categories on which Wechselwirkung has to be imposed, and this 
prerogative guides his dramaturgical decisions. Analytically speaking, the ends of aesthetic 
education and Spiel precede the actual construction of a Schillerian history play. But as Barbara 
Nagel has recently argued, there is no real “master” discourse in Dantons Tod, as aesthetic 
education is for Schiller.23 This is another aspect of the play’s apparent ambivalence: it does not 
propose its own answer to the problematics it draws out. Nagel’s starts by rejecting the familiar 
categorization of Büchner as a “materialist”: “neither idealism nor materialism are safe from 
Büchner” (“Spirit,” 2)—instead, Dantons Tod creates a space in which no theoretical or 
ideological system predominates entirely. The discursive profusion is the point: just as the play 
presents a trenchant critique of idealism, it also preempts the hegemony of its counterpart, 
materialism, which in elevating substance or physicality to a privileged position, becomes its 
																																																						
23 See Barbara Natalie Nagel, “The Spirit of Matter in Büchner,” CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 
(2011). <https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.1802>. Subsequent citations of Nagel correspond to page numbers on 




own form of idealism. Nagel traces a transition in Büchner’s thought from a “metaphysical” 
materialism, in which “materiality already gets entangled in its own conceptual ideality” once it 
has been posited as absolute, to a literary-linguistic stage, aimed directly at this kind of absolutist 
materialism (“Spirit,” 9). At that final stage (when he writes Dantons Tod), “every conceptual 
ideality in Büchner remains bound to a linguistic materiality of the dead letter” (Nagel 9; my 
emphasis). That is, any given conceptual system—any discourse—is grounded in the play to the 
extent that it is linguistically expressed: it is concrete in being articulated, but none of these 
articulations can become absolute. Radicalism, epicureanism, populism, idealism, eroticism, 
Spinozism—all discourses Büchner writes into the play via direct speech situations, monologues, 
conversations, orations. These linguistic expressions alone are the substance of their respective 
“idealities,” their discourses.  
 The concreteness of language is also on display in the practice of revolutionary violence 
itself, which Port describes as the “mimetische Übersetzung” (“Pathosformeln,” 216) of 
revolutionary idioms. In a sense less abstract than the Revolution qua “Satz” of St. Just’s speech, 
certain linguistic decisions—statements in the street or in a private conversation—are tied to a 
specific political fate. Part of the exceptional politics of the Terror is what Nagel calls “death by 
a slip of the tongue”: any offhand remark can carry unexpected political consequences, which 
she likens to a process in which speech is no longer one form of symbolic activity employed by 
an acting subject, but is itself the act and itself constitutes the subject (“Spirit,” 8). The clearest 
example in Dantons Tod is its final moment: Lucille’s declaration “Es lebe der König!” has her 
immediately detained by the revolutionary guard, for whom she is inconsequential until making 
this statement (WB 68). Her speech is a criminal act that also subjectivizes her as a counter-
revolutionary, and in such a way that is part of an immediate sequence of actions—it is a 
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concrete provocation with the direct consequence of her detainment (and likely later execution). 
In moments like this, Nagel sees language “on the verge of turning into matter” (“Spirit,” 8). 
That is, language “materializes” directly in a series of tangible effects.  
 This kind of linguistic materiality complements the aforementioned function of language 
in the play, i.e. to install various discourses, some empirical, some fictive, all organized 
episodically. The overall effect is that of variously intersecting themes, none of which 
predominates. The discursive world of the play is multitudinous, much like Büchner imagines 
the composition of a political community. If Dantons Tod has a politics, the concept of 
multiplicity is crucial—not just in describing the world of political subjects, but also the 
circulation of political ideas. Büchner’s play shows us a program of uniformity (Jacobinism) 
colliding with a field of representations and ideas, the sheer variegation of which is amplified 
through the play’s use of montage. In this sense, Dantons Tod comes close to the politics of 
Lefort and Rancière, whose conceptions of democracy emphasize the role of disagreement, 
profusion, debate—multiplicity at all levels. 
 The resonance with Lefort is worth exploring in more detail. Lefort’s famous formula is 
that, in a democracy, “the place of power is empty”—there is no source of authority that could 
function as an absolute, no final arbiter, no permanent, unaccountable power. This is one 
corollary; the second is that society is essentially and always non-integrated: there is no neatly 
unified Volk, just as there is no wholly apposite representation of it. This is another way of 
saying that direct democracy is impossible: only representative institutions that acknowledge and 




 In several respects, Dantons Tod seems to dramatize exactly this gap. What are the 
Jacobins trying to do but unify society, to directly embody the people? And what does the play as 
a whole depict but the irrepressible circulation of competing discourses, a multiplicity that resists 
any attempt to integrate it into a single “revolutionary” rubric? Dantons Tod is the vehicle for 
this multiplicity, it shows politics coming to terms with the gap at the center of every modern 
democracy. The fact that we witness this process through the aesthetic representation of the play 
gives Camille and Danton’s exchange on art added significance: the insurmountable distance 
between power and society is depicted via a literary medium that is itself subject to a structurally 
equivalent distance from its own object of representation. In this way, the play involves a 
doubling of representative distance, exactly because it is a dramatic—and not, for instance, 
historiographic—representation of the Terror. 
 The idea that this gap needs to be preserved also helps us understand the politics of Der 
Hessische Landbote. As we saw, Büchner’s pamphlet explicitly advocates representative 
democracy, which may seem counterintuitive, given the revolutionary political program Büchner 
tried to galvanize into existence, as well as the inherited image of Büchner as a bona fide 
political radical. I am not saying Büchner was not radical (quite the opposite) but rather that it 
may seem difficult to reconcile the idea of political radicalism with the idea of representative 
institutions. Something about these institutions just feels inherently moderate, probably due in 
part to the influence of political thinkers like Žižek and Badiou, who, like their Jacobin heroes, 
imagine a more authentic form of politics that cuts through the representative machinery of the 
state and arrives directly at the will of the people. Already in 1834, Büchner saw this was a trap. 
Dantons Tod is above all a play about the futility of trying to close the representative gap, 
whether political or aesthetic, and Der Hessische Landbote, anticipating Lefort, gives us the best 
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alternative: government by democratically chosen representatives, figures who are selected by 
the people, rather than claiming to incarnate some truer essence of them. Like Dantons Tod, this 
world involves the proliferation and ongoing circulation of discourses—it is a universe of real 













In Schiller, Fichte and Büchner we have three judgments of the French Revolution based on 
three concepts of representation. Each concept is simultaneously political, aesthetic, 
historiographic and theatrical, which means it addresses a complex set of questions: Should 
democracy be direct or representative? Does a democratic state transmit or incarnate the will of 
the people? What is the political function of art, and how closely should artworks observe a 
mimetic principle of representation? Is moral and political progress developmental, or should 
politics seek to bring about a radical break from the past? And what role does the institution of 
theater have in a democracy? Is it desirable to conceive of politics itself in theatrical terms, as a 
spectacle, a drama that unfolds before our eyes or in which we play a role? 
 The concept of representation in Schiller, Fichte and Büchner derives its uniqueness, in 
each case, from how it responds to these questions collectively. The three configurations that 
result are hardly assimilable into familiar intellectual-historical categorizations of these writers, 
e.g. idealism, materialism, aestheticism, subjectivism, etc. For instance, rather than classifying 
Schiller as an “aesthetic idealist,” I approach him as a thinker who favors representational 
distance along all four axes of politics, aesthetics, historiography and theater. This means 
Schiller advocates expressing the popular will through representative institutions rather than 
seeking to enact it directly, but with the important addition that all members of society are 
subject to aesthetic education. Political life is suffused with artworks that help bring citizens’ 
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internal drives into a higher unity, thus preparing them for full democratic freedoms. Integral to 
this vision is a robust public knowledge of history, so that contemporary political subjects can 
situate themselves in the larger arc of human development. The chief venue for disseminating 
this historical awareness is theater: history plays provide a vehicle for representing critical 
junctures of the political past while also incorporating the conceptual parameters of aesthetic 
education in their composition. This is the political, aesthetic, historiographic and theatrical 
program Schiller opposes to the French Revolution in the Ästhetische Erziehung and his late 
history plays. 
 Unlike Schiller, Fichte supports the Revolution, and in developing his position, reverses 
Schiller along every axis of representation. Fichte’s Beitrag is an ardent call for direct 
democracy: once the potential of the French Revolution is realized, the moral purity of the 
people will make representative institutions unnecessary. But this transcendence is only possible 
if we remove all forms of pleasure and edification that bind us to the present. Moored as they are 
in the sensuous dimension of human experience, aesthetic representations are precisely this kind 
of bondage. True to the concept of the sublime, Fichte’s politics conceives of all sense-pleasure 
as anathema to moral elevation: it is only through traumatic collision with something impossibly 
vast and limitlessly terrifying (the Revolution) that we realize our subjective foundation in moral 
independence from the external world. In this sublime-political paradigm, the world of history is 
useful only as something that brings us to the threshold moment of moral transcendence, at 
which point we renounce the political past in toto. Fichte’s vision is anti-theatrical for the same 
reason it opposes any practice of artistic representation—theater is another form of sense-
pleasure that delays moral awakening—as well as in the sense that it rejects any non-moral 
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signification or metaphor for the social world. Conceiving of society dramatically can only mean 
weakening its determination as something moral. 
 Schiller and Fichte seem to invert one another, with a crucial exception: both insist the 
world as it is (including political history) needs to be elevated, transfigured, signified and 
conceptualized in some way. The same goes for the French Revolution itself, which Schiller and 
Fichte do not approach so much as an event as a symbol. But Büchner is interested in the event 
itself, and especially its consequences for subsequent European politics. For Büchner, history is 
not something to be overcome or idealized, but rather explored as closely as possible in its 
complexity and internal tension. In the case of the French Revolution, part of that complexity 
involves the way revolutionary actors constantly sought to rhetorically frame and orchestrate the 
Revolution as, alternatively, a spectacle and a sublime event. Thus his innovate practice of 
citation, putting literal (spoken) history on the German stage for the first time in Dantons Tod, 
which quotes extensively from revolutionary oratory. This drama, a watershed in theatrical and 
historiographic representation alike, is preceded directly by Der hessische Landbote, a document 
that is simultaneously an appeal to revolutionary action and a call for representative democracy. 
Politically, revolution is a means to representation: Büchner advocates upheaval for the sake of 
creating genuinely representative institutions of government.     
Like Schiller, Büchner comes down in favor of representation on all four axes. 
Nonetheless, the overall aesthetic politics at work in Schiller and Büchner are vastly different, 
despite each figure’s basic pro-representative stand. This involves the specific configuration of 
their respective concepts of representation, which is not simply a matter of whether one is “for” 
or “against” representation in politics, aesthetic, historiography and theater, but what 
representation more tangibly entails in each case. In this respect, the concept of distance 
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becomes crucial. Along the political axis of representation, for instance, if we accept that 
democracy should be representative rather than direct, the next question is: how close should 
representatives be to the people? Is it important for elected officials to be proximate and 
immediately responsive to their constituents, or is a more remote body of legislators better for 
the smooth functioning of government? Either would satisfy the basic criterion of 
“representative” democracy. The concept of distance helps us make more precise distinctions 
within these larger categories. With respect to Schiller and Büchner, for example, while both 
advocate representative democracy, Schiller has a far more contemptuous view of the everyday 
citizenry than Büchner. Because the public needs to be aesthetically educated before it is ready 
for substantive freedoms, Schiller is prepared to accept a strong (though still democratically 
accountable) body of rulers to guide the state in the meantime. But Büchner sees no need to 
improve the people. Der hessische Landbote appeals to impoverished farmers and laborers as 
they are to consolidate a revolutionary movement. And in the democracy Büchner envisions, 
representatives serve the immediate needs of their constituencies, governing in “Christian 
fraternity” (“Christlich über Brüder zu regieren”). However, since for Büchner the people is an 
active force, he does not dictate what form their self-representation should take. The same 
applies to Dantons Tod, which does not prescribe or condemn any specific representative 
mechanism. 
 The criterion of distance also helps distinguish Schiller and Büchner along other 
representative axes. Though both create theatrical representations of history, Büchner chooses an 
episode only 40 years in the past, while Schiller’s histories are far more remote from his own 
time. And in terms of their respective portrayals, Büchner is much more mimetically close to his 
material, meticulously excerpting from historical record in Dantons Tod, where Schiller gives 
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himself ample freedom to intervene and thus more smoothly present political history as a drama 
of drives (and therefore comprehensible under the rubric of aesthetic education). Though 
representing history is an important element of Schiller’s larger aesthetic-political vision, the 
historical material of his plays is always submitted to a governing aesthetic concept—usually 
Spiel or the reciprocal functioning of the drives. But Büchner expressly avoids subordinating 
historical or experiential content to an idea (or ideal). Büchner’s aesthetics is one of intense 
proximity: whereas a Schillerian play about the Terror would try to express a greater truth behind 
the event, Büchner lets his viewers experience the literal, quoted oratory of Robespierre in an 
actual context of speaker and audience (the theater). When it comes to politics, aesthetics, 
historiography and theater, Schiller and Büchner are both in favor of representational distance, 
but in every instance, Schiller’s representation is remote while Büchner’s is close. 
 Fichte refuses to make the key acknowledgement that unites Schiller and Büchner: that 
some degree of representative distance is inevitable and desirable. Unlike Schiller and Büchner, 
Fichte is not a literary writer—his own work is non-artistic, does not partake in aesthetic 
representation. Likewise, the world he envisions in the Beitrag does not seem to have a place for 
artistic institutions, nor does he attribute any cognitive or social benefit to aesthetic experience. 
This kind of experience can only create distance between humanity and its moral foundation, 
where the French Revolution provides a unique opportunity for the will of the people to 
completely coincide (“völlige Übereinstimmung”) with the moral law. For Fichte, morality is not 
filtered or communicated through an external concept (like Schillerian Spiel) but incarnated by 
human beings. There is no representative gap between the subject and its moral vocation. 
Similarly, Fichte’s Beitrag calls for a form of government understand solely as the immediate 
expression of the popular will, which moreover disappears once the political community is 
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sufficiently morally integrated. Fichte also rejects the importance of historical understanding. 
The political past exists, in the world of the Beitrag, only to be negated outright: the point is to 
create a qualitative break from history, not to situate oneself in it. 
 The trope of distance thus helps us more clearly position Schiller, Fichte and Büchner on 
the aesthetic-political spectrum of the left. Schiller develops the most remote model of 
representation, with considerable distance along political, aesthetic, historiographic and theatrical 
axes. The representative gap is greatest with Schiller, and he also promotes what we would now 
call the most “moderate” political and aesthetic program. The middle figure is Büchner, an actual 
revolutionary operative whose radicalism, in the rubric I propose, is mitigated by his 
endorsement of various forms of representation: he supports representative democracy and 
creates a theatrical representation of history. But distance along every axis is closer for Büchner 
than it is for Schiller, and unlike Schiller, Büchner advocates revolutionary change for the sake 
of creating a more just society. The most radical vision is Fichte’s, premised on eliminating 
political, artistic and historiographic representation alike. This insistence coincides with a 
defense of political upheaval regardless of its human costs. Seen in this light, Schiller, Fichte and 
Büchner alike reinforce the lesson of the Jacobins: representation moderates programs of 
political change, and the more a movement attempts to overcome representative distance, the 
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